Sprache: Englisch
Verlag: Cambridge University Press, 2008
ISBN 10: 0521063469 ISBN 13: 9780521063463
Anbieter: WorldofBooks, Goring-By-Sea, WS, Vereinigtes Königreich
EUR 49,87
Anzahl: 1 verfügbar
In den WarenkorbPaperback. Zustand: Very Good. The book has been read, but is in excellent condition. Pages are intact and not marred by notes or highlighting. The spine remains undamaged.
Sprache: Englisch
Verlag: Cambridge University Press, 2008
ISBN 10: 0521063469 ISBN 13: 9780521063463
Anbieter: Ria Christie Collections, Uxbridge, Vereinigtes Königreich
EUR 55,43
Anzahl: Mehr als 20 verfügbar
In den WarenkorbZustand: New. In.
Sprache: Englisch
Verlag: Cambridge University Press, 2008
ISBN 10: 0521063469 ISBN 13: 9780521063463
Anbieter: Kennys Bookstore, Olney, MD, USA
Zustand: New. This book is a major contribution to decision theory, focusing on the question of when it is rational to accept scientific theories. Series: Cambridge Studies in Probability, Induction and Decision Theory. Num Pages: 324 pages, black & white illustrations. BIC Classification: GPQ; HPK; HPL. Category: (P) Professional & Vocational; (U) Tertiary Education (US: College). Dimension: 228 x 153 x 21. Weight in Grams: 502. . 2008. 1st Edition. paperback. . . . . Books ship from the US and Ireland.
Sprache: Englisch
Verlag: Cambridge University Press, 2008
ISBN 10: 0521063469 ISBN 13: 9780521063463
Anbieter: AHA-BUCH GmbH, Einbeck, Deutschland
Taschenbuch. Zustand: Neu. Druck auf Anfrage Neuware - Printed after ordering - This book is a major contribution to decision theory, focusing on the question of when it is rational to accept scientific theories. The author examines both Bayesian decision theory and confirmation theory, refining and elaborating the views of Ramsey and Savage. He argues that the most solid foundation for confirmation theory is to be found in decision theory, and he provides a decision-theoretic derivation of principles for how many probabilities should be revised over time. Professor Maher defines a notion of accepting a hypothesis, and then shows that it is not reducible to probability and that it is needed to deal with some important questions in the philosophy of science. A Bayesian decision-theoretic account of rational acceptance is provided together with a proof of the foundations for this theory. A final chapter shows how this account can be used to cast light on such vexed issues as verisimilitude and scientific realism.