Strategic Politicians, Institutions, and Foreign Policy

Most would agree that political leaders want to stay in office. What does this mean for foreign policymaking? The essays in this book probe the way in which the desire of political leaders to stay in office shapes the choices they make in foreign policy. Moving beyond theories of international politics that emphasize the pursuit of power by the state as the goal of foreign policy, the writers look at the domestic political reasons why leaders might pursue greater power in the world for their states. In both the area of conflict policy and choices over economic policy, the essays demonstrate that leaders behave strategically, shaping their policies to satisfy key constituents whose support is necessary to keep them in power. Enhanced state power is used to satisfy constituents who will in turn be more likely to support the continued tenure of the leader.

Covering topics ranging from monetary negotiations and trade agreements to decisions to go to war, increase defense spending or form alliances, the essays explore the strategic domestic political behavior of leaders in making foreign policy decisions, enhancing our understanding of how foreign policy is made.

The contributors include Kurt Taylor Gaubatz, Michael J. Gilligan, W. Ben Hunt, Keisuke lida, Atsushi Ishida, Lisa Martin, Fiona McGillivray, T. Clifton Morgan, Glenn Palmer, Kenneth Shultz, Randolph Siverson, Alastair Smith, and Barry Weingast.

Randolph Siverson is Professor of Political Science, University of California at Davis and the co-author ofThe Diffusion of War.