9780521313810 - The Economics of Imperfect Information von Phlips, Louis (6 Ergebnisse)

Paperback. Zustand: Good. No Jacket. Pages can have notes/highlighting. Spine may show signs of wear. ~ ThriftBooks: Read More, Spend Less.

Broschiert. Zustand: Gut. 281 Seiten; Das hier angebotene Buch stammt aus einer teilaufgelösten Bibliothek und kann die entsprechenden Kennzeichnungen aufweisen (Rückenschild, Instituts-Stempel.); der Buchzustand ist ansonsten ordentlich und dem Alter entsprechend gut. In ENGLISCHER Sprache. Sprache: Englisch Gewicht in Gramm: 420.

Softcover. Zustand: Bon. Ancien livre de bibliothèque. Légères traces d'usure sur la couverture. Edition 2010. Ammareal reverse jusqu'à 15% du prix net de cet article à des organisations caritatives. ENGLISH DESCRIPTION Book Condition: Used, Good. Former library book. Slight signs of wear on the cover. Edition 2010. Ammareal gives back up to 15% of this item's net price to charity organizations.

Zustand: New. In.

Zustand: New. This book provides a systematic presentation of new microeconomic theories of imperfect information. Num Pages: 296 pages, 9 tables, 51 line diagrams, notes, references, index. BIC Classification: KCC. Category: (P) Professional & Vocational. Dimension: 228 x 152 x 17. Weight in Grams: 408. . 2010. paperback. . . . . Books ship from the US and Ireland.

Taschenbuch. Zustand: Neu. Druck auf Anfrage Neuware - Printed after ordering - This book provides a systematic presentation of new microeconomic theories of imperfect information. Each chapter explores a particular type of informational asymmetry and reviews major papers. Wherever possible the theories are compared with experimental evidence. An extensive bibliography is included. Part I, statics, begins with an examination of how imperfect price or quantity information on the buyer's side provides new explanations of phenomena such as price dispersion and sales or resale price maintenance. A thorough discussion of private value auctions and common value auctions follows. Subsequent chapters investigate the links between uncertainty about personal characteristics and job signaling, incomplete insurance coverage, and credit rationing by banks. Part II, dynamics, relates the dynamics of collusion, predation, and market efficiency to the transmission, pooling, and aggregation of private information. Game theoretic findings and their implications for antitrust policy are included.