CHAPTER 1

Hari

Hari was not among those who were killed on May 21, 1991, whenthe suicide bomber got her target. They found only his camera andsurmised that he too had died in the blast that killed the formerprime minister and all those thronging around him. Since that fatefulday, it was the sixth time that he was making the narrow crossingacross the Palk Straits, which separates the Indian mainland fromSri Lanka. Each time it had felt like the last.

His mission was to frustrate the voyage of the ship MV Akbar,which was carrying the first load of Tamil refugees back to SriLanka. He had considered two options. The softer one was to createdissension among the refugees on board upon the ship's arrivalto an insecure homecoming and to force the captain to abort thevoyage. The harder one was to detonate an on-board explosion, whichwould force the same result. He had been told repeatedly that themission was crucial to restore the prestige of the Tamil Tigers, toembarrass the governments of Sri Lanka and India, and to convincethe international community that conditions in northeast Sri Lankadid not warrant the return of the Tamil refugees.

The mission was even more important to Hari personally.His standing in the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, or LTTE,the richest and most ruthless of international terrorist groupsoperating in Sri Lanka, had suffered after his perceived failure inthe assassination attempt; the loss of his camera had left valuableclues for the perpetrators of that terrible act. Under the field nameof Kandeepan, which he was given when he joined the LTTE, Hariwas considered by the LTTE rank and file to be endowed with theaura of Gandiva—the mythological unbreakable bow of Arjuna, thehero of the renowned Hindu text, the Mahabharata. There was afeeling in the organization that he had gone soft with the creaturecomforts of the European bases, such as Geneva and Nicosia, thathe had operated out of. In every sense, this was his last throw of thedice, for all he had come to believe in—even for his life.

In the organization, the failure of a mission cost an operativehis or her life; indeed, even success could mean the same, shouldit become necessary to bite the cyanide capsule all field operativescarried round their necks to leave no possibility of capture.

CHAPTER 2

The Palk Straits

After a number of false starts, the meeting between the Indian primeminister and the Sri Lankan president took place in Colombo onDecember 21, 1991, on the occasion of the Summit of the SouthAsian Association for Regional Cooperation. It was the first meetingbetween the two leaders after a period of bitterness and acrimonyfollowing the virtually forced withdrawal of the Indian Peace KeepingForce from Sri Lanka in March 1990. It had followed the assassinationon May 31, 1991, of Rajiv Gandhi, who was on the cusp of winningthe general elections that would have made him prime minister ofIndia once again. The assassin was allegedly part of the dreaded SriLankan terrorist organization LTTE, which was fighting a war withthe Sri Lankan government, aiming to create a separate state of TamilEelam, carved out from north and east Sri Lanka and parts of theIndian state of Tamil Nadu.

Both leaders were keen to rekindle the traditional warmth andfriendship between the two peoples that had been lost after thedisastrous withdrawal of the Indian Peace Keeping Force from theisland. The decision to start the return of the Sri Lankan Tamilrefugees from India was the most significant result of their encounter.This was the first time in the nearly ten years, since the anti-Tamilethnic riots of July 1983, that the two governments had decidedto reverse the steady stream of Tamil refugees from Sri Lanka tothe southern Indian state of Tamil Nadu, despite the continuinginsecurity for the Tamil population in north and east Sri Lanka.While the Indian government wanted to reduce political pressure onTamil Nadu, the Sri Lankan government wanted to project a veneerof normalcy to the international community. Both governmentsaimed to reinforce their relationship and isolate the LTTE. Neitherminimized the difficulties of logistics and maritime security inmoving a large number of refugees at night on a slow-moving shipcrossing the treacherous waters of the Palk Straits. They were acutelyaware that a failure would rebound politically and lose them prestigeinternationally. The plan had to succeed.

The Palk Straits, which separated the two countries, consistedof no more than thirty kilometers of shoal-ridden shallow passageacross the sea and had become the safety valve for a beleagueredcommunity in the north of the island to move to Tamil Nadu eachtime the people felt unsafe at home. A pogrom in July 1983 againstthe minority Tamil community by the majority Sinhalese communityhad unleashed a civil war on that beautiful island. The refugee inflowhad then reached a crescendo after increasing military hostilitybetween the LTTE and the Sri Lankan government. Expectedly, oncethe decision became public, there was an outcry, in part orchestratedby the LTTE, and in part due to the genuine misgivings of some reliefand humanitarian organizations that feared that the refugees werebeing sent back against their will only to further a political imperativefor both governments.

The first voyage of the MV Akbar was fixed for January 13, 1992.It was scheduled to leave Madras harbor at six in the morning andreach Trincomalee by seven that evening.

A letter from his parents had conveyed to Hari rumors amongthe Sri Lankan Tamil community of the Indian government's likelydecision to send the refugees back. He could not believe his eyes. Hewondered what had provoked such a cruel decision. He could notimagine his Tamil compatriots who had fled to India leaving all theirworldly possessions behind not feeling extreme agony in having toreturn to a country still in the throes of ethnic tension and insecurity.

Hari was aghast when he learned that the decision was to bemade at a summit meeting in Colombo between the Indian primeminister and the Sri Lankan president. The political decision wouldsuit not only both the governments, but also the United NationsHigh Commissioner for Refugees, or UNHCR. For the Sri Lankangovernment, the return of the refugees was expected to strengthenthe government's claim to Western donors as a sign of the return tonormalcy. It also hoped that the return of the Tamil refugees wouldprovide the bonus of lessening Indian interest in Sri Lanka's internalsituation. For the Indian government, the return of the Sri Lankanrefugees would reduce the LTTE's unbridled political and economicaccess in Tamil Nadu that had resulted from the presence of the largenumber of refugees. The UNHCR issued a statement expressing thehope that the proposed movement would be voluntary and conveyingits readiness to help. It hoped that this "positive" attitude would removethe Indian government's resistance to allowing the organization anyfoothold on the Indian side of the Sri Lankan refugee story.

Hari wondered what would happen to the nearly two hundredthousand refugees, some of whom had been in India since July1983, spread out over Tamil Nadu and its neighboring states andhaving made their homes in little villages and in refugee camps. Itseemed inhuman, especially since the security situation in northeastSri Lanka was bad and individual safety could not be assured. Themajority of refugees were from the Jaffna and Mannar districts, bothdeclared no-go areas by the Sri Lankan army. The only prospect forthe refugees now was to go to refugee camps on the other side. Theones on the Sri Lankan side were far more makeshift, as they hadbeen set up in a hurry to prepare for the arrival of these refugees. TheIndian government had even provided materials and funds to help theoperation. The construction of housing tenements of tarpaulin andplywood, the food distribution system in the camps, and the provisionof health care services all had yet to be used. Hari felt that it was amost unsatisfactory situation in which to throw the refugees.

Meanwhile, the LTTE and others had already started a campaignagainst the proposed return of the refugees. They saw it as a politicaland military defeat, as they believed no refugees should return to SriLanka, which was still far from normal. Militarily, the reverse flowwould also demonstrate the Sri Lanka government's confidence intaking on the LTTE cadres operating in northern and eastern SriLanka. The two governments appeared to be acting in unison againstthe LTTE. Hari wondered whether the LTTE had thought of thisparticular consequence of their assassination of Rajiv Gandhi.

The letter from his parents, who were among the refugees, alsoinformed him that the state authorities had come around to checktheir willingness to return—a preliminary procedure to avoid theodium of having forced the refugees out. They had been told thatit would be better for them to go. There could be many difficultiesin their day-to-day lives if they continued to stay, particularly thewithdrawal of special facilities for securing cooking gas, free foodrations, and medicine. It appeared to Hari that even the Tamil Nadugovernment had decided to reduce the burden the large numbers ofTamil refugees had become over the years.

His father wrote, "Frankly, we never wanted to leave Jaffna inthe first place. But at that time there seemed to be no other choice.We went away then in the hope that all this would end soon. It isnow going to be almost ten years that we have been here. Anotheruprooting will really kill us. Besides, what are we going back to? Wehad hoped for the same understanding from the Indian authoritiesthat we have had all this time. Once again, we have become pawns inthe political game of the two countries. We really feel drained of allemotion and feeling. I suppose we will have to fall in line." The Indiangovernment had decided to start with sea shuttles between Madrasand Trincomalee.

It was incredibly sad for Hari to read these words. And tothink that now even he was a contributor in their misfortune—he'drealized that even in the LTTE's stance, the political aspect, notthe humanitarian one, was dominant. He was sure that there werea number of others who shared the same feeling of despondencyand frustration. A sense of inevitability came through in his father'swords, yet he offered no criticism of the LTTE.

Hari had no idea how to react to this new development. He feltfrustrated and powerless. There was very little he could do for hisparents. He could of course go to Madras and join them in their returnjourney, or alternately go to Jaffna and be there when they arrived. Herealized neither was possible. He was now at the mercy and commandof the LTTE, having pledged his troth to the organization. And hisparents were only two of many who would doubtlessly be affected.There was no reason for the organization to do anything special forhim or his parents.

The message from Geneva had asked him to go to London assoon as possible. He went directly from Heathrow Airport to theoffices of the Sunbird Shipping Company, the front for the LTTE'soperation in London. He found Shan and Pottu Amman there. Theywere waiting for him.

"We have an assignment for you in India," said Shan.

When he heard this, Hari knew that the leader's promise wasbeing redeemed. He was being brought out of seven months of forcedinaction and given a reprieve for his perceived failure during theassassination. Hari was overjoyed. It meant that his incarcerationand isolation were over. He was now expected to deliver. This was thechance he had been waiting for. Finally, the team player would comecenter stage. He waited to hear about his assignment.

"As you know, the Indian government has decided to send therefugees back. It serves both governments to enact this charade atthe expense of our community. We cannot let this happen. We haveto stop it. We have a plan, and you have been selected by the leaderto execute it," said Pottu Amman.

"I am ready," replied Hari. There was nothing else to say.

"Fine. We are going to spend the next two days going over theplan. You are to leave on the Air India flight to Bombay the day after.You should inform the office in Limassol that you will not be back forsome time. Tell the same to anyone else who needs to know—but nottoo many details," said Pottu Amman, letting him know that theyknew he would want to tell Zina. Until then, Hari hadn't been sureif they knew of his relationship with Titziana, whom he had first metin Colombo well before the beautiful island had been devastated bythe humanitarian tragedy they were living through.

All three were virtually incommunicado for the next two days,going over the details of the plan.

Pottu Amman explained that throughout the second half of1991, the two governments were in touch to work out the details.They anticipated that the Sri Lankan government would expect theLTTE to disrupt the arrangements. An increase in LTTE attacks onsecurity forces to provoke retaliatory attacks on Tamil villages couldincrease the risk to the refugees, cause heightened insecurity, buildinternational pressure against their return from India, and set backthe Sri Lanka government's claim of control.

On the Indian side there was an equal imperative to see that theplan would not be frustrated by the LTTE and its sympathizers inIndia and abroad.

The decision to repatriate the refugees had seen an increase ofrhetoric from detractors of the idea in both countries and amongthe nongovernmental organizations in the West, including AmnestyInternational and the International Commission of Jurists. Yetthe officials responsible for working out the logistic details of themovement on both sides continued their work. The arrangements hadto be such that once begun, the movement would be uninterruptedand uninterruptible. There were an estimated two hundred thousandrefugees, most in seven camps scattered throughout Tamil Nadu andthe neighboring states of Karnataka and Orissa. Of these, the mostproblematic refugees were those in urban centers, because they couldeasily move out of the camps, and those suspected to be militants,who were lodged in special camps.

Even under normal circumstances, the movement of such a largenumber of people across the sea would pose an enormous logisticalchallenge. In the present case, it was compounded by factors no one couldcontrol,suchasmaritimeconditions,theeffectivenessofnavalescort,andthe likelihood of an attack by the LTTE's naval wing, the Sea Tigers.

There were high political stakes in the operation for all sides.Pottu Amman told Hari that the LTTE was determined to spare noeffort to see that the movement did not start.

The target date for starting the repatriation operation wasJanuary 1, 1992; by then, all the arrangements had to be in place. Ithad been agreed that a UNHCR representative would be allowedto visit intended returnees in the transit camps set up in Madras.Hari would need to find out who the officials were. He would needto lobby with them and insist on verifying that all were returning oftheir own free will. He would have to persuade them, both as theUNHCR insider that he used to be, and as a Sri Lankan Tamil whowas close to the refugees. Reports would also be inspired by LTTEsympathizers in the Indian Tamil press and in the camps suggestingthat official action was high-handed and that no choice was beinggiven to the refugees.

For the government, the problem of tracing and registering thosein the cities and not the refugee camps was more difficult. Theyincluded both the more prosperous refugees and the family membersof LTTE leadership and cadres—like Hari's parents and brother.Even LTTE supremo Prabhakaran's father resided in Madras, allthe while receiving the protection of the same state authorities thatwere offering base facilities to the Indian army. The local authoritieswere cajoled and persuaded by the LTTE to turn a blind eye to suchLTTE faithfuls.