Secessionist Rule: Protracted Conflict and Configurations of Non-state Authority (Mikropolitik der Gewalt, 12, Band 12) - Softcover

Buch 12 von 14: Mikropolitik der Gewalt

Smolnik, Franziska

 
9783593506296: Secessionist Rule: Protracted Conflict and Configurations of Non-state Authority (Mikropolitik der Gewalt, 12, Band 12)

Inhaltsangabe

Franziska Smolniks Untersuchung stützt sich auf die südkaukasischen international nicht beziehungsweise nur zum Teil anerkannten De-facto-Staaten, die sich weiterhin im Konflikt mit ihren einstigen Metropolstaaten befinden. Sie zeigt, wie auch sogenannte Gewaltkonflikte niedriger Intensität die Form und Funktion von politischer Herrschaft entscheidend prägen können.

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Über die Autorin bzw. den Autor

Franziska Smolnik ist Wissenschaftlerin in der Forschungsgruppe Osteuropa und Eurasien der Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Berlin.

Auszug. © Genehmigter Nachdruck. Alle Rechte vorbehalten.

1 Introduction

To adopt the words of Jean-François Bayart (Bayart 2000, 229-30), the South Caucasus
"political societies are duplicated between, on the one hand, a pays légal, a legal structure, which is the focus of attention for multilateral donors and Western states, and on the other hand, a pays réel where real power is wielded".

This research focuses on the pays réel, on political authority beyond or con-voluted with the trappings of legal-rational bureaucracy. In the cases that lie at the heart of this study the situation, however, is still more complex: Officially, a pays légal does not exist. While the South Caucasus self-proclaimed but internationally (largely) unrecognized states Abkhazia and Nagorno-Karabakh exist de facto, they do not de jure.



1.1 De facto state or rebel region?

Abkhazia and Nagorno-Karabakh constituted autonomous entities within the federal framework of the Soviet Union. The Autonomous Region of Nagorno-Karabakh with an ethnic Armenian majority was integrated in the Union Republic of Azerbaijan; the Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia with its Abkhaz titular nation was located within the confines of the Union Republic of Georgia. In the context of the Soviet demise, both in the Union Republics and the subordinated autonomous entities movements for independence emerged, which came into conflict with one another: Georgia's agenda conflicted with the striving of the Abkhaz for indepen-dence; the secessionist aspirations of Nagorno-Karabakh's Armenians conflicted with the Azerbaijani national project. Ultimately, these contra-dicting trajectories led to open warfare. Large-scale hostilities were ended by ceasefire agreements in the mid-1990s, yet, the violent conflicts between 'secessionist entities' and 'metropolitan states' have been persistent and peace agreements remain outstanding. Nagorno-Karabakh and Abkhazia embarked upon developing separate institutions and declared themselves independent. Until today, however, their status remains in limbo. The former is not recognized by any country world-wide; the independence of the latter was officially endorsed by Russia and a couple of smaller states in the aftermath of the Russian-Georgian War of 2008, but comprehensive recognition is lacking.

The secessionists have sought to justify their position by stressing the right to self-determination. While except for the context of de-coloniza-tion, this principle has been construed as 'internal self-determination' within an existing state in form of cultural and ethnic rights, represent-tatives of Abkhazia and Nagorno-Karabakh have claimed a territorial dimension. They have focused on 'external self-determination' and inter-preted it as a right to secession. Self-determination, however, collides with another central principle of international law, that of territorial integrity. The 'metropolitan states' Georgia and Azerbaijan have (largely) success-fully enforced the latter's supremacy. The great majority of states has withheld recognition and thus corroborated the "sanctity of recognized boundaries" (Pegg 2004, 36). The literature on secession differentiates between successful and unsuccessful ones: Either independence of the secessionist entity is endorsed by other states or international recognition is not extended (cf. Pavkovi? and Radan 2007, 5). From such a perspective the secessions of Abkhazia and even more so Nagorno-Karabakh have been unsuccessful. De jure the territories they claim belong to the Republics of Georgia and Azerbaijan. Yet, lack of juridical statehood notwithstan-ding, de facto control over a particular territory and population for over two decades, the development of political institutions, and the claim to independent sovereignty challenge the picture of failed secession.

The resulting ambiguity has qualified Abkhazia and Nagorno-Karabakh as unrecognized states. Further notions used to address the entities reflect this duality. Alongside unrecognized state, the term de facto state is pre-valent; somewhat less common is the notion of 'informal state'. After Russia's recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the third South Caucasus de facto state, the term partially/partly recognized state has gained in significance. Others refer to the entities as quasi-states, para-states, or pseudo-states. These terms are more contested, however, as they are equally employed to address recognized states that scholars and peace-building practitioners have classified as 'failed', that is, states that possess external sovereignty but are considered to lack internal state capacity. Not all notions focus on a lack of recognition combined with empirical statehood, though. Others, such as secessionist entity, renegade or breakaway region, put emphasis on the challenged territorial integrity of the parent states and thus do not imply 'creation' but disintegration. Terms such as warlord republic or rebel territory evoke more negative conno-tations and indicate illegitimacy and lack of order. Similarly to widespread images of the entities such as 'black holes', which for long have been also prominent in academia, these notions reflect the violent formation of Abkhazia and Nagorno-Karabakh. In policy circles, too, the secessionist projects have been predominantly considered in terms of the potential of a re-escalation into large-scale war. Accordingly, policy-makers have treated the unrecognized entities as security risks for the South Caucasus but also with respect to stability of the wider region such as the European Union (cf. European Council 2003, 2008).



1.2 Unresolved conflict

As in the majority of secessions, the (de facto) ones of Abkhazia and Nagorno-Karabakh have been violent. Open warfare in the early 1990s caused thousands of deaths, hundreds of thousands of people were and remain displaced; damage to livelihood opportunities was immense. The signing of ceasefires ended large-scale hostilities. Yet, while the mode of violent conflict changed, the conflicts have been persistent. In the case of the conflict on Nagorno-Karabakh, the post-ceasefire period is charater-ized by static warfare at the heavily fortified line of contact that separates the conflict parties and more recently also at the state border between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Even though the name line of contact may indicate other-wise, contact between the populations has been basically reduced to zero. In the case of the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict, the ceasefire agreement entailed the deployment of a peacekeeping force and the establishment of a demilitarized zone. In particular until the August War of 2008, the administrative boundary line between Abkhazia and Georgia 'proper' was open for crossing. The development of fortifications with combat-ready armies facing each other as in the former case has thus been prevented. Instead, the conflict has been manifest in a highly volatile situation, particularly in the Abkhaz-claimed area adjacent to the administrative boundary line, which is home to the majority of Abkhazia's ethnic Georgian population. Despite a constant exchange of sniper-fire in the conflict on Nagorno-Karabakh, respectively a continuing precarious situation on the ground in the Georgian-Abkhazian case, prominent conflict databases that operate with quantitative definitions of violent conflict largely do not capture the South Caucasus conflicts in their post-ceasefire periods. According to their prime indicator, the number of battle-related deaths, the level of physical violence is too low to include them. For most of the post-ceasefire periods, indeed, severe escalations or a renewed outbreak of open warfare has been avoided. One central assumption of this research, however, is that the ex-clusive emphasis placed on direct physical violence may only grasp one particular dimension of violent conflict. Especially for...

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