p a crosbie (6 Ergebnisse)

Zustand: New. In.

Zustand: New. In.

Zustand: New. KlappentextrnrnThis study examines a portion of the current US Army rear operation doctrine as it applies to the tactical level of war. Specifically, it compares the capability of the dedicated rear area tactical combat force (TCF) with an on-or.

Taschenbuch. Zustand: Neu. Neuware - This study examines a portion of the current US Army rear operation doctrine as it applies to the tactical level of war. Specifically, it compares the capability of the dedicated rear area tactical combat force (TCF) with an on-order tactical combat force (TFC) to effectively counter a level III Soviet incursion into the division rear area (DRA). To obtain evidence for this comparison contemporary TCF practices in nine US Army divisions are examined, as well as, the rear experiences of the 24th Infantry Division along the Naktong River during the Korean conflict in August 1950. The author concludes that the tactical combat force (TCF) portion of the rear operations doctrine is vague, that it requires revision. Due primarily to the scope and capability of Soviet combat units to successfully engage our rear area, the criticality and vulnerability of the sustainment effort emanating in the division rear area the need for a dedicated rear area TCF subordinated to the Rear Operations officer possesses the greatest potential for successfully countering a level III Soviet threat, thereby maintaining a continuous sustainment effort to the close-in and deep operations of the unified battlefield.This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work.This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work.As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant.

Zustand: New. KlappentextrnrnThis monograph examines the adequacy of the current rear operations command and control (C2) doctrine at theater army that is contained in FM 90-14, Rear Battle. Specifically, this study seeks to determine if the TAACOM commander .

Taschenbuch. Zustand: Neu. Neuware - This monograph examines the adequacy of the current rear operations command and control (C2) doctrine at theater army that is contained in FM 90-14, Rear Battle. Specifically, this study seeks to determine if the TAACOM commander is the best choice to command the theater army rear fight (as stipulated in the doctrine) or if there is a need for a separate Rear Operations officer and staff at this echelon. The German Army rear security command and control structures used in World War II during the Russian campaign are examined in detail. From this experience the Wehrmacht gleaned four rear operations command and control lessons that serve as a framework for analysis and comparison to our current doctrine. Based on the compelling reasons of simplicity and unity of command the author concludes that the current rear operations command and control doctrine for theater army is deficient. Further, the current doctrine requires revision and refinement. Finally, the author concludes that the TAACOM commander is not the optimal choice to captain the theater army rear fight, rather a separate Rear Operations commander and staff is required for this endeavor.