don m gottfredson (10 Ergebnisse)

Hardcover. Zustand: Near Fine. Zustand des Schutzumschlags: Very Good. 1st Edition. First edition, 1987. The binding is fine showing only slightest sign of aging at spine head. The dust jacket has very slight shelf wear and small fading on front. Small previous owner's signature on front end paper however pages remain clean, unmarked and tightly bound.

Zustand: Fair. Volume 9. This is an ex-library book and may have the usual library/used-book markings inside.This book has soft covers. In fair condition, suitable as a study copy. Please note the Image in this listing is a stock photo and may not match the covers of the actual item,700grams, ISBN:0226808092.

Zustand: Good. Volume 9. This is an ex-library book and may have the usual library/used-book markings inside.This book has hardback covers. Clean from markings. In good all round condition. No dust jacket. Please note the Image in this listing is a stock photo and may not match the covers of the actual item,850grams, ISBN:0226808033.

gebundene Ausgabe. Zustand: Gut. 2nd ed. 308 Seiten; Der Erhaltungszustand des hier angebotenen Werks ist trotz seiner Bibliotheksnutzung sehr sauber. Es befindet sich neben dem Rückenschild lediglich ein Bibliotheksstempel im Buch; ordnungsgemäß entwidmet. In ENGLISCHER Sprache. Sprache: Englisch Gewicht in Gramm: 630.

Zustand: New. In.

Zustand: New.

Zustand: New. In.

Zustand: New.

Taschenbuch. Zustand: Neu. Druck auf Anfrage Neuware - Printed after ordering - The study of decisions in the criminal justice process provides a useful focus for the examination of many fundamental aspects of criminal jus tice. These decisions are not always highly visible. They are made, or dinarily, within wide areas of discretion. The aims of the decisions are not always clear, and, indeed, the principal objectives of these decisions are often the subject of much debate. Usually they are not guided by explicit decision policies. Often the participants are unable to verbalize the basis for the selection of decision alternatives. Adequate information for the decisions is usually unavailable. Rarely can the decisions be demonstrated to be rational. By a rationaldecision we mean 'that decision among those possible for the decisionmaker which, in the light of the information available, maximizes the probability of the achievement of the purpose of the decisionmaker in that specific and particular case' (Wilkins, 1974a: 70; also 1969). This definition, which stems from statistical decision theory, points to three fundamental characteristics of decisions. First, it is as sumed that a choice of possible decisions (or, more precisely, of possible alternatives) is available. If only one choice is possible, there is no de cision problem, and the question of rationality does not arise. Usually, of course, there will be a choice, even if the alternative is to decide not to decide-a choice that, of course, often has profound consequences.

Buch. Zustand: Neu. Druck auf Anfrage Neuware - Printed after ordering - The study of decisions in the criminal justice process provides a useful focus for the examination of many fundamental aspects of criminal jus tice. These decisions are not always highly visible. They are made, or dinarily, within wide areas of discretion. The aims of the decisions are not always clear, and, indeed, the principal objectives of these decisions are often the subject of much debate. Usually they are not guided by explicit decision policies. Often the participants are unable to verbalize the basis for the selection of decision alternatives. Adequate information for the decisions is usually unavailable. Rarely can the decisions be demonstrated to be rational. By a rationaldecision we mean 'that decision among those possible for the decisionmaker which, in the light of the information available, maximizes the probability of the achievement of the purpose of the decisionmaker in that specific and particular case' (Wilkins, 1974a: 70; also 1969). This definition, which stems from statistical decision theory, points to three fundamental characteristics of decisions. First, it is as sumed that a choice of possible decisions (or, more precisely, of possible alternatives) is available. If only one choice is possible, there is no de cision problem, and the question of rationality does not arise. Usually, of course, there will be a choice, even if the alternative is to decide not to decide-a choice that, of course, often has profound consequences.