Masterarbeit aus dem Jahr 2011 im Fachbereich BWL - Unternehmensführung, Management, Organisation, Note: 2, Fachhochschule des bfi Wien GmbH, Sprache: Deutsch, Abstract: Management remuneration has become a public and political issue over the last years of recession and one of the largest economic crisis all over the world. Since decades there are scandals of managers cheating in their balances or laying off thousands of employees to raise the price of the shares of their corporations to earn a high bonus. How much managers should be allowed to earn and how performance contracts should look like is as well a controversial topic that on the one hand is more and more under public pressure and regulated by politicians, but on the other hand not very well defined by law and corporate governance codices. This thesis describes the problem of moral hazard with the theoretical background of the principal-agent-theory and in praxis and then tries to answer the question if there is any relationship of economic performance of a corporation and the remuneration of its managers. Later on systems and tools of fixed and variable remuneration will be described with a focus on stock options and the ways how they can set wrong incentives. After that it will be shown how these tools can be used in a sustainable way and how remuneration of managers could look like that provide long term incentives for them and lead to a sustainable economic performance. But not only economic sustainability will be discussed, but also social and ecological aspects of remuneration contract incentives will be a topic of this thesis. But after a lot of scientific background given in the thesis there will be a description of some Austrian corporations that are listed on the stock market and how their remuneration systems looks like and has changed over the last years. In this chapter theory will be put into practice and it will be shown how those tools are used in real life. It will show how sensitive those
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