The Elements of Faith

Now faith is the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen. — Hebrews 11:1

THE ORIGINS OF RELIGION can never be found through historical or archaeological research. As the distinguished William J. Goode (1918–2003) remarked, "How, under what conditions, [humans] began to believe in divine beings nearly a million years ago must remain sheer speculation [for] the data are irrevocably gone." Consequently, the only feasible way to discover the fundamental sources of religious expression is not to seek data on early humans, but to examine elementary theoretical principles about what humans are like and their existential circumstances. That, too, is a sort of expedition.

Rewards and Reason

Any adequate social scientific theory must begin, even if only implicitly, with thinking, feeling, and behaving human beings:

Proposition 1: Within the limits of their information and understanding, restricted by available options, guided by their preferences and tastes, humans will attempt to make rational choices.

Definition 1: A rational choice seeks to obtain a greater value of rewards over costs.

The first part of this proposition — "within the limits of their information" — recognizes that we can neither select choices if we do not know about them nor select the most beneficial choice if we have incorrect knowledge about the relative benefits of choices. The second part — "within the limits of their ... understanding" — acknowledges that people must make choices based on a set of principles, beliefs, or theories they hold about how things work. These may, of course, be false, but the rational person applies the principles because they are, for that moment, the most plausible assumptions. Finally, it is self-evident that people may only select from among available options, although the full range of choices actually available may not be evident to them.

However, if all humans attempt to make rational choices, why do they not always act alike? Why don't people reared in the same culture all seek the same rewards? Because their choices are guided by their preferences and tastes. This point not only helps us understand why people do not all act alike, but why it is possible for them to engage in exchanges: to swap one reward for another. Of course, not all preferences and tastes are variable — clearly, virtually everyone values some things regardless of their culture or upbringing: food, shelter, security, and affection, among others. Obviously, too, culture in general, and socialization in particular, have a substantial impact on preferences and tastes. It is neither random nor a matter of purely personal taste whether someone prays to Allah or Shiva, or indeed, whether one prays at all. Still, even within any culture, a substantial variation exists across individuals in their preferences and tastes. Some of this variation is also at least partly the result of socialization differences, but a great deal of variation is so idiosyncratic that people have no idea how they came to like or dislike certain things. As the old adage says, "There's no accounting for taste."

Finally, as already mentioned, the phrase "humans attempt to make rational choices" means that they will attempt to follow the dictates of reason in an effort to achieve their desired goals. As implied by the word "attempt," people don't always act in entirely rational ways. Sometimes we act impulsively — in haste, passion, boredom, or anger ("I really didn't stop to think about what I was doing"). Sometimes humans also err because they are lazy, careless, or neurotic. But, most of the time, normal human beings choose what they perceive to be the more reasonable option, and whenever they do so, their behavior is fully rational, even if they are mistaken.

Proposition 1 is a carefully qualified version of the rational actor proposition, because, in my judgment, the form used by most economists — the bare assertion that "people maximize rewards over costs" — is too simplistic to be plausible. But, as Definition 1 makes clear, I do assume that choices tend to involve the subjective weighing of anticipated rewards and costs. However, I do not assume that the choice will attempt to maximize the ratio of rewards to costs, as normal people often settle for less — in keeping with the commonsense saying that "enough is enough." In any event, it needs to be recognized that rewards and costs are complementary in that a lost or forgone reward is a cost, while an avoided cost is a reward. It also must be recognized that rewards and costs vary in kind, value, and generality. A reward or cost is more general to the extent that it includes other rewards or costs. Happiness is a more general reward than having a nice day. Poor health is a more general cost than having the flu. I do not attempt to characterize rewards or costs as to kind, although obviously these include psychic and intellectual, as well as material "commodities." As is obvious throughout, I assume that culture and socialization do substantially account for taste, culture providing the general outlines of what people seek (and seek to avoid), and socialization filling in many of the details. Nevertheless, all normal individuals in all societies retain a substantial leeway for idiosyncrasy, innovation, and deviance. Specifically, religious doctrines and practices do change, and some people are irreligious, not only in modern societies, but in traditional and preliterate ones as well.

However, I entirely agree with economist Gary Becker (1930–2014) that social scientists must resist the "temptation of simply postulating the required shift in 'preferences' to explain changing patterns." Thus, for example, when Methodism swept through the Church of England during the eighteenth century, resulting in a tumultuous schism, the usual response of historians and sociologists has been to ask, why did people's religious preferences change? The assumption is that events like this occur because people suddenly develop new, unmet, religious preferences or "needs." But a far better explanation of this and other such events can usually be found by postulating changes in "supply," rather than changes in preferences — that is, in religious "demand." When people change churches or even religions, it usually is not because their preferences have changed, but because the new church or faith more effectively appeals to preferences they have always had — as I pursue at length in chapter 5. In fact, even when changes in preferences do occur, this usually is the consequence, rather than the cause, of...