Games of Chicken: Four Decades of U.S. Nuclear Policy. Dieser Artikel ist nicht verfügbar.Games of Chicken: Four Decades of U.S. Nuclear Policy

Games of Chicken proposes basing nuclear weapons policies on both historical and analytical arguments. Schwartzman analyzes the trade-off between the aggression risk, which U.S. policy has sought to minimize, and the pre-emption risk, which has been ignored. This analysis is then applied to policy developments under each of the post-war U.S. presidents. The historical analysis also demonstrates the importance of the role of myths in the development of policy, most notably: the myth of the nuclear strategy expert; the evil empire myth; and the economic necessity myth. Finally, the author proposes a viable solution to the increasing build-up of nuclear weapons, one which would minimize the preemption risk.

DAVID SCHWARTZMAN is Professor of Economics at the New School for Social Research in New York City. Dr. Schwartzman has researched and written extensively in areas related to economic policy, and his publications include The Decline of Service in Retail Trade, Oligopoly in the Farm Machinery Industry, Innovation in the Pharmaceutical Industry, Games of Chicken: Four Decades of U.S. Nuclear Policy (Praeger, 1988), Economic Policy: An Agenda for the Nineties (Praeger, 1989), and The Japanese Television Cartel: A Study Based on Matsushita v. Zenith.