Inhaltsangabe:
This study examines whether light infantry is envisioned for employment in an optimal way, specifically in an offensive role in Central Europe. The report reviews current doctrine and determines that a disconnect exists. Lower level manuals argue for innovative and aggressive offensive employment, while the division and higher level manuals virtually ignore this capability. A historical overview traces the employment of light forces in tactical infiltration roles from World War I to the Korean War and supports the use of these tactics for hitting critical, vulnerable areas in the enemy rear. Deep operations by light infantry are contrasted to other US capabilities for deep attack are then addressed at specific Soviet vulnerabilities at the tactical level suited for attack by light forces. The following type deep battle missions for light infantry are suggested for incorporation in US doctrine: deep spoiling attacks, attack of enemy ADA assets (SEAD role) to open air corridors, deep attack against critical soft targets within 25 kilometers of the front lines, deep tactical reconnaissance to locate targets for other deep attack assets, and the provision of terminal guidance for smart munitions. The study concludes that light infantry, in Central Europe, operating closer to the unconventional mode and using infiltration tactics is able to strike the enemy at a time and place for which he is unprepared. The cumulative effect of a number of these small blows can disrupt the enemy and expedite the reaching of his culminating point.
Reseña del editor:
This study examines whether light infantry is envisioned for employment in an optimal way, specifically in an offensive role in Central Europe. The report reviews current doctrine and determines that a disconnect exists. Lower level manuals argue for innovative and aggressive offensive employment, while the division and higher level manuals virtually ignore this capability. A historical overview traces the employment of light forces in tactical infiltration roles from World War I to the Korean War and supports the use of these tactics for hitting critical, vulnerable areas in the enemy rear. Deep operations by light infantry are contrasted to other US capabilities for deep attack are then addressed at specific Soviet vulnerabilities at the tactical level suited for attack by light forces. The following type deep battle missions for light infantry are suggested for incorporation in US doctrine: deep spoiling attacks, attack of enemy ADA assets (SEAD role) to open air corridors, deep attack against critical soft targets within 25 kilometers of the front lines, deep tactical reconnaissance to locate targets for other deep attack assets, and the provision of terminal guidance for smart munitions. The study concludes that light infantry, in Central Europe, operating closer to the unconventional mode and using infiltration tactics is able to strike the enemy at a time and place for which he is unprepared. The cumulative effect of a number of these small blows can disrupt the enemy and expedite the reaching of his culminating point.
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