gregory marzolf (11 Ergebnisse)

Zustand: New. In.

Zustand: New. In.

Zustand: New. In.

Zustand: New. KlappentextrnrnExperiences in Operations Desert Storm and Allied Force have highlighted a significant weakness in the USAF s ability to engage time-critical targets. Major Marzolf introduces and investigates two methods-reactive and preemptive-a.

Zustand: New. KlappentextrnrnExperiences in Operations Desert Storm and Allied Force highlighted a significant weakness in the USAF s ability to engage time-critical targets. The weakness stems from airpower s inability to employ force quickly and kill an eme.

Zustand: New. KlappentextrnrnRecent experiences in Operations Desert Storm and Allied Force have highlighted a significant weakness in the USAF s ability to engage time-critical targets. The weakness stems from air power s inability to quickly employ force an.

Taschenbuch. Zustand: Neu. Neuware - Experiences in Operations Desert Storm and Allied Force highlighted a significant weakness in the USAF's ability to engage time-critical targets. The weakness stems from airpower's inability to employ force quickly and kill an emerging target before it disappears back into hiding. USAF's engagement sequence, called the kill chain, is not fast enough to detect, locate, identify, and engage the target. Experience shows that the enemy has used this method of emerging, engaging, and dispersing since the beginning of time, and because it is still effective, the enemy has little reason to change. To help solve this difficulty, this study introduces and investigates two methods--reactive and preemptive--and determines how they might solve the problem in 2010. Evidence suggests that the USAF is attempting to solve the problem by using the reactive approach, which first detects a target with an intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) platform and tasks a loitering-strike platform to kill it.

Taschenbuch. Zustand: Neu. Neuware - Recent experiences in Operations Desert Storm and Allied Force have highlighted a significant weakness in the USAF's ability to engage time-critical targets. The weakness stems from air power's inability to quickly employ force and kill an emerging target before it disappears back into hiding. In essence, the USAF's engagement sequence, called the kill chain, is not fast enough to detect, locate, identify, and then engage the target. Experience has shown that the enemy has used this method of emerging, engaging, and then dispersing since the beginning of time, and because it is still effective, the enemy has little reason to change. To help solve this difficulty, this thesis introduces and investigates two different approaches (reactive and preemptive methods) and determines how they might solve the problem in 2010.

Taschenbuch. Zustand: Neu. Neuware - Recent experiences in Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom have highlighted the need for adaptable and tailorable airpower command and control (C2) systems that can better serve the joint force across the entire range of operations. Though the Air Force has done a good job adapting the existing C2 system to the task, at times using a variety of control frameworks, it has not yet looked at future C2 requirements holistically in order to create a 'toolbox of capabilities' that avoids the need for poorly optimized piece-meal or work-around solutions. Simply stated, as battlefield dynamics change and technology moves forward, air employment and its associated C2 systems must also change to remain relevant. The inattention has resulted in obsolete elements of the Theater Air Command System, Air Operations Centers funded at 50 percent (or less), poor command relationships, and an unwieldy C2 structure that is difficult to tailor for today's fight.

Buch. Zustand: Neu. Neuware - Recent experiences in Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom have highlighted the need for adaptable and tailorable airpower command and control (C2) systems that can better serve the joint force across the entire range of operations. Though the Air Force has done a good job adapting the existing C2 system to the task, at times using a variety of control frameworks, it has not yet looked at future C2 requirements holistically in order to create a 'toolbox of capabilities' that avoids the need for poorly optimized piece-meal or work-around solutions. Simply stated, as battlefield dynamics change and technology moves forward, air employment and its associated C2 systems must also change to remain relevant. The inattention has resulted in obsolete elements of the Theater Air Command System, Air Operations Centers funded at 50 percent (or less), poor command relationships, and an unwieldy C2 structure that is difficult to tailor for today's fight.

Taschenbuch. Zustand: Neu. Neuware - Experiences in Operations Desert Storm and Allied Force have highlighted a significant weakness in the USAF's ability to engage time-critical targets. Major Marzolf introduces and investigates two methods-reactive and preemptive-and determines how they might solve the problem in 2010. Evidence suggests that the USAF is attempting to solve the problem by using the reactive approach, which first detects a target with an intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance platform and tasks a loitering-strike platform to kill it. While this is a cost-effective approach from a weapons-employment perspective, it is not efficient for weapons delivery aircraft. Major Marzolf found that even though this approach has long-term advantages, it would not likely be ready for implementation circa 2020, which would be 10 years too late. Evidence suggests that the USAF should pursue persistent area dominance munitions as an answer to the time-critical targeting problem.