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ISBN 10: 201162231XISBN 13: 9782011622310
Anbieter: medimops, Berlin, Deutschland
Buch
Befriedigend/Good: Durchschnittlich erhaltenes Buch bzw. Schutzumschlag mit Gebrauchsspuren, aber vollständigen Seiten. / Describes the average WORN book or dust jacket that has all the pages present.
Verlag: Kluwer Academic, 1997
ISBN 10: 0792344022ISBN 13: 9780792344025
Anbieter: Anybook.com, Lincoln, Vereinigtes Königreich
Buch
Zustand: Good. Volume 70. This is an ex-library book and may have the usual library/used-book markings inside.This book has soft covers. In good all round condition. Please note the Image in this listing is a stock photo and may not match the covers of the actual item,950grams, ISBN:9780792344025.
Verlag: Springer Netherlands, 1997
ISBN 10: 0792344014ISBN 13: 9780792344018
Anbieter: Buchpark, Trebbin, Deutschland
Buch
Zustand: Sehr gut. Zustand: Sehr gut - Gepflegter, sauberer Zustand. | Seiten: 496 | Sprache: Englisch.
Verlag: Springer Netherlands, 1997
ISBN 10: 0792344014ISBN 13: 9780792344018
Anbieter: AHA-BUCH GmbH, Einbeck, Deutschland
Buch
Buch. Zustand: Neu. Druck auf Anfrage Neuware - Printed after ordering - Conscious experience and thought content are customarily treated as distinct problems. This book argues that they are not. Part One develops a chastened empiricist theory of content, which cedes to experience a crucial role in rooting the contents of thoughts, but deploys an expanded conception of experience and of the ways in which contents may be rooted in experience. Part Two shows how, were the world as we experience it to be, our neurophysiology would be sufficient to constitute capacities for the range of intuitive thoughts recognized by Part One. Part Three argues that physics has shown that our experience is not veridical, and that this implies that no completely plausible account of how we have thoughts is comprehensible by humans. Yet this leaves thoughts not especially suspect, because such considerations also imply that all positive and contingent human conceptions of anything are false.
Verlag: Springer Netherlands, 1997
ISBN 10: 0792344022ISBN 13: 9780792344025
Anbieter: AHA-BUCH GmbH, Einbeck, Deutschland
Buch
Taschenbuch. Zustand: Neu. Druck auf Anfrage Neuware - Printed after ordering - Conscious experience and thought content are customarily treated as distinct problems. This book argues that they are not. Part One develops a chastened empiricist theory of content, which cedes to experience a crucial role in rooting the contents of thoughts, but deploys an expanded conception of experience and of the ways in which contents may be rooted in experience. Part Two shows how, were the world as we experience it to be, our neurophysiology would be sufficient to constitute capacities for the range of intuitive thoughts recognized by Part One. Part Three argues that physics has shown that our experience is not veridical, and that this implies that no completely plausible account of how we have thoughts is comprehensible by humans. Yet this leaves thoughts not especially suspect, because such considerations also imply that all positive and contingent human conceptions of anything are false.