Verlag: Peter Lang GmbH, Internationaler Verlag der Wissenschaften, 2023
ISBN 10: 3631896182 ISBN 13: 9783631896181
Sprache: Englisch
Anbieter: PBShop.store UK, Fairford, GLOS, Vereinigtes Königreich
EUR 45,94
Anzahl: 15 verfügbar
In den WarenkorbHRD. Zustand: New. New Book. Shipped from UK. Established seller since 2000.
Verlag: Peter Lang, Peter Lang Mär 2023, 2023
ISBN 10: 3631896182 ISBN 13: 9783631896181
Sprache: Englisch
Anbieter: buchversandmimpf2000, Emtmannsberg, BAYE, Deutschland
Buch. Zustand: Neu. Neuware -The Ottoman and Habsburg Empires both faced the 'general crisis' of the 17th century. Yet they responded to the crisis very differently. The Habsburgs centralized fiscal structures, which would facilitate economic development in the 19th century. The Ottomans, which initially had more centralized tax collection, opted for decentralization, paving the way for economic peripheralization. To account for this puzzle, this book offers a political-economic theory of institutional change that focuses on the structure and intensity of elite conflict over the distribution of resources. Using the comparative-historical method, the book demonstrates that high levels of conflict generated political incentives for centralization, and where such incentives were lacking, decentralization followed.Lang, Peter GmbH, Gontardstraße 11, 10178 Berlin 236 pp. Englisch.
Anbieter: AHA-BUCH GmbH, Einbeck, Deutschland
Buch. Zustand: Neu. Druck auf Anfrage Neuware - Printed after ordering - The Ottoman and Habsburg Empires both faced the 'general crisis' of the 17th century. Yet they responded to the crisis very differently. The Habsburgs centralized fiscal structures, which would facilitate economic development in the 19th century. The Ottomans, which initially had more centralized tax collection, opted for decentralization, paving the way for economic peripheralization. To account for this puzzle, this book offers a political-economic theory of institutional change that focuses on the structure and intensity of elite conflict over the distribution of resources. Using the comparative-historical method, the book demonstrates that high levels of conflict generated political incentives for centralization, and where such incentives were lacking, decentralization followed.