Sprache: Englisch
Verlag: Cambridge University Press, 2011
ISBN 10: 0521179467 ISBN 13: 9780521179461
Anbieter: Ria Christie Collections, Uxbridge, Vereinigtes Königreich
EUR 39,63
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In den WarenkorbZustand: New. In.
Sprache: Englisch
Verlag: Cambridge University Press, 2011
ISBN 10: 0521179467 ISBN 13: 9780521179461
Anbieter: Kennys Bookstore, Olney, MD, USA
Zustand: New. This book provides an account of the underlying mathematics of mechanism design based on linear programming. Series: Econometric Society Monographs. Num Pages: 184 pages, 11 b/w illus. BIC Classification: KCA; PBUH. Category: (U) Tertiary Education (US: College). Dimension: 230 x 155 x 12. Weight in Grams: 28. . 2011. Illustrated. paperback. . . . . Books ship from the US and Ireland.
Anbieter: Revaluation Books, Exeter, Vereinigtes Königreich
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In den WarenkorbPaperback. Zustand: Brand New. 1st edition. 184 pages. 8.80x5.90x0.60 inches. In Stock.
Sprache: Englisch
Verlag: Cambridge University Press, 2011
ISBN 10: 0521179467 ISBN 13: 9780521179461
Anbieter: AHA-BUCH GmbH, Einbeck, Deutschland
Taschenbuch. Zustand: Neu. Druck auf Anfrage Neuware - Printed after ordering - Mechanism design is an analytical framework for thinking clearly and carefully about what exactly a given institution can achieve when the information necessary to make decisions is dispersed and privately held. This analysis provides an account of the underlying mathematics of mechanism design based on linear programming. Three advantages characterize the approach. The first is simplicity: arguments based on linear programming are both elementary and transparent. The second is unity: the machinery of linear programming provides a way to unify results from disparate areas of mechanism design. The third is reach: the technique offers the ability to solve problems that appear to be beyond solutions offered by traditional methods. No claim is made that the approach advocated should supplant traditional mathematical machinery. Rather, the approach represents an addition to the tools of the economic theorist who proposes to understand economic phenomena through the lens of mechanism design. Mechanism design is an analytical framework for thinking clearly and carefully about what exactly a given institution can achieve when the information necessary to make decisions is dispersed and privately held. This analysis provides an account of the underlying mathematics of mechanism design based on linear programming.