During the early years of the Iraq War, the US Army was unable to translate initial combat success into strategic and political victory. Iraq plunged into a complex insurgency, and defeating this insurgency required beating highly adaptive foes. A competition between the hierarchical and vertically integrated army and networked and horizontally integrated insurgents ensued. The latter could quickly adapt and conduct networked operations in a decentralized fashion; the former was predisposed to fighting via prescriptive plans under a centralized command and control.
To achieve success, the US Army went through a monumental process of organizational adaptation-a process driven by soldiers and leaders that spread throughout the institution and led to revolutionary changes in how the army supported and conducted its operations in Iraq. How the army adapted and the implications of this adaptation are the subject of this indispensable study. Intended for policymakers, defense and military professionals, military historians, and academics, this book offers a solid critique of the army's current capacity to adapt to likely future adversary strategies and provides policy recommendations for retaining lessons learned in Iraq.
Die Inhaltsangabe kann sich auf eine andere Ausgabe dieses Titels beziehen.
Chad C. Serena works at the RAND Corporation, where he analyzes national security issues with a focus on US Army strategy and doctrine. He received his PhD from the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs at the University of Pittsburgh. He previously served in the US Army as a military intelligence officer, a signals intelligence officer, and in various information operations positions in the Second Stryker brigade at Fort Lewis, Washington.
„Über diesen Titel“ kann sich auf eine andere Ausgabe dieses Titels beziehen.
Anbieter: PBShop.store UK, Fairford, GLOS, Vereinigtes Königreich
PAP. Zustand: New. New Book. Shipped from UK. Established seller since 2000. Artikel-Nr. CX-9781589017832
Anzahl: 15 verfügbar
Anbieter: Phatpocket Limited, Waltham Abbey, HERTS, Vereinigtes Königreich
Zustand: Good. Your purchase helps support Sri Lankan Children's Charity 'The Rainbow Centre'. Ex-library, so some stamps and wear, but in good overall condition. Our donations to The Rainbow Centre have helped provide an education and a safe haven to hundreds of children who live in appalling conditions. Artikel-Nr. Z1-C-006-03001
Anzahl: 1 verfügbar
Anbieter: Ria Christie Collections, Uxbridge, Vereinigtes Königreich
Zustand: New. In English. Artikel-Nr. ria9781589017832_new
Anzahl: 3 verfügbar
Anbieter: Kennys Bookstore, Olney, MD, USA
Zustand: New. During the early years of the Iraq War, the US Army was unable to translate initial combat success into strategic and political victory. Suitable for policymakers, defense and military professionals, military historians, and academics, this book offers a critique of the army's capacity to adapt to likely future adversary strategies. Num Pages: 224 pages, 4 figures, 1 table. BIC Classification: 1FBQ; 1KBB; 3JM; HBWS5; JWJ; JWKT. Category: (UF) Further/Higher Education. Dimension: 228 x 156 x 15. Weight in Grams: 370. . 2011. Paperback. . . . . Books ship from the US and Ireland. Artikel-Nr. V9781589017832
Anzahl: Mehr als 20 verfügbar
Anbieter: Revaluation Books, Exeter, Vereinigtes Königreich
Paperback. Zustand: Brand New. original edition. 206 pages. 9.00x6.00x0.50 inches. In Stock. Artikel-Nr. x-1589017838
Anzahl: 2 verfügbar
Anbieter: Speedyhen, Hertfordshire, Vereinigtes Königreich
Zustand: NEW. Artikel-Nr. NW9781589017832
Anzahl: 1 verfügbar
Anbieter: moluna, Greven, Deutschland
Zustand: New. During the early years of the Iraq War, the US Army was unable to translate initial combat success into strategic and political victory. Suitable for policymakers, defense and military professionals, military historians, and academics, this book offers a cr. Artikel-Nr. 904386904
Anzahl: Mehr als 20 verfügbar
Anbieter: AHA-BUCH GmbH, Einbeck, Deutschland
Taschenbuch. Zustand: Neu. Neuware - During the early years of the Iraq War, the US Army was unable to translate initial combat success into strategic and political victory. Iraq plunged into a complex insurgency, and defeating this insurgency required beating highly adaptive foes. A competition between the hierarchical and vertically integrated army and networked and horizontally integrated insurgents ensued. The latter could quickly adapt and conduct networked operations in a decentralized fashion; the former was predisposed to fighting via prescriptive plans under a centralized command and control. To achieve success, the US Army went through a monumental process of organizational adaptation-a process driven by soldiers and leaders that spread throughout the institution and led to revolutionary changes in how the army supported and conducted its operations in Iraq. How the army adapted and the implications of this adaptation are the subject of this indispensable study. Intended for policymakers, defense and military professionals, military historians, and academics, this book offers a solid critique of the army's current capacity to adapt to likely future adversary strategies and provides policy recommendations for retaining lessons learned in Iraq. Artikel-Nr. 9781589017832
Anzahl: 2 verfügbar