Peace does not offer such an obvious rationale for arming oneself as does war. In fact, war expresses an intention to attack which fuels preparation for it via arming oneself. Yet, there are reasons to arm for peace especially when war is modeled only as a potential outcome. Potential wars could be stylized into a winner-takes-all(-that-is-left) contest. The contest design formalizes strategic behavior of, for simplicity, two players such as nations or states. These players set out to make two decisions: First, they decide the degree of arming and then, observe the armaments. Second, they decide on whether or not to use force. Two different mutual deterrence-concepts lead to armed, peaceful equilibria with certainty. Yet another better established concept considers arming to serve a different purpose, namely, to reinforce bargaining power.
Die Inhaltsangabe kann sich auf eine andere Ausgabe dieses Titels beziehen.
Sharon Pfister obtained a master's degree in economics and a teaching diploma at the University of St. Gallen, where she continues to work as a lecturer after finishing her Ph.D. in this topic. Motivated by a strong interest in understanding social interactions and society, her work reflects her curiosity in exploring conflicting interests; as well as her passion for making possible explanations accessible to a broad audience.
Peace does not offer such an obvious rationale for arming oneself as does war. In fact, war expresses an intention to attack which fuels preparation for it via arming oneself. Yet, there are reasons to arm for peace especially when war is modeled only as a potential outcome. Potential wars could be stylized into a winner-takes-all(-that-is-left) contest. The contest design formalizes strategic behavior of, for simplicity, two players such as nations or states. These players set out to make two decisions: First, they decide the degree of arming and then, observe the armaments. Second, they decide on whether or not to use force. Two different mutual deterrence-concepts lead to armed, peaceful equilibria with certainty. Yet another better established concept considers arming to serve a different purpose, namely, to reinforce bargaining power.
Contents
n Winner-Takes-All-Contest
n Mutual Deterrence
n Bargaining Theory
Target Groups
· Researchers and students in disciplines Economics, International Relations and History
· Theoretical conflict researchers and security experts
The Author(s)
Sharon Pfister obtained a master's degree in economics and a teaching diploma at the University of St. Gallen, where she continues to work as a lecturer after finishing her Ph.D. in this topic.
Motivated by a strong interest in understanding social interactions and society, her work reflects her curiosity in exploring conflicting interests; as well as her passion for making possible explanations accessible to a broad audience.
„Über diesen Titel“ kann sich auf eine andere Ausgabe dieses Titels beziehen.
Anbieter: Ria Christie Collections, Uxbridge, Vereinigtes Königreich
Zustand: New. In English. Artikel-Nr. ria9783658039523_new
Anzahl: Mehr als 20 verfügbar
Anbieter: Revaluation Books, Exeter, Vereinigtes Königreich
Paperback. Zustand: Brand New. 2013 edition. 159 pages. 8.20x5.80x0.34 inches. In Stock. Artikel-Nr. x-3658039523
Anzahl: 2 verfügbar
Anbieter: AHA-BUCH GmbH, Einbeck, Deutschland
Taschenbuch. Zustand: Neu. Druck auf Anfrage Neuware - Printed after ordering - Peace does not offer such an obvious rationale for arming oneself as does war. In fact, war expresses an intention to attack which fuels preparation for it via arming oneself. Yet, there are reasons to arm for peace especially when war is modeled only as a potential outcome. Potential wars could be stylized into a winner-takes-all (-that-is-left) contest. The contest design formalizes strategic behavior of, for simplicity, two players such as nations or states. These players set out to make two decisions: First, they decide the degree of arming and then, observe the armaments. Second, they decide on whether or not to use force. Two different mutual deterrence-concepts lead to armed, peaceful equilibria with certainty. Yet another better established concept considers arming to serve a different purpose, namely, to reinforce bargaining power. Artikel-Nr. 9783658039523
Anzahl: 2 verfügbar
Anbieter: preigu, Osnabrück, Deutschland
Taschenbuch. Zustand: Neu. Arm For Peace | A Rationalist Explanation | Sharon Pfister | Taschenbuch | xvi | Englisch | 2014 | Springer Gabler | EAN 9783658039523 | Verantwortliche Person für die EU: Springer Gabler in Springer Science + Business Media, Tiergartenstr. 15-17, 69121 Heidelberg, juergen[dot]hartmann[at]springer[dot]com | Anbieter: preigu. Artikel-Nr. 105429242
Anzahl: 5 verfügbar