The Conception of Value

The works of Paul Grice collected in this volume present his metaphysical defence of value, and represent a modern attempt to provide a metaphysical foundation for value. Value judgements are viewed as objective; value is part of the world that we live in, nonetheless it is constructed by us. We inherit or seem to inherit, the Aristotlelian world in which objects and creatures are characterized in terms of finality features, namely, what they are supposed to do. We are thereby enabled to evaluate by reference to function and finality. This is not surprising. The most striking part of Grice's position, however, is his contention that the legitimacy of such evaluations rests ultimately on an argument for absolute value. The collection includes Grice's three previously unpublished Carus Lectures on the Conception of Value, delivered in 1983. The work is aimed at scholars interested in metaphysics, epistemology, and the philosophy of psychology, and of mind.