Sextus Empiricus and Greek Scepticism. Dieser Artikel ist nicht verfügbar.Sextus Empiricus and Greek Scepticism

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It is probable that those who seek after anything whatever, will 1 either find

it as they continue the search, will deny that it can be found and confess it

to be out of reach, or will go on seeking it. Some have said, accordingly, in

regard to the things sought in philosophy, that they have found the truth,

while 2 others have declared it impossible to find, and still others continue

to seek it. Those who think that they have found it are those who are espe-

cially called Dogmatics, as for example, the Schools of Aristotle and Epicu-

rus, the Stoics and some others. Those who have declared it impossible to

find are Clitomachus, 3 Carneades, with their respective followers, and other

Academicians. Those who still seek it are the Sceptics. It appears therefore,

reasonable to conclude that the three 4 principal kinds of philosophy are the

Dogmatic, the Academic, and the Sceptic. Others may suitably treat of the

other Schools, but as for the Sceptical School, we shall now give an outline

of it, remarking in advance that in respect to nothing that will be said do we

speak positively, that it must be absolutely so, but we shall state each thing

historically as it now appears to us.

CHAPTER II.

W

ays

One way of treating the Sceptical philosophy is called 5 general, and the other

special. The general method is that by which we set forth the character of

Scepticism, declaring what its idea is, what its principles are, its mode of

reasoning, its criterion, and its aim. It presents also, the aspects of doubt,

[Greek: hoi tropoi tes epoches], and the way in which we should under-

stand the Sceptical formulae, and the distinction between Scepticism and

the related Schools of philosophy. The special method, on the contrary, is

that by which we 6 speak against 6 each part of so-called philosophy. Let us

then treat Scepticism at first in the general way, beginning our delineation