Expellees, Counterfactualism and Potatoes. Enlargement and Cross-National Debates in German-Polish Relations

Stefan Manz

Introduction

Eastern enlargement of the EU has triggered not only renegotiations of European identity but also of bilateral relationships. Constructions of Cold War dichotomies between East and West need to be reconsidered as former 'enemies' now find themselves under a single umbrella that aims at political, economic, military and cultural integration. If we accept the assessment of the former EU commissioner for enlargement, Günter Verheugen, that 'German-Polish dialogue is the core of European unification' (Verheugen, 2004: 8), eastern enlargement could not have had a less promising start. The new closeness between the two nations appeared to have reinforced rather than dissolved long-held mutual suspicions and negative perceptions. Polish and German observers agreed in the immediate post-enlargement period that the relationship between the two countries had hit its lowest point since 1989. Because bilateral issues now have to be increasingly negotiated at the EU level, the belligerent past and strained present relationship between Germany and Poland even cast a shadow over Poland's first European appearance as a full-fledged EU member state. EU leaders and officials unanimously felt the country to be the new 'awkward partner' (Grabbe, 2004) – a role traditionally held by the United Kingdom (George, 1998) – that fought battles of the past instead of concentrating on a common future.

This chapter takes a closer look at the period between the runup to 1 May 2004, when Poland and nine other countries joined the European Union, and October 2007, when national-conservative Prime Minister Jaroslaw Kaczynski was replaced by a more conciliatory successor, Donald Tusk. Analyzing the cross-national friction points and debates that unfolded during this period allows us to assess the extent to which bilateral relationships are increasingly negotiated at the EU level. This chapter is mainly based on German broadsheet articles (especially Spiegel/Spiegel online, Süddeutsche Zeitung/sueddeutsche.de, Tageszeitung and Die Zeit/zeit.de) and aims to ascertain the effect of enlargement and 'Europeanization' (Zaborowski, 2004: 5–26) on the triangular Poland– Germany–EU relationship.

Historical Burdens

A historical outline is crucial for understanding current debates and the pervading European dimension of this relationship. Although few Central European countries were exempt from German military aggression over the centuries, it was Poland that arguably suffered most under its larger neighbor. Three partitions in the second half of the eighteenth century eliminated the Polish state from the map of Europe, dividing the country between Russia, Austria and Prussia. Throughout the nineteenth century, Prussia pursued a policy of forced Germanization in occupied western Poland, trying to push back the Polish language and Catholicism through administrative measures and mass expulsions. Bismarck reinforced these Kulturkampf measures after German unification in 1871, and ethnic cohesion became a cornerstone of national identity construction in the newly founded German Empire. An influential expatriate community of Polish aristocrats and artists (e.g. Adam Mickiewicz and Frédéric Chopin), mainly based in Paris, upheld notions of independence and assertiveness that remain reference points for the nation today (Urban, 2004: 17–24). Independence in 1918 was achieved not least of all through US president Woodrow Wilson's support. Long-lasting notions of the United States as a guardian of Polish security interests can be traced back to the Treaty of Versailles. Germany's invasion of Poland in September 1939 resulted in immeasurable destruction and triggered a global conflagration. It was followed by a postwar settlement that allocated a quarter of German territory to Poland and resulted in the expulsion of 7.5 million ethnic Germans. It also resulted in a border dispute over the Oder–Neisse line, which remained unresolved throughout the Cold War and continues to cast its shadow over the bilateral relationship today (Bingen, 2005; Lebioda, 2000; Müller, 2004; Urban, 2004; Zaborowski, 2004: 1–2).

The end of communism presented an opportunity to normalize relations and create a 'win-win' situation for both countries. Germany could cast off its precarious position as a Frontstaat (front-line state) against the east by supporting Polish integration into western economic and political structures. Poland, on the other hand, could now realize its 'return to Europe'. The era of communism was interpreted as a historical aberration, having separated the country from its 'natural' sociopolitical and economic environment (Zaborowski, 2004: 124–126). It was accepted that 'the way to Europe leads through Germany' (Holesch, 2007: 23), and Germany willingly took on the role of Poland's advocate in the EU. For the first time in 200 years, both countries' interests seemed to converge, and a Werte- und Interessensgemeinschaft (community of values and interests) (Hudabiunigg, 2004: 160) could be proclaimed by foreign minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski. Tangible progress was made in this direction. The treaty on 'Good Neighborly Relations...