9780262633086 - being no one: the self-model theory of subjectivity (a bradford book) von metzinger, thomas (15 Ergebnisse)

Paperback. Zustand: Fine.

Zustand: Good. Former library copy. Pages intact with minimal writing/highlighting. The binding may be loose and creased. Dust jackets/supplements are not included. Includes library markings. Stock photo provided. Product includes identifying sticker. Better World Books: Buy Books. Do Good.

Zustand: Poor. This is an ex-library book and may have the usual library/used-book markings inside.This book has soft covers. In poor condition, suitable as a reading copy. Tea staining. Please note the Image in this listing is a stock photo and may not match the covers of the actual item,1200grams, ISBN:9780262633086. …

Paperback. Zustand: Very Good. The book has been read, but is in excellent condition. Pages are intact and not marred by notes or highlighting. The spine remains undamaged.

PAP. Zustand: New. New Book. Shipped from UK. Established seller since 2000.

Zustand: New. pp. 720.

Paperback. Zustand: Brand New. reprint edition. 714 pages. 9.00x7.00x1.50 inches. In Stock.

Zustand: New. In.

Zustand: New. 2004. New Ed. Paperback. A representationalist, empirically based philosophical exploration of consciousness, the subjective experience of selfhood, and the first-person perspective. Num Pages: 714 pages, 14 illus. BIC Classification: HPM. Category: (P) Professional & Vocational. Dimension: 227 x 180 x 34. Weight in Grams: 1030. . . . . . Books ship from the US and Ireland. …

Zustand: NEW.

Zustand: New. Thomas Metzinger is Professor of Philosophy and Fellow at the Gutenberg Research College at the Johannes Gutenberg-Universit&#228t, Mainz, and an Adjunct Fellow at the Frankfurt Institute for Advanced Study in Frankfurt am Main. He is the editor of Neur.

Taschenbuch. Zustand: Neu. Neuware - According to Thomas Metzinger, no such things as selves exist in the world: nobody ever had or was a self. All that exists are phenomenal selves, as they appear in conscious experience. The phenomenal self, however, is not a thing but an ongoing process; it is the content of a 'transparent self-model.' In Being No One, Metzinger, a German philosopher, draws strongly on neuroscientific research to present a representationalist and functional analysis of what a consciously experienced first-person perspective actually is. Building a bridge between the humanities and the empirical sciences of the mind, he develops new conceptual toolkits and metaphors; uses case studies of unusual states of mind such as agnosia, neglect, blindsight, and hallucinations; and offers new sets of multilevel constraints for the concept of consciousness. Metzinger's central question is: How exactly does strong, consciously experienced subjectivity emerge out of objective events in the natural world His epistemic goal is to determine whether conscious experience, in particular the experience of being someone that results from the emergence of a phenomenal self, can be analyzed on subpersonal levels of description. He also asks if and how our Cartesian intuitions that subjective experiences as such can never be reductively explained are themselves ultimately rooted in the deeper representational structure of our conscious minds.…

Taschenbuch. Zustand: Neu. Neuware -According to Thomas Metzinger, no such things as selves exist in the world: nobody ever had or was a self. All that exists are phenomenal selves, as they appear in conscious experience. The phenomenal self, however, is not a thing but an ongoing process; it is the content of a 'transparent self-model.' In Being No One, Metzinger, a German philosopher, draws strongly on neuroscientific research to present a representationalist and functional analysis of what a consciously experienced first-person perspective actually is. Building a bridge between the humanities and the empirical sciences of the mind, he develops new conceptual toolkits and metaphors; uses case studies of unusual states of mind such as agnosia, neglect, blindsight, and hallucinations; and offers new sets of multilevel constraints for the concept of consciousness. Metzinger's central question is: How exactly does strong, consciously experienced subjectivity emerge out of objective events in the natural world His epistemic goal is to determine whether conscious experience, in particular the experience of being someone that results from the emergence of a phenomenal self, can be analyzed on subpersonal levels of description. He also asks if and how our Cartesian intuitions that subjective experiences as such can never be reductively explained are themselves ultimately rooted in the deeper representational structure of our conscious minds.Easy Access System Europe Oü, 16879218, Mustamäe tee 50, 10621, Tallinn, Estonia, Tallinn Englisch.…

Taschenbuch. Zustand: Neu. Being No One | The Self-Model Theory of Subjectivity | Thomas Metzinger | Taschenbuch | Einband - flex.(Paperback) | Englisch | 2004 | The MIT Press | EAN 9780262633086 | Verantwortliche Person für die EU: Libri GmbH, Europaallee 1, 36244 Bad Hersfeld, gpsr[at]libri[dot]de | Anbieter: preigu.…

Taschenbuch. Zustand: Neu. Neuware -According to Thomas Metzinger, no such things as selves exist in the world: nobody ever had or was a self. All that exists are phenomenal selves, as they appear in conscious experience. The phenomenal self, however, is not a thing but an ongoing process; it is the content of a 'transparent self-model.' In Being No One, Metzinger, a German philosopher, draws strongly on neuroscientific research to present a representationalist and functional analysis of what a consciously experienced first-person perspective actually is. Building a bridge between the humanities and the empirical sciences of the mind, he develops new conceptual toolkits and metaphors; uses case studies of unusual states of mind such as agnosia, neglect, blindsight, and hallucinations; and offers new sets of multilevel constraints for the concept of consciousness. Metzinger's central question is: How exactly does strong, consciously experienced subjectivity emerge out of objective events in the natural world His epistemic goal is to determine whether conscious experience, in particular the experience of being someone that results from the emergence of a phenomenal self, can be analyzed on subpersonal levels of description. He also asks if and how our Cartesian intuitions that subjective experiences as such can never be reductively explained are themselves ultimately rooted in the deeper representational structure of our conscious minds. Englisch.…