The nature of the military institution in Brazil, its relations with civilian governments up to 1964, and its use of power since the coup of that year are examined by Alfred Stepan. Throughout his study, while looking at the Brazilian experience, he tests and reformulates implicit and explicit models, propositions, and middle-range hypotheses in the literature of civil-military relations and in political development theory.
Professor Stepan's analysis suggests that many of the expectations and hypotheses held by theoreticians and policymakers about the capabilities of the military in modernization need to be seriously qualified. His discussion of the socio-economic origins and career patterns of the officer corps and of the ideological changes within the Brazilian army makes extensive and systematic use of previously unexploited data: Brazilian military academy files, editorials, interviews with military and civilian leaders. Throughout, the experiences of Asian and African countries are compared to that of Brazil, thus providing a wide comparative framework.
Contents: PART I: The Military in Politics: The Institutional Background. 1. Military Organizational Unity and National Orientation: Hypotheses and Qualifications. 2. The Size of the Military: Its Relevance for Political Behavior. 3. Social Origins and Internal Organization of the Officer Corps: Their Political Significance. PART II: The "Moderating Pattern" of Civil-Military Relations: Brazil, 1945-1964. 4. Civilian Aspects of the "Moderating Pattern." 5. The Functioning of the "Moderating Pattern"—A Comparative Analysis of Five Coups, 1945-1964. PART III: The Breakdown of the "Moderating Pattern" of Civil-Military Relations and the Emergence of Military Rule. 6. The Growing Sense of Crisis in the Regime, 1961-1964: Its Impact on the "Moderating Pattern." 7. The Impact of Political and Economic Crises on the Military: Growth of Institutional Fears, 1961-1964. 8. The Impact of Political and Economic Crises on the Military: The Escola Superior de Guerra and the Development of a New Military Ideology. 9. The Assumption of Power—The Revolution of 1964. PART IV: The Brazilian Military in Power, 1964-1968: A Case Study of the Political Problems of Military Government. 10. The Military in Power: First Political Decisions and Problems. 11. Military Unity and Military Succession: An Elite Analysis of the Castello Branco Government. 12. The Military as an Institution Versus the Military as Government. Index.
Originally published in 1971.
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The Military in Politics
Changing Patterns in Brazil
By Alfred C. StepanPRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS
Copyright © 1971 The RAND Corporation
All rights reserved.
ISBN: 978-0-691-07537-2Contents
List of Tables and Figures, ix,
Acknowledgments, xi,
Introduction, 3,
PART I The Military in Politics: The Institutional Background, 7,
1. Military Organizational Unity and National Orientation: Hypotheses and Qualifications, 9,
2. The Size of the Military: Its Relevance for Political Behavior, 21,
3. Social Origins and Internal Organization of the Officer Corps: Their Political Significance, 30,
PART II The "Moderating Pattern" of Civil–Military Relations: Brazil, 1945–1964, 57,
4. Civilian Aspects of the "Moderating Pattern", 67,
5. The Functioning of the "Moderating Pattern" — A Comparative Analysis of Five Coups, 1945–1964, 85,
PART III The Breakdown of the "Moderating Pattern" of Civil–Military Relations and the Emergence of Military Rule, 123,
6. The Growing Sense of Crisis in the Regime, 1961–1964: Its Impact on the "Moderating Pattern", 134,
7. The Impact of Political and Economic Crises on the Military: Growth of Institutional Fears, 1961–1964, 153,
8. The Impact of Political and Economic Crises on the Military: The Escola Superior de Guerra and the Development of a New Military Ideology, 172,
9. The Assumption of Power — The Revolution of 1964, 188,
PART IV The Brazilian Military in Power, 1964–1968: A Case Study of the Political Problems of Military Government, 213,
10. The Military in Power: First Political Decisions and Problems, 216,
11. Military Unity and Military Succession: An Elite Analysis of the Castello Bronco Government, 229,
12. The Military as an Institution Versus the Military as Government, 253,
Conclusion, 267,
Appendix: Researching a Semiclosed Institution — a Note on Sources and Field Techniques, 273,
Selected Bibliography, 277,
Index, 297,
CHAPTER 1
Military Organizational Unity and National Orientation: Hypotheses and Qualifications
Comparative Analysis
A classic criticism of the military has been that its codes, hierarchy, uniforms, and barracks set it dangerously apart physically and psychologically from civilian life. Recently, however, a new school of analysts, worried by the problems of national unity and nation-building in developing countries, has emphasized that the military can perform a constructive role in these areas precisely because its training, organization, and national recruitment mission help isolate it from subnational tribal, regional, or political pressures in the polity.
Guy Pauker, in his influential analysis of Southeast Asia, commented on the "habits of discipline, hierarchical organization, and responsible command" of the military. He urged that: "Ways must be found to utilize the organizational strength of the national armies and the leadership potential of their officer corps as temporary kernels of national integration."
An influential exponent of this "neorealist" position in the area of Latin American politics is John J. Johnson. He argued:
Until responsible civil services emerge, the armed forces as coherent groups of men often will be as competent as any other group concerned with national policy. Furthermore, for the next decade or more, they will on occasion be the most reliable institution to ensure political continuity in their countries. They will, in certain instances, stand as a bulwark of order and security in otherwise anarchical societies.
As a group, this school of analysts has helped make political observers sensitive to the fact that under some circumstances the military can make a contribution to development. Clearly, in a country such as Turkey the army has played an important role in nation-building and modernization. In comparison to other elites, the military is often less parochial and more national in orientation.
While recognizing this, I nevertheless feel that both the traditional liberal critics of the military and the modern "neorealists" often overestimate the unitary, self-encapsulated aspects of the military institution, and underemphasize the degree to which a military organization is permeated and shaped by outside political pressures. Obviously the situation will vary from country to country. However, if we examine the question of the military's contribution to national unity, much evidence exists that in many developing countries not only is the military not isolated from the tensions experienced by the general population and therefore not able to act as an integrating force, but the military is itself an element in the polity that may transform latent tensions into overt crises.
The armies of many of the new nations were originally created as instruments of imperial control. As such they were often deliberately constructed with extreme tribal, racial, and religious imbalances.* This policy, coupled with the normal differential rates of recruitment based on education and inclination, makes these armies all too often both unrepresentative and explosive. Contrary to the national orientation and national integration hypotheses, the power to "socialize to national identity" of these armies has often been very weak. Primordial sentiments and loyalties frequently express themselves in violence. Three of the most costly civil wars in the newly independent nations had their immediate origins within the military.
In Nigeria a mix of tribal loyalties and intertribal animosities permeated the whole society. As in most new nations the initial stages of modernization tended to exacerbate traditional conflicts and intensify primordial sentiments. But they were felt in the army even more strongly because the requirements of cooperation, obedience, and command were more intense within the military than in society at large, and antagonisms were amplified. In addition, the existing tribal imbalances within the officer corps were inherently unstabilizing both because political actors were constantly tempted to interfere with the military hierarchy to shift the military balance of power, and because the dominant tribal group within the military was tempted to use its military power base to change the national political balance. The Ibo tribe of Eastern Nigeria, partly because of its Christianization and superior education, dominated the officer corps after Nigeria attained independence. In 1961, of the 81 Nigerian officers, nearly 60 were Ibos. Most were from the small Ibo heartland of Onitsha. However, the more traditional Muslim tribes in Northern Nigeria dominated the federal political structure. Tensions between the two major groups finally culminated in a wholesale assassination of northern political leaders in a military coup led by Ibo officers. Their action eventually resulted in the secession of Biafra, a civil war, and tremendous loss of life.
Another case where the army has been a major force of instability is Sudan. The Sudanese army has been called the "one African ... modern military establishment" at the time of independence. Upon independence, however, the officer corps was almost exclusively composed of Arabs from the north, while the sergeants and enlisted men were largely non-Arab blacks from the south. Racial tensions first broke out in a mutiny of black sergeants against their Arab officers in 1955 and later in continuing guerrilla warfare that had cost an estimated 500,000 lives by...
