Pirates, warlords, guerillas, criminal organizations, drug cartels, apocalyptic religious extremists, police agencies, terrorists: these are classic insurgents whose past, present, and future is dissected in this important book. Contributing writers including Martha Crenshaw, T. X. Hammes, Russell Howard, Gene Cristy, Yosef Kuperwasser, and academics from Naval War College, Marine Corps War College, and Stanford University, explore important insurgency-related issues such as domestic terrorism, globalization of armed groups, children on the battlefield, religious influence on armed fights, and more. This rich anthology offers scholars and citizens a new way to think about national and international security—as it stands today, and its future.
Pirates, Terrorists, And Warlords
The History, Influence, and Future of Armed Groups Around the World
By Jeffrey H. NorwitzSkyhorse Publishing
Copyright © 2009 Jeffrey H. Norwitz
All rights reserved.
ISBN: 978-1-60239-708-8Contents
Title Page,
Copyright Page,
Dedication,
INTRODUCTION,
Part One - HISTORY AND ARMED GROUPS,
Chapter 1 - Pirates, Vikings, and Teutonic Knights,
Chapter 2 - The Italian Red Brigades (1969-1984): Political Revolution and Threats to the State,
Chapter 3 - Armed Conflict in Cambodia and the UN Response,
Chapter 4 - Armed Groups and Diplomacy: East Timor's FRETILIN Guerrillas,
Chapter 5 - Adapting to a Changing Environment — The Irish Republican Army as an Armed Group,
Chapter 6 - Pseudo Operations — A Double-Edged Sword of Counterinsurgency,
Part Two - PRESENT CONTEXT AND ENVIRONMENT,
Chapter 7 - The Threat to the Maritime Domain: How Real is the Terrorist Threat?,
Chapter 8 - Armed Groups and the Law,
Chapter 9 - Globalization and the Transformation of Armed Groups,
Chapter 10 - Is It Possible to Deter Armed Groups?,
Chapter 11 - Sanctuary: The Geopolitics of Terrorism and Insurgency,
Chapter 12 - Small Wars Are Local: Questioning Assumptions about Armed Groups,
Chapter 13 - Piracy and the Exploitation of Sanctuary,
Chapter 14 - Domestic Terrorism: Forgotten, But Not Gone,
Chapter 15 - The Threat of Armed Street Gangs in America,
Chapter 16 - Prosecuting Homegrown Extremists: Case Study of the Virginia "Paintball Jihad" Cell,
Part Three - RELIGION AS INSPIRATION,
Chapter 17 - Armed with the Power of Religion: Not Just a War of Ideas,
Chapter 18 - Arming for Armageddon: Myths and Motivations of Violence in American Christian Apocalypticism,
Chapter 19 - Glory in Defeat and Other Islamist Ideologies,
Part Four - THINKING DIFFERENTLY ABOUT ARMED GROUPS,
Chapter 20 - The Erosion of Constraints in Armed-Group Warfare: Bloody Tactics and Vulnerable Targets,
Chapter 21 - Knowledge Transfer and Shared Learning among Armed Groups,
Chapter 22 - The "Memory of War": Tribes and the Legitimate Use of Force in Iraq,
Chapter 23 - Terrorist or Freedom Fighter? Tyrant or Guardian?,
Chapter 24 - Disrupting and Influencing Leaders of Armed Groups,
Chapter 25 - Armed Groups through the Lens of Anthropology,
Part Five - THE SHAPE OF THINGS TO COME,
Chapter 26 - Children on the Battlefield: The Breakdown of Moral Norms,
Chapter 27 - The "New Silk Road" of Terrorism and Organized Crime: The Key to Countering the Terror-Crime Nexus,
Chapter 28 - Shari'a Financing and the Coming Ummah,
Chapter 29 - Terrorism as an International Security Problem,
Chapter 30 - Takin' It to the Streets: Hydra Networks, Chaos Strategies, and the "New" Asymmetry,
Chapter 31 - Virtual Sanctuary Enables Global Insurgency,
Chapter 32 - Armed Groups: Changing the Rules,
Appendix - United Nations Guidelines on Humanitarian Negotiations with Armed Groups,
CHAPTER 1
Pirates, Vikings, and Teutonic Knights
Peter T. Underwood
Armed groups not directly springing from governmental authority, such as military and police forces, fall into three basic categories along a spectrum, ranging from poorly organized, disjointed, and motivated by greed, to highly organized, coordinated, and motivated by ideology. Recognizing where any particular group falls on this spectrum can help explain how and why the group behaves as it does. This in turn will aid in determining how to effectively deal with these groups.
At one end of the spectrum are criminals, motivated by the simple prospect of plunder. At the other end are ideologues, driven by strong motives and seeking to change political and social conditions. Occupying the middle ground are groups in transition. Still motivated by greed, at some point they "mature" and want a bigger stake in the political, social, and economic order. The group seeks the trappings of authority more closely associated with traditional political power.
Identifying where a particular group is on the spectrum is important in determining how we deal with it. While these categories often overlap in their purposes and motivations, a common thread is their inevitable connection to an established political power. Whether from a modern nation-state, feudal kingdom, or colonial empire, some form of support from an existing government, tacit or overt, is present if any of these groups moves beyond the stage of routine criminal annoyance or fanatical fringe element.
THE PIRATES
The first group on the spectrum has a long history. Its members are organized criminals. Pirates are a classic example. Their goal is money. They don't want to change society or overthrow existing governments even though their actions may ultimately contribute to both. They simply want to prey on society and steal from others. In fact, their livelihood depends on the prosperity of the societies on which they prey. Since arguably their plunder comes from the wealth generated by productive societies, it is in their interest not to disrupt those societies to the point of decline or collapse. Pirates simply want to "skim the cream from the top."
As criminals driven by profit, pirates are usually found taking the path of least resistance. From the ancient world to today, the lucrative, easily taken merchant vessel is their target. They rarely challenge an authoritative presence in any region. They desire to exploit the trade routes, not control them.
The struggle to control maritime trade is as old as seafaring itself. Yet the line between piracy and state-sponsored war was never clear in the ancient world until governments developed sufficient strength to actually police the seas. Until that point, piracy was not viewed as an illegal action but simply another form of armed conflict. Once governments developed sufficient power to build navies, or at least issue letters of marque, piracy could be, and was, declared an illegal activity. Pirates became lawbreakers, pure and simple.
Piracy follows well-defined cycles. Initially small groups attack weak merchants. As small groups gain wealth and grow in size and power, they absorb or drive off other, smaller groups, a pattern readily recognizable in other organized criminal groups. When sufficient power is gained and pirates become a genuine threat to a state's stability, the sovereign will make a concerted effort to crush that threat. If the offensive is successful, piracy will return to a low level of annoyance. If not, pirates begin to be more than just criminal gangs.
In the modern world, the percentage of trade affected by piracy is insignificant when compared to the total volume and the associated profits of worldwide shipping interests. Most acts of piracy, if reported at all, suggest no pattern or logic other than random acts aimed at targets of opportunity. They are simply a criminal annoyance. However, in some regions, particularly Latin America, Africa, and Asia, there are signs of increased involvement by organized crime. There is evidence of the systematic targeting and seizure of whole vessels and their cargoes, followed by quick, efficient disposal. This implies a level of sophistication beyond the capability of small-scale criminal activity driven by mere opportunity and convenience. This pattern fits neatly with the previously identified cycle of piracy: small groups being absorbed by...
