Isbn: 9780160516832 - verifying nonproliferation treaties: obligation, process, and sovereignty (2 Ergebnisse)

Zustand: As New. Like New condition. A near perfect copy that may have very minor cosmetic defects.

Trade paperback. Zustand: Good. First Edition. First Printing. xi, [1], 155, [1] pages. Wraps. Notes. Bibliography, The come has some wear and soiling. Examines two issues of national security policy: stemming the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and verifying international nonproliferation agreements. Describes the forces that shape the ways in which negotiators address the question of establishing and maintaining confidence among signatories to treaties limiting nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and reducing the size of conventional forces. Explains how the chance events of the day intertwine with substantive developments in treaty negotiations and implementation. J. Christian Kessler is an experienced national security, nonproliferation, & export control policy analyst. He has been a successful negotiator in international bilateral & multilateral fora. This book examines two of the most critical issues of national security policy: stemming the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and verifying international nonproliferation agreements. Contrary to predictions made in the 1970s, there are relatively few countries today that either possess or are pursuing nuclear weapons, although there are some pursuing chemical and biological weapons. This general success is a result of several most unusual international treaties?in the cases of chemical and biological weapons, treaties banning such weapons outright, and in the case of nuclear weapons, a treaty limiting the authorized possession of such weapons. If the integrity and effectiveness of these treaties are to be sustained, the question to be addressed is how each party maintains confidence that other parties are abiding by the obligations each has undertaken. It is the character of this verification that has been the subject of considerable debate, with certain critics arguing that real verification is unachievable. Whatever the prospect for successful verification, there is widespread agreement that modern treaties for the purpose of enhancing national security must be verifiable in some fashion; no government should take the good behavior of its adversary as an article of faith. As President Reagan said, "Trust but verify." Mr. Kessler's book speaks to the student as well as the practitioner. To the student he describes the forces that shape the ways in which negotiators address the question of establishing and maintaining confidence among signatories to treaties limiting nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and reducing the size of conventional forces. To the practitioner he explains how the chance events of the day?fate and circumstance?intertwine with substantive developments in treaty negotiations and implementation. To both audiences he speaks from 15 years of active experience in studying and negotiating how to limit the dangers of weapons of mass destruction.…