The political landscape of Europe

Since the financial crisis in 2008–9, centre-left parties have been performing poorly in almost every EU member state. The present electoral map is bleak; as Figure 1.1 of EU15 countries since 1946 demonstrates, the electoral position of centre-left parties has been in dramatic decline since the late 2000s having risen fairly consistently throughout the postwar years.

The period of electoral decline seems, nonetheless, to have preceded the financial crisis; since the early 1970s, social democracy has undergone a period of 'significant electoral retreat' which worsened during the 2000s. Although the vote share of centre-left parties had eroded, many experts resisted the claim that social democracy was in a state of terminal decline: after all, centre-left parties in most countries were one of two dominant political formations and therefore likely to gain support to form a government at some point in the near future (Moschonas, 2008). More recent trends indicate this may be rather optimistic: even in the UK, where the Labour party's position is entrenched by the first-past-the-post electoral system, there are indications that the traditional two-party system is gradually breaking down.

In recent years, social democrats in western Europe have either been in government, where they have experienced record unpopularity such as in France, or they have been weak junior members of coalition governments with limited room for political manoeuvre, such as Germany and the Netherlands. The French socialists have been divided since François Hollande's presidential victory in 2011: the traditional left in the party sought to put forward a radical alternative to austerity based on higher personal and corporate taxation, while the reformists now backed by President Hollande battled to reform France's apparently arcane labour regulations and introduce tighter controls on public spending. This is a reaction to the deep structural problems afflicting the French economy; nonetheless, Hollande is the most unpopular president in France since polling began.

In the Netherlands, the PvDA has had to cope with much greater electoral volatility as the result of new economic and cultural cleavages over immigration and European integration. As a member of the coalition government, the PvDA has acceded to a major austerity programme including cuts in provision for the elderly which has alienated its core supporters, having promised previously to return to traditional social democracy. In Germany, the SPD entered another 'grand coalition' with Merkel's Christian Democrats in 2013; the dilemma for the SPD is how to differentiate its approach in a coalition, especially when the refugee crisis has antagonised its own working-class supporters. In fairness, according to the Economist "the SPD extracted some big concessions as a price for entering the coalition", notably the minimum wage and capping rents in German cities. Nonetheless, the French Socialists and the German SPD have not succeeded in forging a shared approach to the eurozone crisis and austerity: in Germany, fiscal conservatism still prevails, even on the left, and the momentum for shifting the policy approach towards a 'European growth compact' has stalled.

Scandinavia has traditionally been the heartland of European social democracy, but even here, the omens for the centre left are hardly propitious. In Sweden, Stefan Löfven's Social Democrats failed to secure an overall majority in national elections despite an unpopular centre-right government. The Social Democrats had already declined dramatically in the polls before the eruption of the refugee crisis; they came to power apparently lacking a political project for Sweden's future. The consensus among Swedish voters in favour of immigration appears to be collapsing amid rising support in the polls for the Sweden Democrats. In the meantime, in Denmark the Social Democrats were ejected from government in 2015, despite becoming the largest party amid rising support for the populist right. The resignation of Helle Thorning-Schmidt as leader led to the installation of Mette Frederiksen who has vowed to continue with the policies of 'economic responsibility'; she has signalled an intention to vigorously pursue the interests of 'wage-earners' while affirming the goal of full employment. The Social Democrats have also maintained a tough stance on the recent refugee crisis, refusing to be outflanked by the centre right on policy and rhetoric.

Elsewhere in northern Europe, the British Labour party has suffered two consecutive general election defeats since 2010. The party recovered some support in 2015 achieving 30.4 per cent of the vote, but it won fewer seats due to the catastrophic meltdown of its electoral position in Scotland and its poor performance throughout much of England. Labour's new leader, Jeremy Corbyn, hails from the far left and promises to rejuvenate the party by returning to traditional socialist principles; the polls so far indicate that he is struggling to convince a sceptical electorate despite the fact the governing Conservative party is badly divided over Europe. In Ireland, the Irish Labour party achieved its worst ever result in recent elections having been a junior coalition partner in a 'pro-austerity' coalition government; it won only seven parliamentary seats compared to 33 at the previous election. Nonetheless, there is speculation that the party might return to government, although many believe Labour must now go into opposition and rebuild its position from the backbenches.

The socialist parties of southern Europe, notably Greece and Spain, have demonstrated growing strength since the 1980s, but they have been eclipsed since the financial crash. In Greece, the social democratic party, Pasok, sought to present itself as a force for national stability, but was catastrophically divided when the former prime minister, George Papandreou, formed a breakaway party, Kidiso (the Movement of Democrats and Socialists). This led to a splintering of votes on the centre left towards the radical alternative, Syriza; in the most recent Greek elections, Pasok achieved only 6.3 per cent of the popular vote. Syriza has moderated its position by doing what is necessary to keep Greece within the eurozone, further squeezing Pasok on the centre left. Syriza's leader, Alexis Tsipras, has been able to execute this 'U-turn' since the majority of his voters want to moderate austerity, rather than leave the euro. This has left Pasok electorally and politically bereft. In Spain, Psoe achieved its worst ever result in the December 2015 elections, securing 90 parliamentary seats and 22 per cent of the vote. While Psoe was pivotal to the coalition negotiations, since a majority of votes went to parties of the left, the options did not appear palatable and there were fresh elections in June 2016. The PP secured 137 seats while Psoe managed to hold on to second place against a strong challenge from the left-populist party, Podemos, which secured 85 seats and 22.7 per cent of the vote. However, the problem for the Psoe is that any agreement with Podemos might rupture the Psoe's own internal organisation, particularly over the issue of the future of Catalonia; a national unity government with Mariano Rajoy's PP would be popular with the European Union and the financial sector, but it would simply reinforce the perception that the mainstream parties in Spain are 'all the same'. The risk would be a further haemorrhage of votes away from Psoe. In Portugal meanwhile, the Social Democrats have entered a fragile coalition with other 'leftist' parties.

The exception to the rule of centre-left gloom in southern Europe is, of course, Italy. Matteo Renzi's government has had some success in pursuing structural reforms to reduce taxes on employment and property boosting the private sector, aided by improvements in the performance of the Italian economy; according to the finance minister, Pier Carlo Padoan, "Italy is back". The question for Renzi's government is whether further progress can be made in reforming the Italian constitution and taking additional steps to prevent corruption; the prime minister faces a difficult referendum on constitutional reform later this year which he might well lose. Similarly, Malta has a successful centre-left administration in place.

The collapse of social democracy in eastern and central Europe since the 1990s has been remarkable. Astonishingly, Poland currently has no mainstream left parliamentary representation, as the Left Coalition failed to gain enough votes to beat the 8 per cent threshold, while the post-Communist SLD appear in danger of becoming obsolete. The Polish left has completely fragmented with an array of parties jostling for position and influence. The Czech Republic is currently governed by a social democratic prime minister, but elsewhere in the accession countries, Conservative parties prevail; even Hungary has shifted towards authoritarianism.

Centre-left parties are not in government because they are losing elections; they are defeated predominantly because their electorates are fragmenting towards 'challenger' parties on the left and the right. The causes of defeat vary between countries: having decried capitalism since the financial crisis, social democratic parties seem more interested in debating problems than proposing concrete solutions; and on the major challenges of migration, security and terrorism confronting Europe, social democrats appear to have little new or important to say. Social democracy is not only electorally moribund; it lacks a 'big idea' for the future of European society. Against this backdrop, it seems plausible to predict the demise of the mainstream social democratic left in Europe. The chapter that follows will address which key voter groups the left is losing.

WHICH VOTERS ARE THE LEFT LOSING?

This chapter examines how the long-term erosion of support for social democratic parties among voters can be explained. The prevailing view among political scientists is that having repositioned themselves in the centre ground as 'catch-all' parties after the second world war, social democrats have alienated their traditional working-class supporters, just as they have gained a new, but precarious, base of middle-class support. New Labour in the UK is an exemplar of the shift, but the German SPD and the Swedish Social Democratic party are both held to have moved in a similar modernising 'neoliberal' direction.

There is support for the claim that becoming 'catch-all' parties with moderated policy positions does have adverse electoral consequences for social democrats. It appears that in most countries, working-class voters have defected from centre-left parties towards the radical left and more often, the populist right; whereas social democratic parties were once part of the process of 'democratic class struggle' and decommodification through the development of the welfare state, they no longer perform that historical role. This argument nonetheless underplays the structural impact of class de-alignment alongside disenchantment with established political movements on the decline in support for the left. Such a perspective implies that if only centre-left parties embraced statist social democracy, all would be well. The focus on the 'traditional working class' ignores structural change and misunderstands how economic insecurity has spread to new occupational groups in society. Middle-class support for social democracy has grown among the 'salaried middle strata' and the 'educated and intellectual professions'. The primary reason why social democratic parties appear to be losing elections, however, is that the support base of social democracy has fragmented over the last three decades.

FRAGMENTATION AS 'THE NEW NORMAL'

Centre-left parties are confronting a political dilemma that is far from new: their coalition of support is fracturing as the secular decline of the manual working class has forced them to seek middle-class votes which do not solidify into enduring electoral coalitions. This is a political environment characterised by a breakdown in 'hereditary voting patterns' and the erosion of stable political affiliations (Moschonas, 2008). In the main, electorates are more fragmented and volatile than in the 'golden age' of postwar social democracy. Social democratic parties are operating in a world of 'relative classlessness' characterised by 'a diverse and fluid electorate in which socially structured partisanship is weak, while the potential for volatility is high and increasing' (Padgett, 2003: 47). Moreover, unprecedented numbers of voters no longer participate in the political system. John Callaghan (2009) emphasises that social democracy has been increasingly under pressure, as the case for the traditional activist state has been undermined. From the right, neoliberalism has emphasised the negation of the state in favour of the market; from the left, the culture of 'left libertarianism' has further challenged statism and collectivism (Callaghan, 2009). The goal of centre-left parties is to forge enduring political coalitions in a more segmented and fractured political environment. The emphasis, as ever, is on reconciling seemingly divergent, if not contradictory strategic interests.

CULTURE AND CLASS

Much previous analysis has adopted the more traditional lens of analysing social democracy's electoral coalition in terms of voter groups centred on a broad notion of social class. Yet across western societies, the relationship between class identity and partisan affiliation has substantially broken down: culture is increasingly seen to trump economics. An alternative framework involves understanding voter groups in terms of cultural 'types' rather than occupational categories. This is more sophisticated than the dualism which is frequently posited in the literature between 'communitarian' and 'cosmopolitan' voters (Callaghan, 2009). In Callaghan's schema, for example:

• Traditionalist voters emphasise material solidarity, traditional forms of collectivism, the preservation of postwar welfare states, alongside the importance of class-based social movements such as the trade unions. They are often resistant to developments in the European Union, for example greater freedom of movement and labour mobility.

• Modernist voters place a high premium on individual achievement and aspiration alongside material economic growth and improvements in living standards. They are broadly sympathetic to the 'consumerist' agenda of politics putting an emphasis on material prosperity. They are wary of growing government spending and any rise in the overall tax burden.

• Post-materialist voters prioritise quality of life, emphasising ecological concerns, the climate change transition, and environmental sustainability as key political imperatives. They are often relatively 'cash rich' but 'time poor', valuing greater freedom from paid work.

• Hedonistic 'post-modernist' voters are libertarian 'pleasure-seekers' who stress the importance of freedom and civil liberties. They are generally 'anti-statist' and particularly drawn towards the potential of new technology as well as markets. They are enemies of paternalism and want greater autonomy to govern their own lives (Callaghan, 2009:47).

What is apparent from Callaghan's approach is the difficulty of constructing a political coalition across these social groups given the apparently sharp divergence in social and political attitudes and interests. Nick Lowles and Anthony Painter (2011) have similarly developed this sociological typology analysing the 'new tribes of identity politics' drawing largely on empirical data from the UK:

• Their first group are confident multiculturals predominantly drawn from the professional and managerial occupational classes. They have a tendency to support centre-left and green parties, and are generally positive about diversity, cosmopolitanism, and mass immigration, believing that western societies do well from globalisation.

• Second, mainstream liberals who have similar values to multiculturals and are also well-educated. They may be more sceptical about immigration but still regard it as a 'net benefit' to their country.

• Third, identity ambivalents do not have this degree of confidence in the future, and are generally less optimistic about their country's potential. They tend to be ambivalent about immigration given its impact on public services and social housing on which they are often dependent. This group often includes black and minority ethnic voters.

• Fourth, culturally integrationist voters are in the main older and more prosperous, tending to support centre-right Conservative parties. According to Lowles and Painter, this group's concern about immigration relates to national identity and integration, rather than pressure on living standards and public services.

• Fifth, latent hostiles are less well-educated, and fearful of the impact of immigration and globalisation on their economic prospects and way of life. They want political parties to defend national identity and the distinctive values of their societies.

• The final group exhibit active enmity: they display open hostility to immigrants and are generally intolerant of religious and ethnic differences. These voters are the most disengaged from the formal political system and are often prepared to support far-right parties.