Dissident Marxism 1917–1989

In order to explain the distinctive character of the left in this period, it is appropriate to introduce the main historical forces. This chapter describes the most important processes that shaped the lives of the dissident left, including the trajectory of capitalism in this period, and the main traditions of the dissident and non-dissident left. There is not the space to offer a full history of the short twentieth century, nor even to provide a complete history of dissident Marxism. The history of this tradition was too diverse for it to be summarised in the limited space here. The purpose of this chapter is simply to introduce some key issues, which will be developed more fully in the subsequent chapters.

This chapter begins with a history not of the left, but of the world around it. It would be possible to write a history of socialism which was purely internal in character, but such a history would be misleading. At its best, the dissident left was an activist, combatant tradition. Any history of the left that observes only its own favourites can make no sense of their distinctive position. It would be like a Hollywood film of the Second World War, but a distinct one in which every single actor played a British or American role. If there were no opponents, then why was there a conflict? Before examining any movements of the left — either the dominant traditions of Stalinism and social democracy or the challengers which sprang away from them — it is right to say something about the way in which the world's economic and political system developed in these years. The changing nature of capitalism was the most important factor in making the left what it became.

The other side

At the start of our period, the majority of people lived on the land. Large numbers had already migrated from small towns and the countryside into the major cities. There, they exchanged forms of near-subsistence farming for a new life as paid industrial labourers. Huge proletarian bastions were formed in such cities as Glasgow, Turin, Paris, London, St Petersburg, Chicago and Berlin. The voters from these districts had already chosen socialism. In Germany, for example, the Social Democratic Party (SPD) received by 1914 roughly twice as many votes as each of the conservative parties combined. In global politics, the world was divided into several blocs. The great military powers, including the French, British, Ottoman, Russia, Japanese, Austro-Hungarian and German empires, controlled vast territories, and many diverse peoples. The greatest economic power was Britain, but her influence was slipping. As recently as 1850, around one-half of the world's industrial production had been controlled by the United Kingdom. Sixty-five years later, there was a rough parity between the volume of industrial goods (minerals, metals and chemicals) produced by each of America, Britain and Germany. The economic competition between these mighty states was a major factor pushing the world towards war. In the meantime, other processes were working to change the world. Among them can be counted the development of science and technology, the spread of democracy, the growth of liberation movements among the colonial people and next among women and other 'minorities', the capture of the world's population by the unit of the state, the relative decline of some powers (Austria, Britain), and the rise of others (Russia and the USA).

These seventy-five years witnessed extraordinary progress in human understanding of the world, and in the mastering of technique to apply this knowledge. In the field of biology, breakthroughs included the discovery of penicillin and vaccination. In physics, Einstein's theory of general relativity was confirmed in 1918. It was followed by the validation of quantum mechanics, and the splitting of the atom. Yet the application of science was manifested not only in the spread of new products, cars, cinema and radio (in the 1930s), television and washing machines (in the 1950s and 1960s). The spread of technology also enabled other people to perfect the technique of killing. Millions died in the two world wars. We should also remember those civilians who were murdered in Armenia in 1915–23, in the Ukraine during collectivisation, in the Holocaust, and those killed by US bombers in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia during the 1960s and 1970s.

Over the period as a whole, two important ideas seem to have gained currency. One was that every person in the world belonged to a certain state. Another was that the political leadership of these societies should not be fixed by inheritance, but instead should be decided with some reference to the choices of the people living in them. The proliferation of a consensus in favour of political democracy helps to explain why it was that at the start of our period only two states in Africa enjoyed independence (Liberia and Ethiopia), while at the end the majority of states possessed limited political sovereignty. The most important single story of these years was the gaining of democracy by the nations of the Third World: a process which continued through until the defeat of American forces in Vietnam. By the end of our period, some degree of internal equality had also been won, for example by the women's liberation and Black Power movements of the 1960s and 1970s.

Although such secular trends as the proliferation of science, war, feminism and democracy are important, it is also useful to talk about the different periods that people lived through. From one period to another, the strategies of the people in power varied. Successive decades 'felt' different — even if sometimes the exact contrasts were hard to pin down. The most obvious breaks occurred at the levels of the states and state policy. Ruling-class tactics changed from one period to the next. Between 1914 and 1929, for example, the shape of the world was determined by the events of the First World War. The conflict was a total mobilisation of people and capital, in which ten million died. The conduct of the war was economic. The two main rivals, Britain and Germany, attempted to starve each other to death. States were given unprecedented powers to organise their people for war. Strong states with huge economic powers having been established, there was a profound unwillingness after 1918 to return to the pre-war liberal order. Into the 1920s, the end of the war seemed to create a brief economic boom. The new machinery that had been produced was given over to peacetime tasks. In America, the 1920s were seen as prosperous and carefree — the jazz age — an era of conspicuous wealth. Yet in Europe the short boom of 1919–21...