The triad: America, Europe and Japan — united or fragmented?

The phase of the global deployment of capitalism, which began in 1945 but was impeded until the collapse of the post-war social orders (welfare state, Sovietism, national populism in the South), is characterized by the emergence of a collective imperialism. The 'triad' (that is, the United States plus its Canadian external province, Europe west of the Polish frontier, and Japan — to which we should add Australia and New Zealand) defines the area of this collective imperialism. It 'manages' the economic dimension of capitalist globalization through the institutions at its service (WTO, IMF, World Bank, OECD), and the political–military dimension through Nato, whose responsibilities have been redefined so that it can in effect substitute itself for the United Nations.

Yet the current moment in this phase is also characterized by a US offensive to impose its own leadership on the triad, involving a conception of 'military control of the planet' worked out by the George W. Bush administration. The question that immediately arises is whether this is a viable conception. Are the triad partners forced to accept US leadership, either in the stark forms unilaterally decided by Washington or with some 'concessions' that allow for a less unbalanced division of responsibilities and benefits? Or are we heading towards a radical, if gradual, challenge to Atlanticism (and the complementary asymmetrical alliance between the USA and Japan), and therefore towards the breaking up of the triad? In both cases, we need to be clear what the different developments would entail for North–South relations.

In the immediate term, the United States enjoys an evident strategic advantage: its project is the only one that is clearly and openly formulated and, by virtue of the initiatives taken by Washington, the only one that is actually in play. Up to now its partners in the international community — the triad allies and the rest — have done nothing more than respond to those initiatives, whether by falling into line, accepting with bad grace or seeking to limit some of the consequences they find most troubling to themselves. None has a really positive alternative to guide its strategy, and in a thoroughly disorganized manner each places the immediate emphasis on what it considers to be the defence of its own interests.

The question we posed does not admit of a simple answer, for the contemporary world has been undergoing a number of massive changes. Europe, now the largest trading power, has embarked on a common project of political construction that will probably rule out a return to the internecine wars of its past. Japan has become a major economic power, and a large part of Asia is heading along the road of accelerated development. The United States, for its part, has made a sensational comeback, while the disappearance of 'actually existing socialism' has helped to spread the idea that capitalism is the only possible future for all nations. In these conditions, the geometry of possible rapprochement among the different poles of power and wealth has become extremely complex.

To see our way more clearly, we may usefully start by analysing the project of the US ruling class and identifying its strengths and weaknesses. Then we shall consider how Europe — or the different Europes — and Japan are responding to the challenge, and which conditions need to be fulfilled if the various options of the triad partners are to take effect. This analysis will allow us to clarify the nature of possible conflicts within the triad, and to identify the terrain on which they might occur. It will also enable us to begin discussion on what the various scenarios would entail for North–South relations.

The project of the American ruling class: extension of the Monroe doctrine to the rest of the world

The project that the US ruling class has cherished since 1945 now has five objectives: (i) to neutralize and subjugate the other triad partners (Europe and Japan) and to minimize their capacity to act outside the American fold; (ii) to establish military control over Nato and to 'Latin Americanize' the former parts of the Soviet world; (iii) to assert undivided control over the Middle East and its oil resources; (iv) to break up China, to ensure the subordination of the other major states (India, Brazil), and to prevent the constitution of any regional blocs that might renegotiate the terms of globalization; and (v) to marginalize regions in the South that are of no strategic interest.

The project, which was devised after Potsdam and grounded on the American nuclear monopoly, has always assigned a key role to its military dimension. In a very short time the United States put in place a global military strategy, divided the globe into a number of regions, and created several 'Military Commands' to take responsibility for each. The aim was not only to encircle the USSR (and China) but also to make Washington the worldwide master of last resort: in other words, to extend to the whole planet the Monroe doctrine that had already staked its claim to run the New World in accordance with its own 'national interests'.

The main instrument in the current US drive for hegemony is therefore military. Such hegemony would in turn guarantee that of the triad over the global system, but the allies of the United States would have to accept their subaltern status, as Britain and Japan already do, and to recognize its necessity without feeling even any 'cultural' qualms. This means, however, that the talk of economic strength with which European politicians regale their local constituencies would lose all purchase on reality. If Europe places itself entirely on the ground of mercantile disputes, without advancing any project of its own, it will have been defeated in advance. People in Washington are well aware of that.

The project implies that the 'sovereign national interests of the United States' should hold sway over all other principles defining what is regarded as legitimate political behaviour; it leads to systematic distrust of all international law.

The ruling class of the United States freely proclaims that it will not 'tolerate' the reconstitution of any economic or military power capable of challenging its global domination. To this end, it has given itself the right to wage 'preventive wars', with three main potential adversaries in mind.

First, the dismemberment of the Russian Federation, following that of the USSR, is a major strategic objective for the United States. Until now the Russian ruling class does not appear to have understood this. It seemed convinced that, having lost the war, it could go on to win the peace — as Germany and Japan did before it. What it forgot was...