Issues and Potential Policies and Solutions for Environmental Justice: An Overview

Bunyan Bryant

The control over research becomes manifested by who funds what and for what purposes. Why is more research money spent on nuclear power than on solar and alternative forms of energy? Why is more research money spent on large corporate agribusiness than on improving the economic efficiency of the small family farm? Why is it that more money is spent upon designing highways than mass transit systems? Through the influence of money, powerful corporate interests determine the character of scientific inquiry more so than those without money; powerful interest groups are not only in the position to define the problem to be researched, but they are in a position to benefit directly from its results—results and breakthroughs to help them gain a greater share of the market or in the accumulation of profits. If welfare mothers were given 100 million dollars to spend on university research, the political economy of inquiry would be radically different from that of government and corporate decision-makers.

While money moves upward, pollution moves downward (Odum and Odum, 1976); communities of color and low-income groups get less than their fair share of money and more of their fair share of pollutants. Communities of color and low-income groups not only get more than their fair share of pollutants (Bryant and Mohai, 1992; Bullard, 1983, 1984, 1990, 1993; Bullard and Wright, 1986, 1987a, 1987b, 1991; Burke, 1993; Gelobter, 1986; Goldman, 1991; Higgins, 1993; Lavelle and Coyle, 1992; Mohai and Bryant, 1992a, 1992b, 1992c; United Church of Christ, Commission for Racial Justice, 1987; Goldman and Fitton, 1994; Wernette and Nieves, 1991), but the working poor in particular (the unemployed are often protected by Medicare) are most likely to be unprotected by health care insurance, to suffer more from toxic- induced or-aggravated diseases, and to spend higher proportions of their income on medical health care as compared with more affluent groups. Another way of saying it is that if medical bills were subtracted from the accumulation of wealth, there may be less wealth for the wealthy and potentially better health care for the poor. The accumulation of wealth is thus created at the expense of someone else's health or quality of life, or even death, even though scientists argue that the number of people at risk from toxic exposure is very small. This struggle against toxic exposure resulting from the location of toxic and hazardous waste facilities in communities of color and low-income communities will undoubtedly increase in the future as the economy and by-products of production grow, and as more and more people become aware of the potential health effects of elevated levels of pollutants.

But there are those, mainly scientists and policymakers, who quickly point out that exposures are not necessarily linked to health effects. They maintain that people can be exposed to a variety of hazardous wastes or toxic substances and not suffer dire consequences. Until we can be sure of causality, we will have a difficult time influencing policy; as professionals we would not be believable. The difficulty of proving causation is made clear in the following quote:

The questions of what makes a given chemical dangerous to health and of why, how, and when dangerous chemicals may actually cause human illness are central to the matter of whether toxic waste sites such as Woburn's are the germs of a modern epidemic of environmentally induced disease. The waste sites that are toxic and potentially harmful are indisputable facts; more complicated is the matter of when and how this potential harm is unleashed to manifest itself in humans—whether in the form of rashes, nervousness, headaches, dizziness, nausea, birth defects or cancer. (DiPerna, 1985: 117)

Although we may not be able to prove causality due to confounding variables such as smoking, diet, indoor pollution, and synergistic and repeated effects of multiple exposures, this does not mean that cause and effect does not exist; it may mean only that we failed to prove it. Our inability to show causal relationships, which places us upon weak scientific ground, provides convenient opportunities for the paralysis of analysis; our inability to show causal relationships takes us down the slippery slope into a quagmire of confusion and entanglements and outright disagreements about levels of proof needed. At this point attempting to show causality, or that "A" causes "B," may be a no-win battle for most communities.

Given the complexities of causality, does the degree of risk to human health need to be statistically significant to require political action? Given the low numbers in cluster patterns (an apparent outbreak of disease clumped in time and space or both), do we need to show statistical significance, or should policy be based upon some other criteria? Given the complexities, should a 95 percent confidence level be adhered to for policy decisions? Should we err on the side of human health or on the side of conserving government resources? Given the complexities of causality, consistently debated in the academic community, should we just let people, most of whom are people of color and members of low-income groups, suffer and even die from toxic-induced and -aggravated diseases so that profits can be accumulated? Can we make policy decisions affecting the health of people who are differentially exposed to environmental hazards and toxic substance in the absence of conclusive data? The answer to the last question is yes, we have always done it, but not without being paralyzed in our discussions. How many studies or levels of "proof" do we need before we act in the absence of certainty?

To date, causality arguments or issues of certainty are often used to rationalize inaction, particularly when it has been economically or politically...