Über die Autorin bzw. den Autor

<b>Richard Fumerton</b> is the F. Wendell Miller Professor of Philosophy at the University of Iowa. He is the author of <i>Metaphysical and Epistemological Problems of Perception</i> (1985), <i>Reason and Morality: A Defense of the Egocentric Perspective</i> (1990), <i>Metaepistemology and Skepticism</i> (1995), <i>Realism and the Correspondence Theory of Truth</i> (2002), <i>Epistemology</i> (Blackwell, 2005), and <i>Mill</i> (with Wendy Donner, Wiley-Blackwell, 2009). His present teaching and research interests include epistemology, metaphysics, and value theory. <p><b>Diane Jeske</b> is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Iowa. Her teaching and research interests include ethics, political philosophy, and philosophy of law. She is the author of <i>Rationality and Moral Theory: How Intimacy Generates Reasons</i> (2008).</p>

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From <i>Monty Python</i> and <i>The Matrix</i> to <i>Casablanca</i> and <i>A Clockwork Orange</i>, popular films offer surprisingly perceptive insights into complex philosophical concepts. <i>Introducing Philosophy Through Film</i> combines this novel pedagogical approach with all the virtues of a serious introductory anthology of classical and contemporary philosophical readings. The result is an engaging and effective way to fire the imagination of those new to philosophy. Drawing on a wide range of popular and easily accessible films – along with the ideas of a diverse selection of historical and contemporary thinkers – this book introduces many of the central areas of philosophical concern, including perception, philosophy of mind, ethics, religion, free will, determinism, and more. Chapter by chapter, the editors offer a discussion of relevant film clips to help illuminate and demystify the philosophical arguments and positions raised in the anthology's readings. <p>By merging the cinematic and philosophical worlds, <i>Introducing Philosophy Through Film</i> provides a uniquely effective way for beginning students to engage with philosophy and gain insights into the human mind.</p>

Aus dem Klappentext

From Monty Python and The Matrix to Casablanca and A Clockwork Orange, popular films offer surprisingly perceptive insights into complex philosophical concepts. Introducing Philosophy Through Film combines this novel pedagogical approach with all the virtues of a serious introductory anthology of classical and contemporary philosophical readings. The result is an engaging and effective way to fire the imagination of those new to philosophy. Drawing on a wide range of popular and easily accessible films – along with the ideas of a diverse selection of historical and contemporary thinkers – this book introduces many of the central areas of philosophical concern, including perception, philosophy of mind, ethics, religion, free will, determinism, and more. Chapter by chapter, the editors offer a discussion of relevant film clips to help illuminate and demystify the philosophical arguments and positions raised in the anthology's readings.

By merging the cinematic and philosophical worlds, Introducing Philosophy Through Film provides a uniquely effective way for beginning students to engage with philosophy and gain insights into the human mind.

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Introducing Philosophy Through Film

John Wiley & Sons

Chapter One

Meditation I

Of the things which may be brought within the sphere of the doubtful

It is now some years since I detected how many were the false beliefs that I had from my earliest youth admitted as true, and how doubtful was everything I had since constructed on this basis; and from that time I was convinced that I must once for all seriously undertake to rid myself of all the opinions which I had formerly accepted, and commence to build anew from the foundation, if I wanted to establish any firm and permanent structure in the sciences. But as this enterprise appeared to be a very great one, I waited until I had attained an age so mature that I could not hope that at any later date I should be better fitted to execute my design. This reason caused me to delay so long that I should feel that I was doing wrong were I to occupy in deliberation the time that yet remains to me for action. To-day, then, since very opportunely for the plan I have in view I have delivered my mind from every care [and am happily agitated by no passions] and since I have procured for myself an assured leisure in a peaceable retirement, I shall at last seriously and freely address myself to the general upheaval of all my former opinions.

Now for this object it is not necessary that I should show that all of these are false - I shall perhaps never arrive at this end. But inasmuch as reason already persuades me that I ought no less carefully to withhold my assent from matters which are not entirely certain and indubitable than from those which appear to me manifestly to be false, if I am able to find in each one some reason to doubt, this will suffice to justify my rejecting the whole. And for that end it will not be requisite that I should examine each in particular, which would be an endless undertaking; for owing to the fact that the destruction of the foundations of necessity brings with it the downfall of the rest of the edifice, I shall only in the first place attack those principles upon which all my former opinions rested.

All that up to the present time I have accepted as most true and certain I have learned either from the senses or through the senses; but it is sometimes proved to me that these senses are deceptive, and it is wiser not to trust entirely to any thing by which we have once been deceived.

But it may be that although the senses sometimes deceive us concerning things which are hardly perceptible, or very far away, there are yet many others to be met with as to which we cannot reasonably have any doubt, although we recognise them by their means. For example, there is the fact that I am here, seated by the fire, attired in a dressing gown, having this paper in my hands and other similar matters. And how could I deny that these hands and this body are mine, were it not perhaps that I compare myself to certain persons, devoid of sense, whose cerebella are so troubled and clouded by the violent vapours of black bile, that they constantly assure us that they think they are kings when they are really quite poor, or that they are clothed in purple when they are really without covering, or who imagine that they have an earthenware head or are nothing but pumpkins or are made of glass. But they are mad, and I should not be any the less insane were I to follow examples so extravagant.

At the same time I must remember that I am a man, and that consequently I am in the habit of sleeping, and in my dreams representing to myself the same things or sometimes even less probable things, than do those who are insane in their waking moments. How often has it happened to me that in the night I dreamt that I found myself in this particular place, that I was dressed and seated near the fire, whilst in reality I was lying undressed in bed! At this moment it does indeed seem to me that it is with eyes awake that I am looking at this paper; that this head which I move is not asleep, that it is deliberately and of set purpose that I extend my hand and perceive it; what happens in sleep does not appear so clear nor so distinct as does all this. But in thinking over this I remind myself that on many occasions I have in sleep been deceived by similar illusions, and in dwelling carefully on this reflection I see so manifestly that there are no certain indications by which we may clearly distinguish wakefulness from sleep that I am lost in astonishment. And my astonishment is such that it is almost capable of persuading me that I now dream.

Now let us assume that we are asleep and that all these particulars, e.g. that we open our eyes, shake our head, extend our hands, and so on, are but false delusions; and let us reflect that possibly neither our hands nor our whole body are such as they appear to us to be. At the same time we must at least confess that the things which are represented to us in sleep are like painted representations which can only have been formed as the counterparts of something real and true, and that in this way those general things at least, i.e. eyes, a head, hands, and a whole body, are not imaginary things, but things really existent. For, as a matter of fact, painters, even when they study with the greatest skill to represent sirens and satyrs by forms the most strange and extraordinary, cannot give them natures which are entirely new, but merely make a certain medley of the members of different animals; or if their imagination is extravagant enough to invent something so novel that nothing similar has ever before been seen, and that then their work represents a thing purely fictitious and absolutely false, it is certain all the same that the colours of which this is composed are necessarily real. And for the same reason, although these general things, to wit, [a body], eyes, a head, hands, and such like, may be imaginary, we are bound at the same time to confess that there are at least some other objects yet more simple and more universal, which are real and true; and of these just in the same way as with certain real colours, all these images of things which dwell in our thoughts, whether true and real or false and fantastic, are formed.

To such a class of things pertains corporeal nature in general, and its extension, the figure of extended things, their quantity or magnitude and number, as also the place in which they are, the time which measures their duration, and so on.

That is possibly why our reasoning is not unjust when we conclude from this that Physics, Astronomy, Medicine and all other sciences which have as their end the consideration of composite things, are very dubious and uncertain; but that Arithmetic, Geometry and other sciences of that kind which only treat of things that are very simple and very general, without taking great trouble to ascertain whether they are actually existent or not, contain some measure of certainty and an element of the indubitable. For whether I am awake or asleep, two and three together always form five, and the square can never have more than four sides, and it does not seem possible that truths so clear and apparent can be suspected of any falsity [or uncertainty].

Nevertheless I have long had fixed in my mind the belief that an all-powerful God existed by whom I have been created such as I am. But how...