The Economic Theory of Eminent Domain: Private Property, Public Use

Hardcover, 2013 reprint, xiv + 200 pages, NOT ex-library. Book is clean and bright throughout with unmarked text, free of inscriptions and stamps, firmly bound. Minor faint external shelfwear. Issued without a dust jacket. -- Surveys the contributions that economic theory has made to the often contentious debate over the government's use of its power of eminent domain, as prescribed by the Fifth Amendment. It addresses such questions as: when should the government be allowed to take private property without the owner's consent? Does it depend on how the land will be used? Also, what amount of compensation is the landowner entitled to receive (if any)? The recent case of Kelo v. New London (2005) revitalized the debate, but it was only the latest skirmish in the ongoing struggle between advocates of strong governmental powers to acquire private property in the public interest and private property rights advocates. Written for a general audience, the book advances a coherent theory that views eminent domain within the context of the government's proper role in an economic system whose primary objective is to achieve efficient land use. -- Contents: 1. Introduction: A Framework for Analysis [Takings Clause; Theoretical Preliminaries: Externalities and the Coase Theorem; Role of Transaction Costs; Enforcement Rules: The Choice between Property Rules and Liability Rules; General Transaction Structure; Overview of Takings Law; Plan of the Book]; 2. Public Use [Case Law on Public Use; Means-Ends Distinction; Free-Rider Problem; Holdout Problem; Relationship between Free-Riders and Holdouts: Toward a General Framework for Public Use; Bilateral Monopoly; Other Examples of Private Takings; Mill Acts and Partition Statutes; Urban Renewal and Takings; Urban Sprawl and Takings; Arguments against the Private Use of Eminent Domain; Historical Patterns of the Delegation of Eminent Domain to Private Enterprises in the United States; Statistical Analysis of State Use of Private Takings and the Political Response Thereto]; 3. Just Compensation [Just Compensation Equals Fair Market Value; Schemes for Revealing Sellers' True Valuations; Estimation of Actual Compensation Paid in Eminent Domain Cases; Eminent Domain as a Subsidy to Developers; Exit as a Source of Government Discipline; Market Value Compensation and Tax-Motivated Takings; Compensation as Insurance; Demoralization Costs: The Costs of Not Paying Compensation; Capitalization and Compensation; Grandfathering versus Compensation; Conclusion: Public Use and Just Compensation Are Two Sides of the Same Coin]; 4. Land Use Incentives [Moral Hazard and the No-Compensation Result; Efficiency of the Taking Decision; Constitutional Choice Models; Market Value Compensation and the Epstein-Fischel Conjecture; Timing of Development; A Digression on Unity in Torts, Contracts, and Takings; Insurance and Incentives; Michelman's Standard Revisited; A Proviso on Informational Requirements]; 5. Regulatory Takings [Legal Tests for Compensation; Other Tests for Compensation; An Economic Theory of Regulatory Takings: The Efficient Threshold Rule; Implementation of the Threshold Rule; Implications of the Efficient Threshold Rule for Regulatory Takings Law; Epstein's View of Takings Law; Did Keystone Overrule Pennsylvania Coal?; An Alternative Version of the Efficient Threshold Rule; In-Kind Compensation: Neighborhood Externalities Revisited; Essential Nexus and Proportionality Requirements: Nollan and Dolan; Some Applications of the Theory]; 6. Conclusion: What Does Economic Theory Teach Us about Eminent Domain?; Appendix; List of Cases; References; Index.…