Sprache: Englisch
Verlag: Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2001
ISBN 10: 0521397332 ISBN 13: 9780521397339
Anbieter: Second Story Books, ABAA, Rockville, MD, USA
Softcover. Digital reprinting. Octavo, xviii, 540 pages. In Good minus condition. Spine is white with blue print. Cover is white with blue and black print; light edge wear, creasing, slight smudge on spine. NOTE: Shelved in Netdesk Column Z. 1410152. FP New Rockville Stock.
Sprache: Englisch
Verlag: Cambridge University Press, 1990
ISBN 10: 0521397332 ISBN 13: 9780521397339
Anbieter: Ria Christie Collections, Uxbridge, Vereinigtes Königreich
EUR 105,27
Anzahl: Mehr als 20 verfügbar
In den WarenkorbZustand: New. In.
Sprache: Englisch
Verlag: Cambridge University Press, 1990
ISBN 10: 0521397332 ISBN 13: 9780521397339
Anbieter: Kennys Bookstore, Olney, MD, USA
EUR 152,88
Anzahl: Mehr als 20 verfügbar
In den WarenkorbZustand: New. Develops a theory of value that seeks to reconcile reason with passions, and explores how this grounds our commitment to moral action. The author argues that rational moral action can neither be seen as a way of just maximizing one's own values, nor derived from reason independent of one's values. Series Editor(s): Sosa, Ernest; Dancy, Jonathan; Haldane, John; Harman, Gilbert; Jackson, Frank; Lycan, William G.; Shoemaker, Sydney; Thomson, Judith Jarvis. Series: Cambridge Studies in Philosophy. Num Pages: 560 pages, Illustrations. BIC Classification: HPS. Category: (P) Professional & Vocational. Dimension: 144 x 216 x 34. . . 1990. Illustrated. paperback. . . . . Books ship from the US and Ireland.
Sprache: Englisch
Verlag: Cambridge University Press, 1990
ISBN 10: 0521397332 ISBN 13: 9780521397339
Anbieter: AHA-BUCH GmbH, Einbeck, Deutschland
Taschenbuch. Zustand: Neu. Druck auf Anfrage Neuware - Printed after ordering - This important new book takes as its points of departure two questions: What is the nature of valuing and What morality can be justified in a society that deeply disagrees on what is truly valuable In Part One, the author develops a theory of value that attempts to reconcile reason with passions. Part Two explores how this theory of value grounds our commitment to moral action. The author argues that rational moral action can neither be seen as a way of simply maximising one's own values, nor derived from reason independent of one's values. Rather, our commitment to the moral point of view is presupposed by our value systems. The book concludes with a defense of liberal political morality.