9780521138260 - fiscal governance in europe (cambridge studies in comparative politics) von hallerberg, mark (3 Ergebnisse)
Sprache: Englisch
Verlag: Cambridge University Press, 2010
Serie: Buch 65 von 161 - Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics
- Softcover
Anbieter: Ria Christie Collections, Uxbridge, Vereinigtes KönigreichRia Christie Collections
Verkäufer/-in kontaktierenVerkäufer/-in mit 5 SternenZustand: Neu
EUR 47,51
EUR 13,97 VersandVersand von Vereinigtes Königreich nach USAAnzahl: Mehr als 20 verfügbar
Zustand: New. In.
Sprache: Englisch
Verlag: Cambridge University Press, 2010
Serie: Buch 65 von 161 - Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics
- Softcover
Anbieter: Kennys Bookstore, Olney, MD, USAKennys Bookstore
Verkäufer/-in kontaktierenVerkäufer/-in mit 5 SternenZustand: Neu
EUR 83,37
EUR 9,04 VersandVersand innerhalb von USAAnzahl: Mehr als 20 verfügbar
Zustand: New. Based on data from European Union countries, this book presents a theoretical framework to discuss how governments coordinate budgeting decisions. Series: Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics. Num Pages: 246 pages, 5 b/w illus. 45 tables. BIC Classification: 1D; 1QFE; JPB; KCL. Category: (P) Professional & Voc…ational. Dimension: 230 x 147 x 15. Weight in Grams: 390. . 2010. Illustrated. paperback. . . . . Books ship from the US and Ireland.
Sprache: Englisch
Verlag: Cambridge University Press, 2010
Serie: Buch 65 von 161 - Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics
- Softcover
Anbieter: AHA-BUCH GmbH, Einbeck, DeutschlandAHA-BUCH GmbH
Verkäufer/-in kontaktierenVerkäufer/-in mit 5 SternenZustand: Neu
EUR 65,22
EUR 62,03 VersandVersand von Deutschland nach USAAnzahl: 1 verfügbar
Taschenbuch. Zustand: Neu. Druck auf Anfrage Neuware - Printed after ordering - This book presents a theoretical framework to discuss how governments coordinate budgeting decisions. There are two modes of fiscal governance conducive to greater fiscal discipline, a mode of delegation and a mode of contracts. These modes contrast…with a fiefdom form of governance, in which the decision-making process is decentralized. An important insight is that the effectiveness of a given form of fiscal governance depends crucially upon the underlying political system. Delegation functions well when there are few, or no, ideological differences among government parties, whereas contracts are effective when there are many such differences. Empirically, delegation and contract states perform better than fiefdom states if they match the underlying political system. Additional chapters consider why countries have the fiscal institutions that they do, fiscal governance in Central and Eastern Europe, and the role of such institutions in the European Union.
