Instability and History

Independence transformed Mexico from Spain's largest and most prosperous colony to a sovereign nation suffering economic decline and political strife. Historical writing on early republican Mexico has emphasized the new nation's weakness: the loss of Texas in 1836, the "Pastry War" with France in 1838, and, most dramatically, the loss of half its national territory to the United States in the War of 1846-1848. The reasons for the rapid transition from a strong, stable colony to a weak, unstable nation remain poorly understood. Nearly twenty years ago Josefina Vázquez wrote that "Mexican historiography has forgotten the entire period from 1821 to 1855 almost systematically." Neglect, she suggested, resulted from the complexity and gloominess of an age universally regarded as a blot on the national record. The promise of independence was not fulfilled; Mexican politicians fought among themselves while the United States grabbed the northern half of the new nation. Mexico suffered economic decline as well as political reverses. While the United States industrialized, the Mexican economy faltered. John Coatsworth has estimated that most of the difference in economic productivity between the United States and Mexico can be attributed to nineteenth-century political instability. In the words of Edmundo O'Gorman, the period presents

a spectacle of unspeakable sadness: ... a tedious rosary of pronunciamientos and golpes de Estado which seems to demonstrate nothing more than the congenital incapacity of our people to govern themselves and to establish the basis of a civilized life together. That, in effect, has been and continues to be an interpretation much touted as true by foreign historiographers and one that finds adherents even today among our resentful and less intelligent reactionaries.

These observations may be less true now than they were in the 1950s and 1960s. Scholars in Mexico, Europe, and the United States have made notable contributions in these last decades, adding to our understanding of this crucial period in Mexico's history. But the central problem of the era, the collapse of stable government, remains largely unexplained. All too often historians retreat to outdated historiographical notions to simplify the explanation of Mexico's political instability. Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna, president of Mexico on eleven distinct occasions, has been the principal scapegoat for the trials of the young nation. One man's flawed character has been blamed for Mexico's problems, as if Santa Anna's personal weaknesses infected the entire nation.

The contagion has been called caudillismo. Social scientists have developed a series of hypotheses to explain the contrast between the immediately apparent struggles for power and the more intangible foundations of political conflict. The caudillo thesis discounts political motivations and regards caudillos as unprincipled opportunists who mimicked political discourse to hide personal ambitions. This emphasis on caudillismo illustrates the degree to which historical writing on this period has rested on biography, and on the biography of this one man in particular. As Moisés González Navarro noted, Mexican historiography has "suffered from the inconvenience of explaining Mexico in terms of Santa Anna rather than Santa Anna in terms of Mexico."

In early republican Mexico politicians gained and lost power with bewildering rapidity. Traditional political history has been unable to encompass the complexities of this turbulence. The lack of consensus among historians about the roots of instability in these years can be traced to the inadequacies of the traditional historical method of archival research when applied to this problem. Historians tend toward the study of decision-making in stable polities and toward the study of "meaningful" conflicts that can be termed revolutions or civil wars. Instability falls between these two cases. It presents unusual problems for the historian in that it is neither stable nor apparently significant. Yet these judgments tell us more about the methodological biases of qualitative historical research than about the nature of instability. Analyses of decision-making and policy formation are suited to stable periods when institutions behave with some consistency and decision-making processes can be studied on the basis of evidence preserved in archives. Traditional analysis introduces its own characteristic biases and assumptions, but the traditional historical method presents further difficulties specific to periods of instability. For unstable periods it is hard to generalize on the basis of decisions since administrations were brief and decisions were not enforced or were quickly reversed. In this period of Mexican history the most important political decisions were often to replace cabinet ministers or overthrow a government; but the result has been considered merely rotation, not revolution.

By accepted standards, revolution occurs very infrequently in Latin America, and historians have been reluctant to apply the term to early republican Mexican history. Few authorities recognize even the possibility of social revolution in this period. On the contrary, political motives have been heavily discounted. Political positions were mere affectations, and personalism and opportunism outweighed ideology. Many writers argue that there was no drastic social or economic change because politicians did not want change; they only wanted to sack the treasury.

The obstacles to historical studies of instability are considerable. Instability appears to be a paradoxical concept. It signifies considerable motion without much movement in any direction for very long—hyperkinesis combined with apparent stasis. The visibility of these struggles to occupy government posts contrasts with the more obscure motivations for political conflict. A constantly changing cast of political actors makes it difficult to analyze those policy decisions that are made and the power exercised in enforcing them. The frequency of forced resignations of presidents and changes in the compositions of cabinets makes the assumption of the generality of power even more questionable. When politicians cannot maintain themselves in the hierarchy, how much power can their policy decisions express?

There is a further paradox. On one hand, there are considerable theoretical and practical obstacles to the study of instability. On the other, there is no...