Experiments on the Fragility of Cooperation and Mechanisms to Overcome this Problem

Beschreibung

Neuware -In experimental economics cooperation is frequently modeledby a so-called public-good design. This design tries to depict the problem that cooperation is benefi cial for every participant but that there are individual incentives to free-ride, i.e., to invest no personal effort to increase the common welfare. In public-good experiments cooperation usually breaks down due to imperfect conditional cooperation if measures like sanction possibilities, reputation-building or communication are absent. We contribute to the literature in a number of ways. For example we introduce a new dynamic public-good design to analyze whether subjects behave differently when they do not receive new resources in a multiperiod public-good design. We further provide a monitoring mechanism that mitigates the free-riding problem, in the fi rst study with a linear and in a second study with a non-linear production function. However, the costly implementation of the monitoring in itself represents either a (second-level) step-level public-good or a second-level linear public-good in the latter case. Finally we introduce a limit on punishment. 140 pp. Englisch.

Bestandsnummer des Verkäufers 9783869558172

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Bibliografische Details

Titel

Experiments on the Fragility of Cooperation and Mechanisms to Overcome this Problem

Verlag

Cuvillier, Cuvillier Jul 2011

Erscheinungsjahr

2011

Sprache

Englisch

ISBN-10

3869558172

ISBN-13

9783869558172

Einband

Taschenbuch

Zustand

Neu

Abmessungen

297B x 210 H x 8 T Millimeter Breite: 297 mm, Höhe: 210 mm, Tiefe: 8 mm

Gewicht

384 Gramm