Isbn: 9780262182294 - fiscal decentralization and the challenge of hard budget constraints (mit press) (2 Ergebnisse)

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gebundene Ausgabe. Zustand: Gut. 476 Seiten Der Erhaltungszustand des hier angebotenen Werks ist trotz seiner Bibliotheksnutzung sehr sauber und kann entsprechende Merkmale aufweisen (Rückenschild, Instituts-Stempel.). In ENGLISCHER Sprache. Sprache: Englisch Gewicht in Gramm: 775.

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Hardcover. Zustand: Very Good. 476 pages. A multi-country study of the conditions under which decentralized countries m ight ensure fiscal discipline. n nIn many parts of the world, lower levels of g overnment are taking over responsibilities from national authorities. This often leads to difficulty in maintaining fiscal discipline. So-called soft budget con straints allow these subnational governments to expand expenditures without faci ng the full cost. Until now, however, there has been little understanding of how decentralization leads to large fiscal deficits and macroeconomic instability. This book, based on a research project at the World Bank, develops an analytical framework for considering the issues related to soft budget constraints, includ ing the institutions, history, and policies that drive expectations for bailouts among subnational governments. It examines fiscal, financial, political, and la nd market mechanisms for subnational discipline in Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Ch ina, Germany, Hungary, India, Norway, South Africa, Ukraine, and the United Stat es. The book concludes that the dichotomy between market and hierarchical mechan isms is false. Most countries--and virtually all developing countries--must rely on market mechanisms as well as hierarchical constraints to maintain fiscal dis cipline. When bailouts cannot be avoided, they present important opportunities t o reform underlying institutions. Successful market discipline--where voluntary lenders perform important monitoring functions--is most likely to emerge from a gradual process that begins with carefully crafted rules and oversight.…