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Descriptive Theories of Bargaining: An Experimental Analysis of Two- and Three-Person Characteristic Function Bargaining: 341 (Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, 341) - Softcover
Inhaltsangabe
The aim of this book is the presentation of two new descriptive theories for experimental bargaining games and a comparison with other descriptive and normative theories. To obtain data it was necessary to develop two sets of computer programs for computer controlled ex periments. Moreover, data obtained by other researchers, which are available to us will be included in this study. The use of laboratory experiments in economics was introduced by THURSTONE [1931] in the field of utility theory. CHAMBERLIN [1948] was the first person to establish an expe rimental market for the purpose of testing a theory. The first experiment on characteristic function games was done by KALISH, MILNOR, NASH, and NERING [1954]. Today the use of experiments in controlled laboratory settings has become widespread. Earlier, economists went into the field to observe phenomena as the behavior of individuals, corporations and nations in action, then they formulated theories to explain what they saw. But unlike natural scientists, economists have not been able to test their theories under controlled conditions. Now experimental economists are able to replicate their results. Replication is very proble matic for field studies, because rarely the same conditions can be established again. Moreover, experimenters are able to test theories for situations described by simplified models which are not observable in the real world.
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Reseña del editor
The aim of this book is the presentation of two new descriptive theories for experimental bargaining games and a comparison with other descriptive and normative theories. To obtain data it was necessary to develop two sets of computer programs for computer controlled ex periments. Moreover, data obtained by other researchers, which are available to us will be included in this study. The use of laboratory experiments in economics was introduced by THURSTONE [1931] in the field of utility theory. CHAMBERLIN [1948] was the first person to establish an expe rimental market for the purpose of testing a theory. The first experiment on characteristic function games was done by KALISH, MILNOR, NASH, and NERING [1954]. Today the use of experiments in controlled laboratory settings has become widespread. Earlier, economists went into the field to observe phenomena as the behavior of individuals, corporations and nations in action, then they formulated theories to explain what they saw. But unlike natural scientists, economists have not been able to test their theories under controlled conditions. Now experimental economists are able to replicate their results. Replication is very proble matic for field studies, because rarely the same conditions can be established again. Moreover, experimenters are able to test theories for situations described by simplified models which are not observable in the real world.
Reseña del editor
This book deals with two- and three-person bargaining games in characteristic function form and presents two new descriptive theories, the Negotiation Agreement Area and the Proportional Division Payoff Bounds (PDPB). The evaluation of data for two-person games leads to a new descriptive theory called Negotiation Agreement Area which combines the influence of power and justice norms. The main emphasis of the book is on a new descriptive theory for three-person games, the PDPB. Comparison with other theories on the basis of 3088 plays of different games shows that the PDPB are significantly more successful in prediction than other theories. The PDPB concept is a modification and extension of Selten's Equal Division Payoff Bounds. The determination of the bounds is based on general principles and not on the estimation of parameters. From aspiration levels which depend on power, justice norms, and other reasonable principles the negotiation process leads to a proportional division of the prize.
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Descriptive theories of bargaining: an experimental analysis of two- and three-person characteristic function bargaining. Lecture notes in economics and mathematical systems ; 341
ISBN 10: 3540524835
ISBN 13: 9783540524830
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Descriptive Theories of Bargaining. An Experimental Analysis of Two- and Three-Person Characteristic Function Bargaining.
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Berlin, Springer Berlin / Heidelberg, 1990
ISBN 10: 3540524835
ISBN 13: 9783540524830
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Softcover. 177 S. Ehem. Bibliotheksexemplar mit Signatur und Stempel. GUTER Zustand, ein paar Gebrauchsspuren. Ex-library with stamp and library-signature. GOOD condition, some traces of use. 3540524835 Sprache: Englisch Gewicht in Gramm: 900. Artikel-Nr. 2347812
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Descriptive Theories of Bargaining: An Experimental Analysis of Two- and Three-Person Characteristic Function Bargaining (Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, 341)
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Descriptive Theories of Bargaining
Verlag:
Springer-Verlag Berlin and Heidelberg GmbH & Co. KG, 1990
ISBN 10: 3540524835
ISBN 13: 9783540524830
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Zustand: New. This monograph presents a pair of new descriptive theories for two- and three-person bargaining games in characteristic function form. The three-person game is shown to give better predictions than other theories. Series: Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems. Num Pages: 174 pages, 24 black & white tables, biography. BIC Classification: KC; PBT. Category: (P) Professional & Vocational; (UP) Postgraduate, Research & Scholarly; (UU) Undergraduate. Dimension: 244 x 170 x 9. Weight in Grams: 328. . 1990. Softcover reprint of the original 1st ed. 1990. Paperback. . . . . Books ship from the US and Ireland. Artikel-Nr. V9783540524830
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Descriptive Theories of Bargaining: An Experimental Analysis of Two- and Three-Person Characteristic Function Bargaining (Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems)
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Paperback. Zustand: Brand New. 174 pages. 9.61x6.69x0.42 inches. In Stock. Artikel-Nr. x-3540524835
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Descriptive Theories of Bargaining : An Experimental Analysis of Two- and Three-Person Characteristic Function Bargaining
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Taschenbuch. Zustand: Neu. Druck auf Anfrage Neuware - Printed after ordering - The aim of this book is the presentation of two new descriptive theories for experimental bargaining games and a comparison with other descriptive and normative theories. To obtain data it was necessary to develop two sets of computer programs for computer controlled ex periments. Moreover, data obtained by other researchers, which are available to us will be included in this study. The use of laboratory experiments in economics was introduced by THURSTONE [1931] in the field of utility theory. CHAMBERLIN [1948] was the first person to establish an expe rimental market for the purpose of testing a theory. The first experiment on characteristic function games was done by KALISH, MILNOR, NASH, and NERING [1954]. Today the use of experiments in controlled laboratory settings has become widespread. Earlier, economists went into the field to observe phenomena as the behavior of individuals, corporations and nations in action, then they formulated theories to explain what they saw. But unlike natural scientists, economists have not been able to test their theories under controlled conditions. Now experimental economists are able to replicate their results. Replication is very proble matic for field studies, because rarely the same conditions can be established again. Moreover, experimenters are able to test theories for situations described by simplified models which are not observable in the real world. Artikel-Nr. 9783540524830
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