Introduction: Costs of Secrecy in the Nuclear Fuel Cycle

I think that we must understand that each time we introduce a new bit of technology, we invent, at the same time, a specific accident. The invention of the ship was the invention of the shipwreck. The invention of atomic electricity was the invention of Chernobyl.

—Paul Virilio (Post Modern, French theorist)

Introduction

This introduction presents an update on recent developments in the nuclear fuel cycle so that we can examine the serious consequences inherent in the nuclear electric and weapons options. Nuclear power, for example, can no longer be regarded as "clean" energy, despite the claims of politicians and the utilities.

The Tragedy in Japan

Before this volume was completed, a 9.0 magnitude earthquake and related tsunami hit the east coast of Japan. The next day, March 12, 2011, nine Japanese nuclear reactors were placed under states of emergency—three at Fukushima Daiichi, three at Fukushima Daini, and three at Onagawa. All are located north-northeast of Tokyo, and all are the earlier type boiling water reactors. The station was designed to withstand a powerful earthquake and also a tsunami, but not the two occurring together.

Three of the Daiichi reactors were in critical condition immediately after the earthquake when the plants lost normal electric power and backup diesel power needed to cool down the reactors. Mass evacuations followed a hydrogen explosion in a containment building covering one of the three reactors. On March 13, 2011, the Associated Press reported a "probable partial meltdown" at a second Daiichi reactor. On March 14, a nonoperating fourth reactor caught fire and released additional radiation. By March 17, the Los Angeles Times reported that many persons isolated by the tsunami near the Daiichi facility were unable to escape the increasing levels of radiation. Authorities and others were simply afraid to help them. Almost twenty thousand Japanese were reported dead or missing by September 2011.

In all the chaos and panic that followed, much of the official worry centered on Reactor 3 at Daiichi because it was fueled with MOX, a mixed oxide combining uranium and highly toxic plutonium. By early March 28, CNN announced, and the Arizona Republic (2011) confirmed, that plutonium had been discovered in water outside one of the reactors, suggesting a breach of containment. With loss of reactor core containment, nuclear technology would have to be carefully reconsidered. The disaster in Japan has underlined the dangers of nuclear power (Robinson, March 16, 2011).

As we continued writing, the consequences of the Fukushima accident had begun to accumulate. Yukiya Amano, head of the UN's International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), described the accident as extremely serious. Fires, explosions, three partial meltdowns, and numerous radioactive leaks struck four of the six units at the Daiichi plant. "With its mangled machinery and partly melted reactor cores, bringing the complex under control is a monstrous job," reported the Associated Press on March 22. Radiation from the tsunami-damaged plant caused Tokyo's tap water to exceed safe-drinking standards for infants, and levels of radioactive iodine were more than twice what is considered safe for babies. By March 27, Japan's government admitted a series of mistakes by the Daiichi plant operator. For instance, workers were sent into the plant without protective footwear, resulting in two workers suffering skin burns when they stepped into water that was ten thousand times more radioactive than levels normally found near reactors. On March 28, a Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) spokesperson reported that a new test had found radiation levels hundred thousand times above normal (Associated Press, 2011). Robots were used later to confirm the high radiation levels (Yamaguchi, April 19, 2011).

Further consequences of the Fukushima accident include: the Swiss government imposing an immediate freeze on plans to build and replace nuclear power plants, Germany's decision to stop using nuclear energy because of its inherent risks (Baetz, March 27, 2011), and the sudden realization that property and liability insurance does not cover nuclear calamities (Wiles, March 27, 2011). In the event of a nuclear accident, the potential catastrophe is so large as to be almost immeasurable. Yet Iran began loading fuel rods into its first nuclear power plant, scheduled to be operating soon (Riyadi, 2010: A3).

Thus, the Fukushima Daiichi accident became the worst nuclear crisis Japan had faced since the World War II bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. It was also the first time that such a serious nuclear threat had been raised since the Chernobyl nuclear power plant explosion in 1986. Exposure to such high levels of radiation can cause radiation poisoning, resulting in substantial damage to human and animal tissue, premature aging, and possible death. Prolonged exposure to lower radiation levels is also associated with increased risk of ill health, in general (Kotlabai, 2005).

Later, it was discovered that Unit 1 at Fukushima had been damaged more severely than originally thought (Yamaguchi, May 13, 2011). Newer data revealed that the water level in the core of Unit 1 was much lower than earlier suspected, leaving the fuel rods (that were still intact) fully exposed. These findings also indicate a greater than expected radioactive leak in that particular pressure vessel. This hindered the work to bring Unit 1 under control, as the president of TEPCO resigned in disgrace (Kageyama, May 21, 2011).

On June 26, 2011, the Japanese government held a public hearing on whether or not the reactor in Sage Prefecture should be the first of the nation's nuclear plants to be reactivated after the Daiichi disaster (Ozawa, 2012: 7). This was billed as a chance to gauge local opinion about nuclear power. Yet the hearing turned out to be less of a public forum and more of a piece of badly orchestrated political theater. On company orders, employees of Kyushu Electric Power sent in e-mails pretending to be citizens urging restarting of the reactor (Ozawa, 2012: 8). Nuclear secrecy breeds deception.

Subsequently, the Japanese government, power companies, and some of the media cooperated to withhold information and downplay nuclear dangers. For instance, Tokyo officials delayed releasing data from computer models that predicted the spread of radiation from the Fukushima plant. As Yoichi Funabashi, leader of the Independent Investigation Commission on the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Accident, told the Asahi Shimbun, "The government later decided the public were still children who would...