Introduction

The European Union (EU) is a major political and economic achievement in post–World War II Europe, created to guarantee the stability, growth and prosperity of its members. Over the past decades, it has expanded its jurisdictional authority over a number of key policy areas, including the single market, trade, the euro currency, justice, fundamental rights and citizenship. However, increased economic and political integration have produced growing party and public opposition. Euroscepticism, a term used to describe the disapproval of and opposition to closer European integration, has become an 'embedded' feature of both national and EU politics 'with the potential to cause irreparable damage to the EU's quest for legitimacy and stability' (Usherwood and Startin 2013: 2). The EU's failure to promptly resolve the Eurozone and migration crises has further eroded the project's credibility and has strengthened anti-EU sentiment among European citizens. Trust in the EU was at a record low at 33 per cent in 2016 compared to 57 per cent in 2007 (Eurobarometer 2016).

Within this ever-growing environment of 'constraining dissensus' (Hooghe and Marks 2009), the strongest advocates of Eurosceptic views may be found within the far right party family (Vasilopoulou 2011). Far right parties perceive the EU as posing a threat to nation-states' cultural homogeneity and national sovereignty. The EU's supranational decision-making structures, its global outlook and its promotion of cultural diversity go against the far right's mission of defending the nation (Halikiopoulou et al. 2012; see also Marks and Wilson 2000; Hooghe et al. 2002). Far right parties are also ideally placed to oppose the EU. Their marginal position in their domestic party systems provides them with additional incentives to criticise the EU (e.g. Taggart 1998; Sitter 2001). Indeed, Hainsworth (2008: 85) argues that '[these parties] are well placed to act as the voice of popular opposition and protest against developments declared to be anti-national'. In short, by virtue of their nationalist ideology and marginal status, far right parties across Europe put forward similar Eurosceptic positions, i.e., they oppose the entire process of European integration. These parties are 'distinguished by their intense Europhobia' (Marks and Wilson 2000: 457).

This book questions this very premise. It argues and empirically substantiates that far right party Euroscepticism is by no means uniform. In fact, a comparison of these parties' positions on European integration reveals that they vary from complete rejection of the entire EU project to weak support for aspects of European integration. For example, despite a somewhat positive approach in the 1980s, the French National Front's EU position has crystallised into strong opposition to the EU. The party rejects the principle of multilateral co-operation at the EU level. It denounces all EU treaties as allegedly marking the end of nation-states' political sovereignty and economic prosperity. Marine Le Pen – President of the party since 2011 – has maintained her father's hard Eurosceptic position by calling for a referendum on France's EU membership. Following the party's historic victory during the May 2014 European Parliament (EP) elections, when it claimed first place in the polls, Marine Le Pen upheld this view by stating: 'I do not want this European Soviet Union' (Spiegel 2014). Other far right parties, such as the Greek Popular Orthodox Rally (LAOS), on the other hand, do not support their country's withdrawal from the EU. While LAOS opposes the creation of a European political union and is critical of various EU policies, it accepts the principle of European co-operation at a higher multilateral level. Interestingly, despite the fact that the Greek crisis presented an opportunity for the party to harden its EU stance, LAOS weakly supported the EU's economic adjustment programme for Greece. The – now dissolved – Italian National Alliance (successor of the neo-fascist Italian Social Movement) progressed from a critical position in the 1980s and early 1990s towards a more conciliatory view of European integration in the 2000s. The party accepted, by and large, EU policy integration and recognised the importance of EU institutions. Although it was unfavourable to various aspects of the EU project, its criticisms were mostly technical rather than substantive.

Comparative expert survey data also confirm this variation. Contrary to expectations, not all far right parties put forward extreme Eurosceptic positions. Rather, scores on the EU dimension range considerably with some far right parties strongly opposing the EU and others presenting relatively centrist or even pro-EU positions. On a scale from 1 to 7, where 1 indicates strong opposition to the EU and 7 strong support (Bakker et al. 2015), parties such as the French National Front, the British National Party and the Hungarian Jobbik have consistently positioned themselves very close to the Eurosceptic end of the dimension. Other far right parties, however, such as the Latvian For Fatherland and Freedom and the Italian National Alliance, have been supportive of various aspects of European integration, scoring between 4 and 5.75 on the same dimension. A third subset of far right parties, including the Greek LAOS, the Danish People's Party, the Northern League and the Bulgarian Attack, have adopted comparatively more moderate positions, scoring between 2 and 3 on the scale (Vasilopoulou 2018).

Why do ideologically similar parties oppose the EU to differing extents? The goal of this book is to conceptualise, analyse and explain patterns of far right Euroscepticism. In doing so, it focuses on party positions on the EU and the ways in which these parties may frame European integration. Starting from the assumption that far right parties are rational actors, the book argues that the way in which they may interpret structural incentives depends largely on their relationship with democracy, their attitude towards the polity, their target electorate/social basis and their behaviour towards competitors. Classification on these indicators leads to the identification of three far right party models, i.e., what this book terms anti-system, anti-liberal and normalised. Given that the EU is a core issue in far right parties' toolkit, it becomes a key policy in party competition. Anti-system far right parties tend to opt for a rejectionist position on the EU; anti-liberal far right parties tend to be conditional Eurosceptics; and normalised far right parties tend to adopt a compromising position on the EU. The specific Eurosceptic frame that parties may prioritise depends on the domestic political context and the ways in which they may...