sir alfred jules ayer (15 Ergebnisse)

paperback. Zustand: Very Good. 2nd.

Paperback. Zustand: Gut. 160 p. Fresh and clean copy with some markings in pencil and signs of wear on the front cover. Frisches und sauberes Exemplar mit einigen Bleistiftmarkierungen und Gebrauchsspuren auf dem Vorderdeckel. CONTENTS Introduction Preface Ch. I. The Elimination of Metaphysics p, 33' What is the purpose and method of philosophy? Rejection of the metaphysical thesis that philosophy affords us knowledge of a transcendent reality. 34: Kant also rejected metaphysics in this sense, but whereas he accused metaphysicians of ignoring the limits of the human understanding we accuse them of disobeying the rules which govern the significant use of language. 33: Adoption of verifiability as a criterion for testing the significance of putative statements of fact. 36: Distinction between conclusive and partial verification. No propositions can be conclusively verified. 38: Or conclusively confuted. 38: For a statement of fact to be genuine some possible observations must be relevant to the determination of its truth or falsehood. 39: Examples of the kinds of assertions, familiar to philosophers, which are ruled out by our criterion. 41: Metaphysical sentences defined as sentences which express neither tautologies nor empirical hypotheses. 42: Linguistic confusions the prime source of metaphysics. 44: Metaphysics and Poetry. Ch. II. The Function of Philosophy p. 46: Philosophy is not a search for first principles. 46: Barrenness of Descartes' procedure. 48: The function of philosophy is wholly critical. But this does not mean that it can give an a priori justification of our scientific or common-sense assumptions. 49: There is no genuine problem of induction, as ordinarily conceived. 31: Philosophising is an activity of analysis. 31: Most of those who are commonly thought to have been great philosophers were philosophers in our sense, rather than metaphysicians. 32: Locke, Berkeley, Hume as analysts. 53: We adopt Berkeley's phenomenalism without his theism. 34: And take a Humean view of causation. 56: Philosophy in our sense is wholly independent of metaphysics. We are not committed to any doctrine of atomism. 57; The philosopher as an analyst is not concerned with the physical properties of things, but only with the way in which we speak about them. 38: Linguistic propositions disguised in factual terminology. 39: Philosophy issues in definitions. Ch. III. The Nature of Philosophical Analysis p. 39: Philosophy provides not explicit definitions, such as are given in dictionaries, but definitions in use. Explanation of this distinction. 60: Russell's "theory of descriptions" as an example of philosophical analysis. 62: Definition of an ambiguous symbol. 63: Definition of a logical construction. 64: Material things are logical constructions out of sense-contents. 64: By defining the notion of a material thing in terms of sense-contents we solve the so-called problem of perception. 63: A solution of this problem outlined as a further example of philosophical analysis. 68: Utility of such analyses. 68: Danger of saying that philosophy is concerned with meaning. 70; The propositions of philosophy are not empirical propositions concerning the way in which people actually use words. They are concerned with the logical consequences of linguistic conventions. 71: Rejection of the view that "every language has a structure concerning which in the language nothing can be said." Ch. IV. The A Priori p. 71: As empiricists, we must deny that any general proposition concerning a matter of fact can be known certainly to be valid. 72: How then are we to deal with the propositions of formal logic and mathematics? 74: Rejection of Mill's view that these propositions are inductive generalisations. 77: They are necessarily true because they are analytic. 77: Kant's definitions of analytic and synthetic judgements. 78: Emendation of Kant's definitions. 79: Analytic propositions are tautological; they say nothing concerning any matter of fact. 80: But they give us new knowledge, inasmuch as they bring to light the implications of our linguistic usages. 81: Logic does not describe "the laws of thought." 82: Nor geometry the properties of physical space. 84: Our account of a priori truths undermines Kant's transcendental system. 83: How, if they are tautological, can there be in mathematics and logic the possibility of invention and discovery? Ch. V. Truth and Probability p. 87: What is truth? 88: Definition of a proposition. 88: The words "true" and "false" function in the sentence simply as assertion and negation signs. 90: The "problem of truth" reduced to the question, How are propositions validated? 90: The criterion of the validity of empirical propositions is not purely formal. 91: No empirical propositions are certain, not even those which refer to immediate experience. 94: Observation confirms or discredits not just a single hypothesis but a system of hypotheses. 93: The "facts of experience" can never compel us to abandon a hypothesis. 96: Danger of mistaking synthetic for analytic propositions. 97: Hypotheses as rules which govern our expectation of future experience. 100: Definition of rationality. 101: Definition of probability in terms of rationality. 101: Propositions referring to the past. Ch. VI. Critique of Ethics and Theology p. 102: How does an empiricist deal with assertions of value? 103: Distinction between various types of ethical enquiry. 104: Utilitarian and subjectivist theories of ethics consistent with empiricism. 103: But unacceptable on other grounds. 105: Distinction between normative and descriptive ethical symbols. 106: Rejection of intuitionism. 107: Assertions of value are not scientific but "emotive." 107: They are therefore neither true nor false. 108: They axe partly expressions of feeling, partly commands. 109: Distinction between expressions and assertions of feeling, no: Objection that this view makes 1 impossible to dispute about questions of value, no: Actually, we never do dispute about ques.

Paperback. Zustand: Gut. 160 p. Lediglich der Einband ist leicht berieben, sonst ein gutes und sauberes Exemplar ohne Anstreichungen / Only the cover is slightly rubbed, otherwise a good and clean copy without annotations. - CONTENTS Introduction Preface Ch. I. The Elimination of Metaphysics p, 33' What is the purpose and method of philosophy? Rejection of the metaphysical thesis that philosophy affords us knowledge of a transcendent reality. 34: Kant also rejected metaphysics in this sense, but whereas he accused metaphysicians of ignoring the limits of the human understanding we accuse them of disobeying the rules which govern the significant use of language. 33: Adoption of verifiability as a criterion for testing the significance of putative statements of fact. 36: Distinction between conclusive and partial verification. No propositions can be conclusively verified. 38: Or conclusively confuted. 38: For a statement of fact to be genuine some possible observations must be relevant to the determination of its truth or falsehood. 39: Examples of the kinds of assertions, familiar to philosophers, which are ruled out by our criterion. 41: Metaphysical sentences defined as sentences which express neither tautologies nor empirical hypotheses. 42: Linguistic confusions the prime source of metaphysics. 44: Metaphysics and Poetry. Ch. II. The Function of Philosophy p. 46: Philosophy is not a search for first principles. 46: Barrenness of Descartes' procedure. 48: The function of philosophy is wholly critical. But this does not mean that it can give an a priori justification of our scientific or common-sense assumptions. 49: There is no genuine problem of induction, as ordinarily conceived. 31: Philosophising is an activity of analysis. 31: Most of those who are commonly thought to have been great philosophers were philosophers in our sense, rather than metaphysicians. 32: Locke, Berkeley, Hume as analysts. 53: We adopt Berkeley's phenomenalism without his theism. 34: And take a Humean view of causation. 56: Philosophy in our sense is wholly independent of metaphysics. We are not committed to any doctrine of atomism. 57; The philosopher as an analyst is not concerned with the physical properties of things, but only with the way in which we speak about them. 38: Linguistic propositions disguised in factual terminology. 39: Philosophy issues in definitions. Ch. III. The Nature of Philosophical Analysis p. 39: Philosophy provides not explicit definitions, such as are given in dictionaries, but definitions in use. Explanation of this distinction. 60: Russell's "theory of descriptions" as an example of philosophical analysis. 62: Definition of an ambiguous symbol. 63: Definition of a logical construction. 64: Material things are logical constructions out of sense-contents. 64: By defining the notion of a material thing in terms of sense-contents we solve the so-called problem of perception. 63: A solution of this problem outlined as a further example of philosophical analysis. 68: Utility of such analyses. 68: Danger of saying that philosophy is concerned with meaning. 70; The propositions of philosophy are not empirical propositions concerning the way in which people actually use words. They are concerned with the logical consequences of linguistic conventions. 71: Rejection of the view that "every language has a structure concerning which in the language nothing can be said." Ch. IV. The A Priori p. 71: As empiricists, we must deny that any general proposition concerning a matter of fact can be known certainly to be valid. 72: How then are we to deal with the propositions of formal logic and mathematics? 74: Rejection of Mill's view that these propositions are inductive generalisations. 77: They are necessarily true because they are analytic. 77: Kant's definitions of analytic and synthetic judgements. 78: Emendation of Kant's definitions. 79: Analytic propositions are tautological; they say nothing concerning any matter of fact. 80: But they give us new knowledge, inasmuch as they bring to light the implications of our linguistic usages. 81: Logic does not describe "the laws of thought." 82: Nor geometry the properties of physical space. 84: Our account of a priori truths undermines Kant's transcendental system. 83: How, if they are tautological, can there be in mathematics and logic the possibility of invention and discovery? Ch. V. Truth and Probability p. 87: What is truth? 88: Definition of a proposition. 88: The words "true" and "false" function in the sentence simply as assertion and negation signs. 90: The "problem of truth" reduced to the question, How are propositions validated? 90: The criterion of the validity of empirical propositions is not purely formal. 91: No empirical propositions are certain, not even those which refer to immediate experience. 94: Observation confirms or discredits not just a single hypothesis but a system of hypotheses. 93: The "facts of experience" can never compel us to abandon a hypothesis. 96: Danger of mistaking synthetic for analytic propositions. 97: Hypotheses as rules which govern our expectation of future experience. 100: Definition of rationality. 101: Definition of probability in terms of rationality. 101: Propositions referring to the past. Ch. VI. Critique of Ethics and Theology p. 102: How does an empiricist deal with assertions of value? 103: Distinction between various types of ethical enquiry. 104: Utilitarian and subjectivist theories of ethics consistent with empiricism. 103: But unacceptable on other grounds. 105: Distinction between normative and descriptive ethical symbols. 106: Rejection of intuitionism. 107: Assertions of value are not scientific but "emotive." 107: They are therefore neither true nor false. 108: They axe partly expressions of feeling, partly commands. 109: Distinction between expressions and assertions of feeling, no: Objection that this view makes 1 impossible to dispute about questions of value, no: Actually, we never do dispute about questi.

Paperback. Zustand: Good. No Jacket. Pages can have notes/highlighting. Spine may show signs of wear. ~ ThriftBooks: Read More, Spend Less 0.4.

Paperback. Zustand: Good. No Jacket. Pages can have notes/highlighting. Spine may show signs of wear. ~ ThriftBooks: Read More, Spend Less 0.4.

Paperback. Zustand: Brand New. reprint edition. 160 pages. 8.00x5.50x0.50 inches. In Stock.

Paperback. Zustand: Brand New. reprint edition. 160 pages. 8.00x5.50x0.50 inches. In Stock.

Zustand: Very Good. Very Good condition. A copy that may have a few cosmetic defects. May also contain light spine creasing or a few markings such as an owner's name, short gifter's inscription or light stamp.

Zustand: Good. Good condition. A copy that has been read but remains intact. May contain markings such as bookplates, stamps, limited notes and highlighting, or a few light stains. Bundled media such as CDs, DVDs, floppy disks or access codes may not be included.

Paperback. Zustand: Very Good. Prompt Shipment, shipped in Boxes, Tracking PROVIDEDVery good. Few creases. *.

Paperback. Zustand: Very Good. Prompt Shipment, shipped in Boxes, Tracking PROVIDEDCover creased and rubbed else very good.

Zustand: New. In.

Zustand: Very good.

12 pages, octavo. Unbound. Folded once, down the centre, vertically. Good, though grubby, and with marks from paperclip. Each of the three contributes a section. PRESENTATION COPY, with slip from Samuel, on his notepaper '32, PORCHESTER TERRACE, W.2.' on which is typed 'WITH LORD SAMUEL'S COMPLIMENTS'.

See Richard Wollheim's appreciative entry on Ayer in the Oxford DNB. From the archives of Philip Dosse, proprietor of Hansom Books, publisher of the 'Seven Arts' group of magazines, including 'Books and Bookmen' and 'Plays and Players'. See 'Death of a Bookman' by the novelist Sally Emerson (editor of 'Books and Bookmen' at the time of Dosse's suicide), in Standpoint magazine, October 2018. The three items are each 1p, small 4to. All three in good condition, each folded twice. All three signed 'A. J. Ayer', with typed name beneath, 'Sir Alfred Ayer'. ONE (4 February 1974): He feared that 'Professor Wiggins would refuse' (to write a review), but is 'very glad to hear that you have managed to secure Dr Roger Poole, and much look forward to reading his review. Indeed, I should be grateful if you would send me a copy when it appears.' TWO (18 April 1974): The delayed reply is due to his having 'been away in Bulgaria and Yugoslavia'. Although he enjoyed the copies of Books and Bookmen which Dosse sent him, he has 'had so much other work to cope with that I have not had time to more than glance at the book'. As Dosse 'said there was no hurry', he asks whether he may let him know 'whether or not I think it worth reviewing'. Regarding the 'reasonable fee' that Dosse said he would pay, Ayer refers him to his agent. THREE (18 October 1974): He is enclosing (not present) his review of 'Mr Mackie's and Dr Hesse's books with apologies for having taken rather long over it'. As Dosse will see, Ayer 'could not avoid being a little bit technical but I think that the greater part of the review should be intelligible to your readers'. See Image on one.