Introduction: An Overview

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) is playing catch-up. As it hurriedly deals with one issue, another leaps forward, forcing the desert kingdom into a vicious circle of conflicts. All the while, it mistakes a mirage of its past leadership role for reality, but that leadership role has long since ceased to exist. This chapter addresses six themes to provide business, intelligence, foreign affairs, and academic communities both a clearer picture and an in-depth understanding of this controversial, intriguing, complicated, and ultraconservative Muslim monarchy.

This chapter offers a brief account of the political climate in the Middle East with Saudi Arabia as its focus. It includes topics such as Saudi-Chinese relations and what those mean for the political and economic future of the Middle East; the impact, if any, that renewed cooperation between Russia and Saudi Arabia may have in the region; and US-Saudi relations given the regional upheavals and resulting geopolitical shifts. To what degree and with what consequences will the Saudi royal family's internal struggle over succession further destabilize the monarchy? Will Saudi Arabia's Wahhabist ideology finally fall in upon its adherents, leading to the kingdom's own collapse? These issues are addressed with new insights, expanded knowledge, and answers to questions avoided for far too long.

As desert sands pass through the hourglass of history, Saudi Arabia realizes that its impulsive strategies and ill-conceived policies no longer serve its interests. Whoever would have thought that, in this era of chest pounding, the desert kingdom would finally reach out to Iraq to mend relations between Riyadh and Tehran? Yet, this Saudi initiative stemmed not only from the complexities of the Middle East current political landscape, but also the realization from within the kingdom of its declining clout. Now that Iran has reached an agreement with the West over its nuclear program, how will that outcome affect Saudi Arabia politically, economically, and socially? Consider what will become of the desert kingdom given the Middle East's geopolitical shifting. Consider furthermore the impact of lower oil prices on the already sluggish Saudi economy.

More than the preceding concerns, regional conflicts in the Middle East dominate and dictate the course of action the Saudi leadership must address. For example, the civil war in Syria shows no signs of abating. Anarchy in Yemen exacerbates tension between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Ongoing sectarian violence in Iraq fuels conflict between Shiites and Sunnis across the region. Political and security instability in Egypt is tentative. The failed state of Libya has opened the door for Russian support of self-appointed militias. Moreover, the kingdom's regional allies Egypt, United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Bahrain assist the ongoing Saudi Arabian blockade against Qatar.

The balance of power in the Middle East has shifted. Saudi Arabia realizes how challenging it has become to influence events on the ground given Iran's growing influence, absent US leadership, Russia and China's increasing footprints as they reshape the region's political and economic outcomes to their favor, and Europe's undertaking major economic ventures with Iran. Add to those the power dynamics within the Saudi royal family given the elevation of prince Mohammed Bin Salman (MbS) to crown prince, next in line to the throne.

Behind the scenes, business leaders, global-affairs analysts, and security analysts now debate MbS's competence to lead the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia after he receives full power from his ailing father, King Salman. Acting presumably in Saudi Arabia's interest, MbS impulsively conducted ground and air strikes on rebel-held areas in Yemen. That ill-conceived military action — which failed to defeat the Houthi rebels — raises serious humanitarian concerns. Saudi ground and air strikes have been partly responsible for displacing more than three million Yemenis and spreading famine.

One common theme surfaces during debates and discussions about Saudi Arabia. The common theme: once perceived as a global player — primarily due to its oil wealth — Saudi Arabia's political influence and economic impact in the Middle East and beyond are waning. Unlike the state of affairs 20 or 30 years ago, current geopolitical dynamics in the Middle East have changed the conversation regarding the KSA's ability to manage such force-producing events. Now with many more players, new and old, the Middle East brings with it a new political order, different thinking, and the need for a new strategy. This new outcome is forcing Saudi Arabia to be reactive rather than proactive. The desert kingdom has never been in similar situations because it never has had to deal with, or even be concerned about, Iran's increasing influence, China and Russia's growing presence in the region, Turkey's aggressive foreign policy in the region, and the ongoing chaos in neighboring Yemen and Syria. The KSA has yet to figure out its strategy to deal with such threatening upheavals.

Global-affairs analysts, business leaders, and security analysts today are asking many serious questions. Particularly, what role, if any, does Saudi Arabia contemplate for itself in the new order of the Middle East? Although Saudi Arabia knows that it is in its best interest, politically and economically, to reconsider its policy toward Iran, will it do so? Will Saudi Arabia retain its religious leadership in the Muslim world now that the world scrutinizes its Wahhabist ideology? Saudi Arabia looks politically vulnerable given the multitude of problems in the Middle East today.

Saudi Arabia must also address its economic outlook following the drop in oil prices on the global market. The KSA's concern about the region's economic outcome depends largely on what Iran can achieve economically. As it stands, Iran rejoins the international community through economic ventures with Russia, China, France, India, Germany, Denmark, and Austria, among others. Simultaneously, Saudi Arabia's domestic tensions include high unemployment, continuing restrictions against Saudi women, and discrimination against its Shi'a minority. The KSA's ongoing relegation to second-class subjects of Shi'a in the eastern province creates ill will. Add to that a rebellion of unemployed, disgruntled Saudi youth in Riyadh, Jeddah, Dammam, or Qatif, and one may wake up to a country in chaos.

Undoubtedly, Saudi Arabia's latest gesture to Iran, through Iraq, to restore diplomatic ties stems not from the KSA's desire to strengthen the ties of Islamic brotherhood. Rather, it stems from the KSA's fear of being left out in the cold once Iran holds the keys to the economic and political engine of the greater Middle East. It would be naïve to think that Iran could achieve this objective by itself. This effort will be well coordinated with Russia and China since doing so provides all...