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Countdown to Crisis: The Coming Nuclear Showdown with Iran - Softcover

Timmerman, Kenneth R.

 
9781400053698: Countdown to Crisis: The Coming Nuclear Showdown with Iran
Softcover
ISBN 10: 1400053692 ISBN 13: 9781400053698
Verlag: Crown Publications, 2006

Inhaltsangabe

In his chilling new book, New York Times bestselling author Kenneth R. Timmerman blows the lid off the greatest threat America faces: the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Using his exclusive access to previously classified documents, Iranian defectors and officials, and high-level sources in the U.S. government and intelligence community, Timmerman blows the lid off previously unreported threats and our intelligence community’s failure to deal with these dangers.

And now it could be too late.

To get the complete story on Iran’s radical Islamic regime, Timmerman crisscrosses the globe, taking the reader into secret terrorist gatherings in Tehran, into tense meetings in the White House, to debriefings at an obscure CIA outpost in Azerbaijan, to diplomatic face-offs in the Kremlin, and to many other spots along the way. His extensive investigative reporting allows him to lay bare the true nature of the Iranian threat.

For Americans interested in the truth about Iran, Countdown to Crisis may amount to a call for action–or even a case for war.


From the Hardcover edition.

Die Inhaltsangabe kann sich auf eine andere Ausgabe dieses Titels beziehen.

Über die Autorin bzw. den Autor

Kenneth R. Timmerman is the New York Times bestselling author of The French Betrayal of America, Preachers of Hate: Islam and the War on America, Shakedown: Exposing the Real Jesse Jackson, and Death Lobby: How the West Armed Iraq. An investigative reporter with more than two decades of experience covering the Middle East, terrorism, and weapons proliferation, he has written for Time, Newsweek, the Wall Street Journal, Reader’s Digest, and Insight magazine, among other publications. Timmerman lives near Washington, D.C.


From the Hardcover edition.

Auszug. © Genehmigter Nachdruck. Alle Rechte vorbehalten.

Chapter 1: THE DEFECTOR

On July 26, 2001, an Iranian intelligence officer named Hamid Reza Zakeri walked into the U.S. embassy in Baku, Azerbaijan, and asked to speak to the CIA. As a trusted security official, Zakeri had a diplomatic passport with permanent visas, allowing him to leave his country at will. He told the local receptionist that he had important information concerning the security of the United States and wanted to convey it to the station chief in person.

The Azeri shrugged. We have no CIA officers here, he said. But the Marine guard behind him had been trained for this type of occasion and discreetly phoned up to the CIA station. The forty-one-year-old Zakeri was known as a "walk-in" in the intelligence trade. Like an itinerant peddler, he had goods for sale. It was the CIA's job to evaluate those goods.

On the one hand, it was easy to get taken in by the Willy Lomans of the intelligence trade. But on the other, if the peddler's wares were good, it was the station chief's job to pay him a fair price and pass the information on to Langley for further evaluation and exploitation. Walk-ins had provided vital information to Western intelligence agencies during the Cold War, including secrets of Soviet spy rings that specialized in stealing our high-technology secrets. It would be irresponsible to reject a live one without carefully scrutinizing his wares.

Azerbaijan was not exactly what CIA covert operators considered a plum assignment. The tiny station was headed by a junior officer ("Oh, you mean that GS-10 woman they sent out there?" sneered one former clandestine operator I asked about the encounter.) When the station chief finally met Zakeri in an anteroom off the main lobby, she introduced herself as "Joan."

"Joan" may not have been a senior officer, but she was a professional. She listened to his tale, made no promises, and sent a message back to headquarters asking them to dispatch an evaluation team. She didn't have a clue what to make of the claims being advanced by this Iranian of a "huge" impending attack on America, but she figured that at least she should pass it along. There was so much chatter about potential terrorist attacks circulating these days, she felt a bit like the little boy crying wolf.

After several days of debriefings with Joan at a CIA safe house in Baku, the "expert" arrived from Washington to evaluate his intelligence. That meeting did not go well.

The officer introduced himself as "George." He was around forty years old, very tall, and very sure of himself. He had read the five-page letter Zakeri had written in Persian that described what he knew of the impending terrorist attack. He made clear that he thought Zakeri was lying.

You say you work for a "shadow" intelligence organization that operates out of the Supreme Leader's office? he said. That's news to me. A shadow intelligence organization in Iran! How come I don't know about this?

Zakeri drew him an organization chart. Hojjat-ol eslam Ali Akbar Nateq-Nouri, the well-known former Majles speaker,* was the top man in the Leader's office. His official title was "head of inspection." Zakeri's boss, Mustafa Hadadian, reported to him. As head of Section 110, Hadadian ran intelligence operations, including physical security for visiting VIPs, counterintelligence, and planning for overseas terrorist attacks. Each of his twelve deputies was listed by his "real" name and his "work" name and had a unique numeric code, like a telephone extension. Hadadian's code was 2500; his real name was Mustafa Sanaie-pour.

George looked at the chart with Hadadian in the center, his deputies arrayed around him in a circle, and burst out laughing. This is preposterous, he said.

There's going to be a big attack on America on the twentieth of Shahrivar, Zakeri insisted. That's the date my boss told us to be ready. Six people who have been trained as pilots have just left Iran.

George consulted a calendar that gave the corresponding Western dates. So we're talking about September 10, right? I'll mark my date book, he added sarcastically. He paid Zakeri a few hundred dollars for his time and sent him away.

"They were not correct with me," Zakeri complained later, during one of many interviews I conducted with him. "They said unacceptable things. They accused me of lying. They said I was telling them false stories to confuse them."

On nearly a dozen occasions over a two-year period, including face-to-face debriefings over five days in Paris and a Middle East country I have agreed not to disclose, Zakeri never contradicted the extremely detailed information he had provided to me. He provided documents and photographs to buttress his claims. As I investigated his claims during this time I discovered that other defectors—and intelligence reports that surfaced well after the September 11 attacks—independently corroborated key parts of his story.

But thanks to "CIA George" and his bosses back in Langley, Zakeri's warnings were never taken seriously.

THE TARGET WALL

There's an old saying in the intelligence business as in life: the more things change, the more they stay the same.

For nearly four years after the violent birth of the Islamic Republic of Iran in 1979, the nation's ruling clerics failed to establish a formal ministry of intelligence. It wasn't that Ayatollah Khomeini and his followers refused to engage in skullduggery. Nor did they have any qualms about using extreme violence to seize and maintain their grip on power. In a way, they were victims of their own success.

Before the revolution, Iran's future rulers had complained about the brutality of SAVAK, the National Organization for Intelligence and Security, getting reporters and human rights activists to refer to it universally as the shah's "dreaded" intelligence service. To establish a successor too soon after the revolution would give the lie to the bogus claims they had peddled to sympathetic reporters and foolish Western leaders that their revolution had replaced one of the world's most horrific tyrannies with a new form of democracy.

When they finally announced the creation of the Ministry of Information and Security (MOIS) in 1983, Iran was mired in war on so many fronts that no one cared about the old lies anymore. Nor did anyone seem to notice when the new minister, Hojjat-ol eslam Mohammad "Nick" Reyshahri, a Soviet-trained intelligence professional, drafted entire overseas networks formerly run by SAVAK. He generalized the use of torture, which SAVAK had in fact used quite sparingly, notwithstanding the loud complaints from international human rights organizations.Reyshahri further showed his respect for his predecessors by taking over the former SAVAK headquarters in Sultanatabad, in northern Tehran, whose enormous underground holding pens now resounded with the screams of the damned.

The display area in the entry hall of the majmoueh etelaat building in Sultanatabad was well known to Zakeri and his colleagues. It was here that their bosses posted photographs of Iranian dissidents shortly before MOIS or Iranian Revolutionary Guard hit squads assassinated them in Europe. This "target wall," as they called it, was a not-so-subtle way of spreading the word to insiders as to who was going to become the regime's next target—a typically Persian bit of braggadocio. It was one of those things...

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Verlag
Crown Publications
Erscheinungsdatum
2006
Sprache
Englisch
ISBN 10 
1400053692
ISBN 13 
9781400053698
Einband
Taschenbuch
Anzahl der Seiten
407
Kontakt zum Hersteller
Three Rivers Press
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