INTRODUCTION

The official Soviet worldview — like the consumer products turned out by Soviet industry — is not manufactured to withstand open, international competition. It is an artificial creation imposed and supported by national planning, tight internal censorship, and persistent controls on the flow of information from outside. It is, of course, not a properly scientific understanding, subject to unlimited revision on the basis of independent scholarship. Nor can one show convincingly that it is accepted unqualifiedly by large numbers of educated Soviet citizens. Nevertheless, this worldview establishes the terms of discourse and helps shape internal change within the USSR, and at the same time it affects relations with other countries.

The Soviet view of historical change and world forces is not static. It has been continually modified in response to challenges posed by new information to which Soviet specialists and, often, large numbers of citizens have access. One of the most serious and persistent challenges from outside the borders of the USSR has come from developments in China. One unexpected occurrence has followed another: China's Great Leap Forward in 1958, the open split with the Soviet Union in 1960, the Cultural Revolution in 1966, the dangerous border skirmishes of 1969, the Sino-American rapprochement of 1972, and the abrupt reversal of leadership and policies in the aftermath of Mao's death in 1976. As the Chinese experience with socialism and as Sino-Soviet relations have changed, Soviet spokesmen have had to account in diverse ways for the wayward path of a rival communist-led society. No less in the post-Mao era than before, new demands are placed on China watchers in defense of the communist leadership's beleaguered worldview. The Chinese heresy has had a profound effect on Soviet orthodoxy, perhaps as profound as any other development since the de-Stalinization movement of the 1950s.

For about a quarter-century the Sino-Soviet dispute has been one of the driving forces in international relations. Soviet leaders have sought to channel this force. Using China as an example of social change, specialists have reinterpreted the regularities of historical development in order to show why China has deviated while the Soviet Union has followed the correct path. They have analyzed many facets of life in China in support of their conclusions. In this way, the Soviet leaders have tried to strengthen the legitimacy of their own system and to rally the international communist movement behind them. The struggle against China has, of course, included troop deployments and occasional border skirmishes, but the primary battleground for the Soviets has occurred in publications that interpret social change in that country.

This is a study of Soviet perceptions of China after the rupture of the Sino-Soviet alliance in 1960. The primary aim is to convey accurately the views presented in Soviet publications about what has gone wrong in the People's Republic of China. Because, according to the perspective of both Chinese authorities and Soviet analysts, social classes are the principal units of society, I have divided this treatment into separate discussions of five social classes or groups in the population. For each social group, I review what Soviet authors contend were the incorrect policies adopted in China and the explanations the Soviets offer for them.

In no way should these separate discussions of social classes and groups be construed as an attempt to represent Soviet views on the PRC in their entirety. Perhaps the most glaring omission is a discussion of what the Soviets consider to have gone right in the period 1949-1957 as a result of Soviet and communist bloc assistance. Nor does this book examine international relations. Nevertheless, we should bear in mind that Soviet writers regard close relations with the Soviet Union as a precondition for China's advance to socialism. During the early and mid-1950s Soviet advisers helped set a course for labor unions and worker relations in China, for the organization of intellectuals, and for the establishment of departments in which cadres worked. This assistance is described in Soviet writings as an unqualified blessing for China's march toward socialism. In general, however, much more can be learned from the creative process of identifying what went wrong in China than from the rote application of formulas assumed to assure success in any communist-led society. For that reason, the following chapters concentrate on the topics about which there is greatest diversity of opinion as authors suggest various reasons why China deviated from the path of socialism.

We will examine especially the writings of Soviet specialists on China — officials, journalists, and, above all, academics — and will review how these specialists have exposed the failings of Chinese society. But this theme itself fits into a broader context, which forms the core of the Soviet worldview. We will also explore, therefore: 1) the current Soviet understanding, based on the official interpretation of Marxism-Leninism, of the transition from feudalism and capitalism to socialism, and the character of a socialist society; 2) the recent Soviet attempts to refute the views labeled "anticommunist," which are critical of Soviet history and contemporary society; 3) the evolution of the Sino-Soviet dispute in which each has accused the other of deviating from the path of socialism; and 4) the sociological study of China, the world's largest society. To understand how these themes fit together, it is necessary to cut through the dense jargon used by communists — and demanded by censors — to rationalize their methods and discredit their opponents. When this is done, the surprising result is a striking resemblance between Soviet criticisms of Chinese society and Western criticisms of Soviet society.

The Soviet Worldview

By worldview I mean an outlook on historical development, on the contemporary world order, and on the nature of one's own society. This outlook explains social change and anticipates the future social system. The Soviet worldview differs from any others because it is grounded in a large body of writings that are claimed to provide a systematic and consistent understanding — a scientific understanding — of human existence.

The current Soviet perspective on historical development recognizes four primary forces: 1) technology·, 2) class struggle; 3) scientific understanding of social change; and 4) planned transformation under communist leadership. According to this materialist conception of history, technological change basically determines the nature of production and greatly influences patterns of ownership and property relations. As technology advances, the relations between individuals engaged in production change. Increasingly individuals become conscious of serious barriers to the further development of production and to improvement in their wellbeing — barriers that result from existing...