michael mckeeman (6 Ergebnisse)

Zustand: New. KlappentextrnrnAs war veterans retire from the military, the U.S. Army transitions to a generation of soldiers with no combat experience. This monograph examines this phenomenon of combat inexperience and assesses the tactical implications for t.

Taschenbuch. Zustand: Neu. Neuware - The challenge modern strategists face concerns preparing for two disparate types of war. One war is conventional and employs forces in familiar ways. The other, more likely war is unconventional in that forces will fight behind enemy lines, relying on tenuous lines of communications. In both cases, the strategist must define the desired outcome, the resources available to achieve that outcome, and the ways to employ those resources. Whether conventional or unconventional, modern warfare requires operational design to bland the ways and means to achieve the end. This monograph draws together operational art and unconventional warfare. At the outset, this monograph reviews operational art and operational planning using the familiar framework of METT-T (mission, enemy, troops available, terrain, and time). With that construct, this paper analyzes these interdependent elements of operational planning and how they differ from the tactical level. Recognizing that these elements are not all-inclusive, this paper turns to common underlying operational factors - intelligence, sustainment, and leadership - which play crucial roles at the operational level. Next, this monograph turns to the Chindits operation in Burma in 1944. After reviewing the strategic setting, this analysis examines the Chindits operation using the same analytical framework. The result is a useful comparison of the Chindits operation and operational art. The study of the Chindits operation yields several significant conclusions for future consideration. First, training proves itself as a combat multiplier for both the tactical unit and the operational level staff. Second, military operations will always be driven and resourced by political decisions. Finally, as a way to employ means to achieve a strategic end, unconventional warfare blends well into operational art.

Buch. Zustand: Neu. Neuware - The challenge modern strategists face concerns preparing for two disparate types of war. One war is conventional and employs forces in familiar ways. The other, more likely war is unconventional in that forces will fight behind enemy lines, relying on tenuous lines of communications. In both cases, the strategist must define the desired outcome, the resources available to achieve that outcome, and the ways to employ those resources. Whether conventional or unconventional, modern warfare requires operational design to bland the ways and means to achieve the end. This monograph draws together operational art and unconventional warfare. At the outset, this monograph reviews operational art and operational planning using the familiar framework of METT-T (mission, enemy, troops available, terrain, and time). With that construct, this paper analyzes these interdependent elements of operational planning and how they differ from the tactical level. Recognizing that these elements are not all-inclusive, this paper turns to common underlying operational factors - intelligence, sustainment, and leadership - which play crucial roles at the operational level. Next, this monograph turns to the Chindits operation in Burma in 1944. After reviewing the strategic setting, this analysis examines the Chindits operation using the same analytical framework. The result is a useful comparison of the Chindits operation and operational art. The study of the Chindits operation yields several significant conclusions for future consideration. First, training proves itself as a combat multiplier for both the tactical unit and the operational level staff. Second, military operations will always be driven and resourced by political decisions. Finally, as a way to employ means to achieve a strategic end, unconventional warfare blends well into operational art.

Taschenbuch. Zustand: Neu. Neuware - As war veterans retire from the military, the U.S. Army transitions to a generation of soldiers with no combat experience. This monograph examines this phenomenon of combat inexperience and assesses the tactical implications for the Army. To consider the impact of combat inexperience on the outcome of battle, this monograph weighs the significance of combat inexperience against other factors which also affect a battle's final result. This monograph first reviews literature and research which address various factors influencing the outcome of battle. In each case - S.L.A. Marshall's 'Men Against Fire' ;, Samuel A. Stouffer's 'The American Soldier: Combat and Its Aftermath' ;, and Richard Holmes'; 'Arts of War'; - the monograph examines some of the characteristics of combat inexperience and how the soldier's consequent behavior affects a battle. The monograph discusses a number of common themes surrounding a soldier's conduct in war. Next, this monograph tests the literature and research by surveying three battles which occur at the outset of World War I, World War II, and the Korean War. The intent is to consider each battle in its historical context, to examine specific significant events in each battle, and to analyze the battles conduct and outcome in light of the literature and research previously reviewed. Finally, a series of conclusions and implications for the Army's future highlight the requirement to train the Army realistically for its combat mission. Although research suggests that combat inexperience is a factor in the outcome of battle, its significance must be considered in the context of several factors - doctrine, tactics, training, and leadership, among others. This monograph adds impetus to the importance of battle drills, standardization, and stressful leader development.

Zustand: New. The challenge modern strategists face concerns preparing for two disparate types of war. One war is conventional and employs forces in familiar ways. The other, more likely war is unconventional in that forces will fight behind enemy lines, relying on tenuo.

Taschenbuch. Zustand: Neu. Neuware - The challenge modern strategists face concerns preparing for two disparate types of war. One war is conventional and employs forces in familiar ways. The other, more likely war is unconventional in that forces will fight behind enemy lines, relying on tenuous lines of communications. In both cases, the strategist must define the desired outcome, the resources available to achieve that outcome, and the ways to employ those resources. Whether conventional or unconventional, modern warfare requires operational design to bland the ways and means to achieve the end. This monograph draws together operational art and unconventional warfare. At the outset, this monograph reviews operational art and operational planning using the familiar framework of METT-T (mission, enemy, troops available, terrain, and time). With that construct, this paper analyzes these interdependent elements of operational planning and how they differ from the tactical level. Recognizing that these elements are not all-inclusive, this paper turns to common underlying operational factors - intelligence, sustainment, and leadership - which play crucial roles at the operational level. Next, this monograph turns to the Chindits operation in Burma in 1944. After reviewing the strategic setting, this analysis examines the Chindits operation using the same analytical framework. The result is a useful comparison of the Chindits operation and operational art. The study of the Chindits operation yields several significant conclusions for future consideration. First, training proves itself as a combat multiplier for both the tactical unit and the operational level staff. Second, military operations will always be driven and resourced by political decisions. Finally, as a way to employ means to achieve a strategic end, unconventional warfare blends well into operational art.