sanmay das (10 Ergebnisse)

Zustand: New. In.

Zustand: New. In.

Paperback. Zustand: Brand New. 1st edition. 117 pages. 9.00x6.00x0.25 inches. In Stock.

Paperback. Zustand: Brand New. revised edition. 124 pages. 9.00x6.00x0.25 inches. In Stock.

Taschenbuch. Zustand: Neu. Druck auf Anfrage Neuware - Printed after ordering - These proceedings present the technical contributions to the First Conference on A- tions, Market Mechanisms, and Their Applications (AMMA), held May 8-9, 2009 in Boston, Massachusetts, USA. The conference was devoted to issues that arise in all stages of deploying a market mechanism to solve a problem, including theoretical and empirical examinations. In addition to more traditional academic papers, the conf- ence placed emphasis on experiences from the real world, including case studies and new applications. The main goal of AMMA was to explore the synergy required for good mechanism design. This includes an understanding of the economic and game-theoretic issues, the ability to design protocols and algorithms for realizing desired outcomes, and the knowledge of specific institutional details that are important in practical applications. We were lucky enough to attract papers and talks from economists and computer scientists, theorists and empiricists, academics and practitioners. The program, as reflected in these proceedings, ranged from fundamental theory on auctions and m- kets to empirical design and analysis of matching mechanisms, peer-to-peer-systems, and prediction markets.

Taschenbuch. Zustand: Neu. Druck auf Anfrage Neuware - Printed after ordering - This book constitutes the thoroughly refereed post-conference proceedings of the Second International ICST on Auctions, Market Mechanisms and Their Applications (AMMA 2011) held in New York, USA, August 22-23, 2011. The 22 revised full papers presented were carefully selected from numerous submissions covering topics such as school choice, markets for housing, energy, and advertising, prediction markets, and the theory of market design.

Taschenbuch. Zustand: Neu. Auctions, Market Mechanisms and Their Applications | First International ICST Conference, AMMA 2009, Boston, MA, USA, May 8-9, 2009, Revised Selected Papers | Sanmay Das (u. a.) | Taschenbuch | x | Englisch | 2009 | Springer | EAN 9783642038204 | Verantwortliche Person für die EU: Springer Verlag GmbH, Tiergartenstr. 17, 69121 Heidelberg, juergen[dot]hartmann[at]springer[dot]com | Anbieter: preigu.

Taschenbuch. Zustand: Neu. Auctions, Market Mechanisms and Their Applications | Second International ICST Conference, AMMA 2011, New York, USA, August 22-23, 2011, Revised Selected Papers | Peter Coles (u. a.) | Taschenbuch | xii | Englisch | 2012 | Springer | EAN 9783642309120 | Verantwortliche Person für die EU: Springer Verlag GmbH, Tiergartenstr. 17, 69121 Heidelberg, juergen[dot]hartmann[at]springer[dot]com | Anbieter: preigu.

Zustand: Sehr gut. Zustand: Sehr gut | Sprache: Englisch | Produktart: Bücher | This book constitutes the thoroughly refereed post-conference proceedings of the Second International ICST on Auctions, Market Mechanisms and Their Applications (AMMA 2011) held in New York, USA, August 22-23, 2011. The 22 revised full papers presented were carefully selected from numerous submissions covering topics such as school choice, markets for housing, energy, and advertising, prediction markets, and the theory of market design.

Zustand: Sehr gut. Zustand: Sehr gut | Sprache: Englisch | Produktart: Bücher | These proceedings present the technical contributions to the First Conference on A- tions, Market Mechanisms, and Their Applications (AMMA), held May 8-9, 2009 in Boston, Massachusetts, USA. The conference was devoted to issues that arise in all stages of deploying a market mechanism to solve a problem, including theoretical and empirical examinations. In addition to more traditional academic papers, the conf- ence placed emphasis on experiences from the real world, including case studies and new applications. The main goal of AMMA was to explore the synergy required for good mechanism design. This includes an understanding of the economic and game-theoretic issues, the ability to design protocols and algorithms for realizing desired outcomes, and the knowledge of specific institutional details that are important in practical applications. We were lucky enough to attract papers and talks from economists and computer scientists, theorists and empiricists, academics and practitioners. The program, as reflected in these proceedings, ranged from fundamental theory on auctions and m- kets to empirical design and analysis of matching mechanisms, peer-to-peer-systems, and prediction markets.