matheny michael (25 Ergebnisse)

Paperback. Zustand: Very Good. No Jacket. Alvarez, David (illustrator). May have limited writing in cover pages. Pages are unmarked. ~ ThriftBooks: Read More, Spend Less.

Paperback. Zustand: Fair. No Jacket. Alvarez, David (illustrator). Readable copy. Pages may have considerable notes/highlighting. ~ ThriftBooks: Read More, Spend Less.

Paperback. Zustand: Good. No Jacket. Pages can have notes/highlighting. Spine may show signs of wear. ~ ThriftBooks: Read More, Spend Less.

paperback. Zustand: Good.

paperback. Zustand: Very Good.

Paperback. Zustand: Like New. Like new softcover. Covers show light edge wear. Signed by author on title page, pages are otherwise clean and unmarked. Binding is tight, hinges strong.; 100% Satisfaction Guaranteed! Ships same or next business day!

Zustand: Very Good. Very Good condition. Volume 28. A copy that may have a few cosmetic defects. May also contain light spine creasing or a few markings such as an owner's name, short gifter's inscription or light stamp.

Zustand: New. In.

Paperback. Zustand: Brand New. 206 pages. 6.06x0.55x8.98 inches. In Stock.

Paperback. Zustand: Very Good. Minor shelf wear may be present due to storage. Otherwise VG, unread. Pages/covers clean, binding sturdy.

Paperback. Zustand: Brand New. reprint edition. 334 pages. 8.75x5.75x0.75 inches. In Stock.

Zustand: New. In.

Zustand: New. In.

Paperback. Zustand: Brand New. 294 pages. 8.94x5.98x0.67 inches. In Stock.

Zustand: New.

Zustand: New. KlappentextrnrnSurprising new evidence of operational art among U.S. commanders in World War IIn nMilitary commanders turn tactics into strategic victory by means of operational art, the knowledge and creative imagination commanders and staff .

Taschenbuch. Zustand: Neu. Neuware - Although armor was developed and organized primarily for high intensity warfare, in the future low intensity conflict will be the most prevalent form of war. Since the army has invested so much of its combat power and force structure into mechanized forces, it should be prepared to use those forces in LIC. This monograph uses J.F.C. Fuller's five combat functions: protect, find, fix, hit, and destroy, to examine the proper role of armor. Vietnam and Afghanistan are analyzed as case studies of the employment of mechanized forces in the LIC. In both conflicts the armies found it necessary to modify their conventional doctrine for armor. In Vietnam the U.S. Army successfully used mechanized forces to hit and protect. However, the reliance on indirect fires to destroy the enemy limited the effectiveness of armor. In Afghanistan the Soviets have enjoyed less tactical success with armor because of terrain, organization, and their operational plan for victory. A look at current doctrine reveals the need for a combined arms doctrine for heavy and light forces in LIC. Current doctrine also does not address the most effective armor organization for the conduct of operations in LIC--the armored cavalry regiment. The study concludes that the most appropriate tactical doctrine for armor in LIC depends upon the combat function it serves within the combined arms team. These functions can vary with terrain, organization, and the operational plan. At the very least, armor can protect and hit. When properly organized and employed it can also be used to find, fix, and in combination with other arms, destroy insurgent forces. Mechanized forces are best employed in small scale cordon search operations from battalion to brigade size. Their mobility and firepower are best used in encirclement operations or as a reaction force. Finally, the near term and future implications of this study are considered under Fuller's combat functions.

Taschenbuch. Zustand: Neu. Neuware - Operational art as a focus for U.S. doctrine has only recently emerged in our manuals. Initially, operational art emerged during the interwar period. Reflecting upon the experience of World War I, German and Soviet theorists recognized that mass armies and new technologies required successive military operations. Operational art was developed to provide the conceptual framework far successive operations. This monograph seeks to answer the question, was operational art developed in the U.S. Army during the interwar years This paper uses lectures and texts from the curricular archives of the Command and General Staff College and the War College to analyze the theory and doctrine of the interwar period. The criteria used to evaluate the doctrine are: elements of campaign planning, sophistication of approach (role of logistics, joint and combined operations), and operational concepts. The key operational concepts examined are phased operations, culminating point, center of gravity, and lines of operation. This study concludes that operational art did exist in the American army during the interwar period. Moreover, in comparison to military thinking in Europe at that time, it was certainly as sophisticated. The Command and General Staff School at Ft. Leavenworth provided a doctrine increasingly influenced by the operational concepts of Clausewitz. The Army War College exercised joint planning and established a formal system of plans which linked strategic aims all the way dawn to tactical objectives. The implications of this study suggest that the interwar emphasis on concentration and planning may be useful to current doctrine developers.

Buch. Zustand: Neu. Neuware.

Buch. Zustand: Neu. Neuware.

Paperback. Zustand: Brand New. 242 pages. 11.00x8.75x0.75 inches. In Stock.

Zustand: New. KlappentextrnrnOperational art as a focus for U.S. doctrine has only recently emerged in our manuals. Initially, operational art emerged during the interwar period. Reflecting upon the experience of World War I, German and Soviet theorists recog.

Zustand: New. Although armor was developed and organized primarily for high intensity warfare, in the future low intensity conflict will be the most prevalent form of war. Since the army has invested so much of its combat power and force structure into mechanized forces,.

Taschenbuch. Zustand: Neu. Neuware - Although armor was developed and organized primarily for high intensity warfare, in the future low intensity conflict will be the most prevalent form of war. Since the army has invested so much of its combat power and force structure into mechanized forces, it should be prepared to use those forces in LIC. This monograph uses J.F.C. Fuller's five combat functions: protect, find, fix, hit, and destroy, to examine the proper role of armor. Vietnam and Afghanistan are analyzed as case studies of the employment of mechanized forces in the LIC. In both conflicts the armies found it necessary to modify their conventional doctrine for armor. In Vietnam the U.S. Army successfully used mechanized forces to hit and protect. However, the reliance on indirect fires to destroy the enemy limited the effectiveness of armor. In Afghanistan the Soviets have enjoyed less tactical success with armor because of terrain, organization, and their operational plan for victory. A look at current doctrine reveals the need for a combined arms doctrine for heavy and light forces in LIC. Current doctrine also does not address the most effective armor organization for the conduct of operations in LIC--the armored cavalry regiment. The study concludes that the most appropriate tactical doctrine for armor in LIC depends upon the combat function it serves within the combined arms team. These functions can vary with terrain, organization, and the operational plan. At the very least, armor can protect and hit. When properly organized and employed it can also be used to find, fix, and in combination with other arms, destroy insurgent forces. Mechanized forces are best employed in small scale cordon search operations from battalion to brigade size. Their mobility and firepower are best used in encirclement operations or as a reaction force. Finally, the near term and future implications of this study are considered under Fuller's combat functions.

Taschenbuch. Zustand: Neu. Neuware - Operational art as a focus for U.S. doctrine has only recently emerged in our manuals. Initially, operational art emerged during the interwar period. Reflecting upon the experience of World War I, German and Soviet theorists recognized that mass armies and new technologies required successive military operations. Operational art was developed to provide the conceptual framework far successive operations. This monograph seeks to answer the question, was operational art developed in the U.S. Army during the interwar years This paper uses lectures and texts from the curricular archives of the Command and General Staff College and the War College to analyze the theory and doctrine of the interwar period. The criteria used to evaluate the doctrine are: elements of campaign planning, sophistication of approach (role of logistics, joint and combined operations), and operational concepts. The key operational concepts examined are phased operations, culminating point, center of gravity, and lines of operation. This study concludes that operational art did exist in the American army during the interwar period. Moreover, in comparison to military thinking in Europe at that time, it was certainly as sophisticated. The Command and General Staff School at Ft. Leavenworth provided a doctrine increasingly influenced by the operational concepts of Clausewitz. The Army War College exercised joint planning and established a formal system of plans which linked strategic aims all the way dawn to tactical objectives. The implications of this study suggest that the interwar emphasis on concentration and planning may be useful to current doctrine developers.