This book traces the activities of the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS/MI6) and the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) during the Suez Crisis, one of the most infamous episodes of British foreign policy. In doing so it identifies broader lessons not only about the events of 1956, but about the place of intelligence in strategy itself. It provides both an exploration of the relationship between intelligence and strategy at the conceptual level, and also a historical account, and strategic analysis of, the performance of the Joint Intelligence Committee and the Secret Intelligence Service during this time. Focusing on the period immediately before, during, and after the crisis, Danny Steed brings together a complete picture of intelligence story in Britain that has so far eluded comprehensive treatment in the Suez historiography. Through extensive consultation of declassified archival sources, a re-examination of often referred to sources, and the employment of oral history, this study identifies the most significant lessons about the use of intelligence revealed by the Suez Crisis.
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Danny Steed, formerly Lecturer in Strategy and Defence at the University of Exeter, UK, now works for the Cabinet Office in CERT-UK specialising in cyber security.
This book traces the activities of the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS/MI6) and the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) during the Suez Crisis, one of the most infamous episodes of British foreign policy. In doing so it identifies broader lessons not only about the events of 1956, but about the place of intelligence in strategy itself. It provides both an exploration of the relationship between intelligence and strategy at the conceptual level, and also a historical account, and strategic analysis of, the performance of the Joint Intelligence Committee and the Secret Intelligence Service during this time. Focusing on the period immediately before, during, and after the crisis, Danny Steed brings together a complete picture of intelligence story in Britain that has so far eluded comprehensive treatment in the Suez historiography. Through extensive consultation of declassified archival sources, a re-examination of often referred to sources, and the employment of oral history, this studyidentifies the most significant lessons about the use of intelligence revealed by the Suez Crisis.
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Anbieter: Revaluation Books, Exeter, Vereinigtes Königreich
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Buch. Zustand: Neu. Druck auf Anfrage Neuware - Printed after ordering - Thisbook traces the activities of the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS/MI6) andthe Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) during the Suez Crisis, one of the mostinfamous episodes of British foreign policy. In doing so it identifies broaderlessons not only about the events of 1956, but about the place of intelligencein strategy itself. It provides both an exploration of the relationshipbetween intelligence and strategy at the conceptual level, and also ahistorical account, and strategic analysis of, the performance of the JointIntelligence Committee and the Secret Intelligence Service during this time.Focusing on the period immediately before, during, and after the crisis, DannySteed brings together a complete picture of intelligence story in Britain thathas so far eluded comprehensive treatment in the Suez historiography. Throughextensive consultation of declassified archival sources, a re-examination ofoften referred to sources, and the employment of oral history, this studyidentifies the most significant lessons about the use of intelligence revealedby the Suez Crisis. Artikel-Nr. 9783319314525
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