Expellees, Counterfactualism and Potatoes. Enlargement and Cross-National Debates in German-Polish Relations

Stefan Manz

Introduction

Eastern enlargement of the EU has triggered not only renegotiations of European identity but also of bilateral relationships. Constructions of Cold War dichotomies between East and West need to be reconsidered as former 'enemies' now find themselves under a single umbrella that aims at political, economic, military and cultural integration. If we accept the assessment of the former EU commissioner for enlargement, Günter Verheugen, that 'German-Polish dialogue is the core of European unification' (Verheugen, 2004: 8), eastern enlargement could not have had a less promising start. The new closeness between the two nations appeared to have reinforced rather than dissolved long-held mutual suspicions and negative perceptions. Polish and German observers agreed in the immediate post-enlargement period that the relationship between the two countries had hit its lowest point since 1989. Because bilateral issues now have to be increasingly negotiated at the EU level, the belligerent past and strained present relationship between Germany and Poland even cast a shadow over Poland's first European appearance as a full-fledged EU member state. EU leaders and officials unanimously felt the country to be the new 'awkward partner' (Grabbe, 2004) – a role traditionally held by the United Kingdom (George, 1998) – that fought battles of the past instead of concentrating on a common future.

This chapter takes a closer look at the period between the runup to 1 May 2004, when Poland and nine other countries joined the European Union, and October 2007, when national-conservative Prime Minister Jaroslaw Kaczynski was replaced by a more conciliatory successor, Donald Tusk. Analyzing the cross-national friction points and debates that unfolded during this period allows us to assess the extent to which bilateral relationships are increasingly negotiated at the EU level. This chapter is mainly based on German broadsheet articles (especially Spiegel/Spiegel online, Süddeutsche Zeitung/sueddeutsche.de, Tageszeitung and Die Zeit/zeit.de) and aims to ascertain the effect of enlargement and 'Europeanization' (Zaborowski, 2004: 5–26) on the triangular Poland– Germany–EU relationship.

Historical Burdens

A historical outline is crucial for understanding current debates and the pervading European dimension of this relationship. Although few Central European countries were exempt from German military aggression over the centuries, it was Poland that arguably suffered most under its larger neighbor. Three partitions in the second half of the eighteenth century eliminated the Polish state from the map of Europe, dividing the country between Russia, Austria and Prussia. Throughout the nineteenth century, Prussia pursued a policy of forced Germanization in occupied western Poland, trying to push back the Polish language and Catholicism through administrative measures and mass expulsions. Bismarck reinforced these Kulturkampf measures after German unification in 1871, and ethnic cohesion became a cornerstone of national identity construction in the newly founded German Empire. An influential expatriate community of Polish aristocrats and artists (e.g. Adam Mickiewicz and Frédéric Chopin), mainly based in Paris, upheld notions of independence and assertiveness that remain reference points for the nation today (Urban, 2004: 17–24). Independence in 1918 was achieved not least of all through US president Woodrow Wilson's support. Long-lasting notions of the United States as a guardian of Polish security interests can be traced back to the Treaty of Versailles. Germany's invasion of Poland in September 1939 resulted in immeasurable destruction and triggered a global conflagration. It was followed by a postwar settlement that allocated a quarter of German territory to Poland and resulted in the expulsion of 7.5 million ethnic Germans. It also resulted in a border dispute over the Oder–Neisse line, which remained unresolved throughout the Cold War and continues to cast its shadow over the bilateral relationship today (Bingen, 2005; Lebioda, 2000; Müller, 2004; Urban, 2004; Zaborowski, 2004: 1–2).

The end of communism presented an opportunity to normalize relations and create a 'win-win' situation for both countries. Germany could cast off its precarious position as a Frontstaat (front-line state) against the east by supporting Polish integration into western economic and political structures. Poland, on the other hand, could now realize its 'return to Europe'. The era of communism was interpreted as a historical aberration, having separated the country from its 'natural' sociopolitical and economic environment (Zaborowski, 2004: 124–126). It was accepted that 'the way to Europe leads through Germany' (Holesch, 2007: 23), and Germany willingly took on the role of Poland's advocate in the EU. For the first time in 200 years, both countries' interests seemed to converge, and a Werte- und Interessensgemeinschaft (community of values and interests) (Hudabiunigg, 2004: 160) could be proclaimed by foreign minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski. Tangible progress was made in this direction. The treaty on 'Good Neighborly Relations and Amicable Cooperation', signed in 1991, confirmed intentions on both sides that historical burdens should be overcome and that German foreign policy would prioritize Polish EU accession. Activities launched in the wake of the treaty included a German-Polish youth association and a bilateral government commission for regional and cross-border cooperation. Together with France, the 'Weimar Triangle' was launched, which has provided for regular meetings among the three heads of state. The idea was to extend the Paris–Berlin 'Axis', which had arguably been the driving force of European integration since the 1950s (Bingen, 2005; Holesch, 2007: 26–40). The symbolic message was to accept Poland as an equal partner, to signify that Franco-German postwar reconciliation was also a realistic option for the Polish-German relationship and that Polish western integration should be solidified. These activities aimed to remove Polish fears of the unified Germany and to level out the apparent asymmetrical relationship in both political and economic terms. The 1990s have aptly been labeled a 'golden era' (Bingen, 2005: 13) for Polish-German relations.

What followed in the ensuing years was the realization that problematic issues between the countries ran too deep to be overcome by mere enthusiasm and Versöhnungskitsch (reconciliation kitsch) (Tageszeitung, 5 August 1994). As one researcher put it, 'the positive signs and accompanying rhetoric do not disguise that the condition of the German-Polish relationship as a whole is not so bright and agreeable' (Wood, 2002: 97). A new working relationship had to be established, and it was now accepted that this could not be detached from its European dimension. One example is an interview with Polish president Kwasniewski on the eve of accession, in which he admitted that the 'frontlines' between Poland and both the EU and Germany had hardened: 'If we were now able to come to a German-Polish agreement on the question of the constitution and thereby help Europe, our relationship would gain a new quality' (Spiegel 3/2004).

Lech and Jaroslaw Kaczynski, Germany and Europe

Along with nine other countries on the EU's eastern and southern rim, Poland joined the European Union on 1 May 2004. By then the country had undergone a political, economic and social transformation process alongside pre-accession strategies set out by the Copenhagen criteria. Those that had hailed the accession date in almost teleological terms as Poland's 'return to Europe' could be nothing but disappointed by the development to come. First impressions were, however, favorable. President Kwasniewski's pro-European stance was in line with that of the newly appointed Prime Minister Marek Belka. Both were ready for compromises regarding the EU budget for 2007–2013 and the constitution. Poland's mediating role during the Orange Revolution in Ukraine and a generally pro-European population added to the positive picture. Below the surface, however, skepticism had been building up. The marathon of conformation to EU structures had exhausted the country, and the pro-European consensus within the parties and political landscape had only proved its stability as long as it had been a condition for accession. It now gave way to opinion-makers who were more Atlanticist and less concerned with nurturing the Weimar Triangle, good-neighborly relations with Germany, or indeed the EU (Holesch, 2007: 99–100, 105–106). This surfaced for the first time during the parliamentary election campaign in autumn 2005 and was spearheaded by the twin brothers Lech and Jaroslaw Kaczynski and their newly founded Law and Justice Party (PiS). Lech Kaczynski, the presidential candidate, found Germany and Russia to be the 'greatest danger' for Poland. He boasted that he did not entertain any contacts whatsoever with German politicians and that the only thing he knew in Germany was 'the spittoon in the gents' room' at the Frankfurt Airport (Tagesspiegel Online, 2 December 2005). When Federal President Horst Köhler offered to see him during his visit toWarsaw in September 2005, he did not reply (Tageszeitung, 7 October 2005). Germanophobia alone did not win him the elections, but it was part of his national-conservative worldview that struck a chord with the electorate.

The Kaczynski twins had grown up with narratives of Nazi crimes; both of their parents had been decorated resistance activists during the occupation period. In the 1980s, the brothers had been major players in the Solidarity movement, but they fell out with its leader Lech Walesa after his rise to power as president. Their political resurrection started around 2000 with appointments to justice minister (Jaroslaw) and mayor of Warsaw (Lech) and, shortly afterwards, their founding the Law and Justice Party (PiS). Lech Kaczynski was elected president in October 2005. Jaroslaw Kaczynski took over as prime minister in July 2006, forming a coalition with the national-clerical 'League of Polish Families' and the agrarian 'Self-Defense of the Republic of Poland' (Holesch, 2007: 109–113; Spiegel 29/2006; Zeit, 16 August 2007). The double leadership was proclaimed to be the birth of the 'Fourth Republic' and a rebirth of honor, patriotism and strength at the international level.

The first bilateral row was triggered by a German newspaper and had an immediate detrimental effect on theWeimar Triangle. In June 2006, the left-wing Berlin-based Tageszeitung published a satirical text about Lech Kaczynski under the title Polens neue Kartoffel (Poland's New Potato), ridiculing his obsessive Germanophobia, political ambitions and private life (Tageszeitung, 26 June 2006; 29 June 2007). The text was translated by the Polish foreign office and appeared under the section 'The Foreign Press on Poland' alongside serious articles and analyses. Foreign minister Anna Fotyga commented, 'Such an accumulation of repulsiveness reminds one of the language of the [Nazi newspaper] Stürmer' (Süddeutsche Zeitung Online, 5 July 2006). Jaroslaw Kaczynski seconded that insulting a head of state was a crime. Fotyga demanded an apology from the German authorities for this 'unprecedented attack on a head of state', but was told by a spokesman that the German government does not, as a rule, comment on press articles about foreign politicians (Süddeutsche Zeitung Online, 5 July 2006). The left-liberal Polish press agreed that a prime minister ought to deal with more important things than trivial articles in small newspapers. Lech Kaczynski was reportedly enraged about the matter and, without a compelling reason, cancelled the imminent Weimar Triangle meeting with Jacques Chirac and Angela Merkel (Süddeutsche Zeitung Online, 10 July 2006, 12 July 2006).

This episode foreshadowed a pattern that was to be repeated over the following years. Poland's 'path to Europe' does indeed lead through Germany, and bilateral frictions have the potential to encumber the country's relations with the EU. In a confrontational article entitled 'Europe – Still Divided', Lech Kaczynski expressed his disagreement with the framework of the proposed constitution, which would aim at deepening European divisions. It would only serve to solidify Germany's dominant position within the EU, whereas smaller countries like Poland would be discriminated against. Rather than stressing the achievements of integration and cross-national connections, he constructed a contested German-Polish dichotomy as a smaller version of Europe's divisions at large (Kaczynski, 2006). The effects of this view are examined in the following section by concentrating on the discourse surrounding two contentious themes: the problem of postwar expellees and property claims and, second, the EU voting structure.

The Presence of the Past: Expellees, Territorial Claims and Reparations

Patterns of rememberingWorldWar II within German public discourse have always been carefully observed by the international community. The latest debate, if reported selectively as has been the case in Poland, does indeed lend itself to the interpretation that major revisionist tendencies are at work in present-day Germany. The debate was triggered in 2002 by Jörg Friedrich's book on the bombing of Hamburg and other cities, in which he focused on ordinary Germans as victims of allied wartime bombings. In the same vein, an anonymous woman published her recollections of rape at the hands of Red Army soldiers after the capture of Berlin (Anonyma, 2003; Friedrich, 2002). A major cornerstone of the 'discourse of victimhood' has been the theme of ethnic Germans' expulsion from territories that are now part of Poland and the Czech Republic. Works concentrating on their suffering have included a documentation by popular historian Guido Knopp, a three-part TV series entitled Die Flucht (The Flight) and Günter Grass' novel Im Krebsgang (Crabwalk), in which the Nobel laureate reconstructs the sinking of the refugee ship Wilhelm Gustloff by the Red Army (Aust & Burgdorff, 2003). The traditional perpetrator–victim dichotomy was further undermined by research into Poles' participation in the killing of Jews duringWorldWar II (Gross, 2001). For the Polish right, these activities were proof that Germans were eager to rewrite history by deflecting some of their own guilt onto other groups, including Poles, which hitherto had made their status as victims part of their collective identity.

The most contentious object of debate, however, was (and still is) the planning of the Zentrum gegen Vertreibungen (Center against Expulsions). It was initiated in 2000 by a trust that aims to serve international understanding and the banishment of expulsion and genocide as political instruments. Its chairpersons were the president of the Association of Expellees, the CDU parliamentarian Erika Steinbach and the former SPD general secretary, Peter Glotz. Supporters included moderate voices such as Cardinal Karl Lehmann or Jewish intellectuals such as Ralph Giordano and Imre Kertész – a fact that was ignored by the Polish press. The initiative triggered a wave of vehement protest in Poland. According to Sejm parliamentarian Jan Maria Rokita, for example, this was yet another attempt by the Germans to redefine their historical self-definition as victims, being in line with the 'political selfishness' that the Schröder administration had displayed at the EU level (Urban, 2005: 34–35). Erika Steinbach was singled out as the embodiment of German revisionism. For author Pawel Huelle, she was 'proof that the Germans are still evil ... If the evil Germans did not exist already, one would have to invent them' (Spiegel 25/2007). The conservative Polish press jumped at the opportunity. The weekly magazine Wprost, for example, carried a photomontage of Erika Steinbach in a Nazi uniform riding on Gerhard Schröder's back on a 2003 cover page. The picture was entitled 'The German Trojan Horse' (Spiegel 25/2007).