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PAP. Zustand: New. New Book. Shipped from UK. Established seller since 2000.

PAP. Zustand: New. New Book. Shipped from UK. Established seller since 2000.

HRD. Zustand: New. New Book. Shipped from UK. Established seller since 2000.

HRD. Zustand: New. New Book. Shipped from UK. Established seller since 2000.

Zustand: New.

Wraps. Zustand: Good. Updated version. Cover, [2], 14 pages. Format is approximately 8.5 inches by 11 inches. Staplebound in upper left corner. Code IB91148. Pencil erasure residue on front cover (both sides). Institutional stamp on verso of front cover. From a Stanford web-posting by Ms. Woolf: "My career in nuclear weapons and arms control began at Stanford, in classes on nuclear weapons and arms control. I continue to interact with the scholars and experts at CISAC. In addition, because I work for Congress, and truly understand how the U.S. government works, I get to step back and view the policy process with the perspective of a political scientist." "I work for the Congressional Research Service at the Library of Congress, providing expert information and analysis to Congress on issues related to U.S. and Russian nuclear weapons and arms control. I also speak to groups outside Congress, providing insights into the role that Congress plays in supporting U.S. nuclear weapons and arms control policies and in providing oversight and funding to U.S. nuclear weapons programs." This Issue Brief addressed arms control negotiations that had been on-going between the United States and Russia and former Soviet republics. Further limits on strategic offensive weapons were possible. Discussions on ballistic missile defenses, the safety and control of nuclear weapons, elimination of nuclear warheads and materials, and additional limits on nuclear testing were possible. These potential arms control initiatives raised several questions. These included questions about whether arms control in the future would consist of lengthy negotiations and detailed agreements or less formal, reciprocal actions taken by each country. Questions could also arise about the role of Congress in arms control if the United States and former Soviet republics did not sign formal agreements that required formal review and approval by Congress.

PAP. Zustand: New. New Book. Shipped from UK. Established seller since 2000.

Paperback. Zustand: Very Good. Same / next day dispatch (Monday - Friday),

PAP. Zustand: New. New Book. Shipped from UK. Established seller since 2000.

Zustand: New. This is a Brand-new US Edition. This Item may be shipped from US or any other country as we have multiple locations worldwide.

Zustand: As New.

Zustand: New. This is a Brand-new US Edition. This Item may be shipped from US or any other country as we have multiple locations worldwide.

Paperback. Zustand: Brand New. 91 pages. 8.40x5.40x0.40 inches. In Stock.

PAP. Zustand: New. New Book. Shipped from UK. Established seller since 2000.

PAP. Zustand: New. New Book. Shipped from UK. Established seller since 2000.

Zustand: New. pp. viii + 65.

Zustand: New. Num Pages: 91 pages, tables. BIC Classification: JPSF. Category: (G) General (US: Trade). Dimension: 216 x 136 x 8. Weight in Grams: 168. . 2008. Paperback. . . . . Books ship from the US and Ireland.

Paperback. Zustand: Brand New. 151 pages. 7.75x5.50x0.50 inches. In Stock.

Zustand: New. This is a Brand-new US Edition. This Item may be shipped from US or any other country as we have multiple locations worldwide.

Zustand: New. KlappentextThe Bush Administration conducted a review of U.S. nuclear weapons force posture during its first year in office. Although the review sought to adjust U.S. nuclear posture to address changes in the international security envir.

Zustand: New. Num Pages: 151 pages. BIC Classification: JPWL. Category: (P) Professional & Vocational. Dimension: 212 x 138 x 11. Weight in Grams: 242. . 2006. Paperback. . . . . Books ship from the US and Ireland.

Paperback. Zustand: Brand New. 65 pages. 8.50x5.50x0.25 inches. In Stock.

Buch. Zustand: Neu. Neuware - A Century Later, Mrs. Dalloway Still Exposes the Fragile Nature of Identity.

Kartoniert / Broschiert. Zustand: New. The Congress passed the Nunn-Lugar amendment, authorizing US threat reduction assistance to the former Soviet Union, in November 1991, after a failed coup in Moscow and the disintegration of the Soviet Union raised concerns about the safety and security of .

Kartoniert / Broschiert. Zustand: New. Non-proliferation assistance programs are a tool in combating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The Co-operative Threat Reduction (CTR) programs, funded by the Department of Defense (DOD), are the most visible of these programs. This book su.

Taschenbuch. Zustand: Neu. Neuware - Congress passed the Nunn-Lugar amendment, authorizing U.S. threat reduction assistance to the former Soviet Union, in November 1991, after a failed coup in Moscow and the disintegration of the Soviet Union raised concerns about the safety and security of Soviet nuclear weapons. The annual program has grown from $400 million in the DOD budget around $1.1 billion across three agencies -- DOD, DOE and the State Department. It has also evolved from an emergency response to impending chaos in the Soviet Union, to a more comprehensive threat reduction and nonproliferation effort, to a broader program seeking to keep nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons from leaking out of the former Soviet Union and into the hands of rogue nations or terrorist groups. The Department of Defense manages the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program, which provides Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan with assistance in transporting, storing, and dismantling nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. U.S. assistance has helped these nations eliminate the delivery systems for nuclear weapons under the START I Treaty, secure weapons storage areas, construct a storage facility for nuclear materials removed from weapons, construct a destruction facility for chemical weapons, and secure biological weapons materials. The State Department manages the International Science and Technology Centers in Moscow and Kiev. These centers provide research grants to scientists and engineers so that they will not sell their knowledge to other nations or terrorist groups. The State Department has also provided assistance with export and border control programs in the former Soviet states. The Department of Energy manages programs that seek to improve the security of nuclear materials at civilian, naval, and nuclear weapons complex facilities. It also funds programs that help nuclear scientists and engineers find employment in commercial enterprises. DOE is also helping Russia dispose of plutonium removed from nuclear weapons and shut-down its remaining plutonium-producing reactors by replacing them with fossil-fuel plants. Analysts have debated numerous issues related to U.S. nonproliferation and threat reduction assistance. These include questions about the coordination of and priority given to these programs in the U.S. government, questions about Russia's willingness to provide the United States with access to its weapons facilities, questions about the President's ability to waive certification requirements so that the programs can go forward, and questions about the need to expand the efforts into a global program that receives funding from numerous nations and possibly extends assistance to others outside the former Soviet Union.

Taschenbuch. Zustand: Neu. Neuware - Non-proliferation assistance programs are a relatively new tool in combating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The Co-operative Threat Reduction (CTR) programs, funded by the Department of Defense (DOD), are the most visible of these programs. Begun in 1991, CTR initially aimed to help Russia meet its START obligations to reduce strategic nuclear weapons; 1. Within a decade, however, CTR took on the goal of reducing the threat of terrorist access to weapons of mass destruction (WMD); 2. Experts realised that Russia needed to protect its Cold War overhang of WMD materials, scientists, and equipment from those who might exploit insider opportunities and who had incentives (particularly financial) to sell WMD technology to anyone. Now, however, many analysts support expanding co-operative threat reduction programs beyond Russia to other geographic areas. The Bush Administration itself stated in early 2003, that it had 'expanded the strategic focus of the CTR program' to support the war on terrorism. This book surveys options for applying CTR programs to states that pose a WMD and terrorism threat.

Zustand: Sehr gut. Zustand: Sehr gut | Seiten: 48 | Sprache: Englisch | Produktart: Bücher | Keine Beschreibung verfügbar.

Zustand: Good. [4], 27 pages. Figures. Tables. Footnotes. Printed on one side only. The author was a Specialist in National Defense in the Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division. The author has written: "A graduate degree in public policy was a natural path for someone with an undergraduate degree in political science. But my career in nuclear weapons and arms control began at Stanford, in the Political Science Department's undergraduate classes on nuclear weapons and arms control. I continue to interact with the scholars and experts at CISAC, which allows me to hold on to my links to the Farm. In addition, because I work for Congress, and truly understand how the U.S. government works, I get to step back and view the policy process with the perspective of a political scientist." "I work for the Congressional Research Service at the Library of Congress, providing expert information and analysis to Congress on issues related to U.S. and Russian nuclear weapons and arms control. I also speak to students and other groups outside Congress, providing insights into the role that Congress plays in supporting U.S. nuclear weapons and arms control policies and in providing oversight and funding to U.S. nuclear weapons programs." During the Cold War, the U.S. nuclear arsenal contained many types of delivery vehicles for nuclear weapons. The longer range systems, which included long-range missiles based on U.S. territory, long-range missiles based on submarines, and heavy bombers that could threaten Soviet targets from their bases in the United States, are known as strategic nuclear delivery vehicles. At the end of the Cold War, in 1991, the United States deployed more than l0,000 warheads on these delivery vehicles. That number has declined to less than 6,000 warheads today, and is slated, under the 2002 Moscow Treaty, to decline to 2,200 warheads by the year 2012. At the present time, the U.S. land-based ballistic missile force (ICBMs) consists of 450 Minuteman III ICBMs, each deployed with between one and three warheads, for a total of 1,2000 warheads. The Air Force recently deactivated all 50 of the 10-warhead Peacekeeper ICBMs; it plans to eventually deploy Peacekeeper warheads on some of the Minuteman ICBMs. It has also deactivated 50 Minuteman III missiles. The Air Force is also modernizing the Minuteman missiles, replacing and upgrading their rocket motors, guidance systems, and other components. The Air Force had expected to begin replacing the Minuteman missiles around 2018, but has decided, instead, to continue to modernize and maintain the existing missiles. The U.S. ballistic missile submarine fleet currently consists of 14 Trident submarines; each carries 24 Trident II (D-5) missiles. The Navy has converted 4 of the original 18 Trident submarines to carry non-nuclear cruise missiles. The remaining submarines currently carry around 2,000 warheads in total, a number that will likely decline as the United States implements the Moscow Treaty. The Navy has shifted the basing of the submarines, so that nine are deployed in the Pacific Ocean and five are in the Atlantic, to better cover targets in and around Asia. Disbound but held by a clip in upper left corner Updated version--Xerox type reproduction.

Zustand: Used: Like New. LIVRE A L?ETAT DE NEUF. EXPEDIE SOUS 3 JOURS OUVRES. NUMERO DE SUIVI COMMUNIQUE AVANT ENVOI, EMBALLAGE RENFORCE. EAN:9781590338766.