Movement Identity, Narrative and Memory

Since the 'cultural turn' in social movement studies, collective identity has been a central theme in research about political activism. Collective identity is widely understood as constitutive of social movements since activists' collective actions and continued commitment depend on the commonalities they recognise among each other. Moreover, collective identity is considered a concept that allows insights into movement dynamics that other approaches to social movements left largely unaddressed, in particular resource mobilisation and political process models owing to their structural and instrumental focus. This concerns especially the questions how collective actors and interests emerge and what motivates collective actions and strategies beyond calculations of costs and benefits (Polletta & Jasper, 2001; Flesher Fominaya, 2010a). Accordingly, collective identity is frequently drawn upon to explain a variety of movement dynamics, including the emergence, trajectories and outcomes of movements.

The frequent use of the term, however, stands in stark contrast with its fragmentary conceptualisation (Rucht, 1995; Daphi, 2011). Francesca Polletta and James Jasper (2001) similarly argue that 'collective identity has been forced to do too much analytically', leaving key questions about how collective identity is formed unanswered (p. 284). In this way, studies often take the existence of collective identity for granted rather than exploring its formation empirically (Hunt & Benford, 2008). Furthermore, I argue that studies that do examine the construction of movement identity tend to focus on either its cognitive or emotional dimension, neglecting the interplay of these dimensions.

With the aim to provide a more comprehensive insight into collective identity formation, this book analyses the interplay of cognitive, relational and emotional dynamics of identity formation by drawing on a narrative approach. Focusing in particular on collective narratives about the movement's past, the analysis sheds light on connections between identity, narrative and memory and brings together the recently growing strand of research on narratives with that on memory in social movements. The following outlines the book's conceptual and analytical approach, first defining collective identity as a group characteristic constructed in social interaction , which outlines shared cognitions, social boundaries and emotional proximity. Second, I argue that a narrative approach to movement identity is particularly conducive to jointly considering collective identity's cognitive, relational and emotional dimensions. Third, I add detail to the book's focus on a particular type of narrative, 'group memories', that is, collective narratives about a group's history, drawing on the literature on collective memory. Fourth, I propose an analytical procedure that combines content and structural analysis of narratives. Finally, I present the data drawn upon in this book.

COLLECTIVE IDENTITY IN SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

Movement identity refers to the collective identity of a social movement. In contrast to individual and social identity, collective identity concerns the definition of a collective as a group with certain commonalities that members ascribe to it in interaction. This book hence considers collective identity as socially constructed (Blumer, 1969; Berger & Luckmann, 1991). This means that commonalities are not simply a matter of preexisting similarities (e.g., personal dispositions) or objectively shared interested, but are actively and continuously constructed and reconstructed in social interaction (Melucci, 1989, 1996; Taylor and Whittier, 1992; Hunt et al., 1994; Rucht, 1995; Eder, 2000; Flesher Fominaya, 2010a). The formation of collective identity thus involves considerable efforts in meaning making, in so-called identity work (Snow & Anderson, 1987). Such 'identity work' takes place in continued interactions that actors engage in individually and collectively constructing commonalities in relation to other actors, including opponents (Snow & McAdam, 2001). 'Imaginations about commonalities' (Jasper & McGarry, 2015), hence, are continuous 'interactional accomplishments' (Hunt & Benford, 2008).

Furthermore, this book – contrary to other publications on movement identity – locates collective identity at the group level (Melucci, 1996; Gamson, 1992; Flesher Fominaya, 2010a) rather than the individual level: Collective identity is understood to refer to the characteristics of a group rather than individuals' qualities or connections to the group. In this vein, collective identity goes beyond the sum of individual identities and identification processes and constitutes a social fact sui generis (Durkheim, 1965), a set of shared meanings that influences social action (Billig, 1995; Eder, 2009; Johnston et al., 1994). As such, collective identity also differs from social identity since it is constitutive of groups: members of the group are not only determined externally as such, but actively share and formulate commonalities (Rucht, 2011). Hence, while related, personal, social and collective identities concern different levels of identity work.

What does collective identity consist of? What are its central 'ingredients' (Daphi & Rucht, 2011)? There are various distinctions between collective identity's different dimensions (e.g., Taylor & Whittier, 1992; Hunt & Benford, 2008). I draw an analytic distinction between three dimensions – shared cognitions, social boundaries and emotional proximity. This combines Alberto Melucci's seminal distinction between collective identity's cognitive, relational and emotional dimensions with Verta Taylor and Nancy Whittier's (1992) influential conceptualisation of movement identity. Cognitive, relational and emotional dimensions of identity formation, of course, overlap empirically; for example, social boundaries may draw on differences in cognitive definitions or feelings of anger. However, their distinction provides a useful analytical tool to understand different elements of identity formation.

First, a shared outlook on the world is crucial in defining a collective as a group since an outlook defines the group's ends, means and field of action (Melucci, 1996). Such shared cognitions include what Taylor and Whittier (1992) define as consciousness: 'the interpretative frameworks that emerge out of a challenging group's struggle to define and realize its interests' (p. 111). Shared cognitions hence are malleable; they are continuously negotiated and renegotiated (della Porta et al., 2006). They centrally include diagnostic and prognostic frames, that is, shared views on relevant issues, sources of problems and...