Power in Pro?t Maximizing Organizations (Classic Reprint) - Softcover

Inhaltsangabe

This book explores an alternative view of decision-making within organizations, arguing that the standard profit-maximizing approach is inadequate in many cases. The author shows that in situations where employees have conflicting preferences over decisions and different levels of stakes in the outcome, profit can be maximized by giving power to employees who are more valuable to the organization. The author explains that this is because such employees are more likely to remain with the organization, which reduces the need for costly staff turnover and training. While prior research suggests that power in organizations flows to those who control important resources or have expertise, the author argues that it can also flow to those who are disproportionately valuable to the organization in other ways. The book challenges the idea that decision-making in organizations is necessarily rational, arguing instead that it is often influenced by factors such as the desire for stability and the personal preferences of those in power. It also provides evidence that the distribution of power within organizations can have a significant impact on employee satisfaction and motivation.

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